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Abstract 
Presidential transitions mark the starting point of any regime change in the US 
federal executive. During this period newly elected Presidents structure their White 
House, fill thousands of political appointments and select their policy priorities. Using 
Carl Brauer's observations on the successful conduct of presidential transitions this 
thesis examines the persoimel and policy choices o fB i l l Clinton during his 1992-1993 
presidential transition. 
Presidential transition success is, according to Brauer, reliant upon the 
awareness of four essential factors; early planning, White House structure, setting a 
legislative agenda and assessing personal strengths and weaknesses. These factors 
form a framework for the analysis of four domestic policy issue areas. The policies 
considered are national service, economic and budgetary policy, health care reform and 
the use of Executive Orders as a policy-making tool. These issues reflect the broad 
policy intentions of the Clinton administration during its first year in oflBce. 
In linking the processes of personnel and policy selection across these issue 
areas this thesis considers the extent to which the Clinton administration was able to 
achieve its stated aims and objectives in 1992 and 1993. Assessments are made 
concerning the levels of success in each of the four factors and conclusions are drawn 
about the influence of the transition on the conduct of the Clinton presidency. 
In examining Bill Clinton's use of Executive Orders in the cases of 
homosexuals in the military and the reauthorisation of abortion practices a new 
perspective on the conduct of the modem presidency is unveiled. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The process of regime change is one of considerable political upheaval and 
institutional uncertainty. As an essential aspect of political life in every western 
liberal democracy, it is the means by which the political system responds to the 
demands of the electorate and brings about renewal in many areas of political and 
social life. Regime change is also important as a symbol of progression as it is 
invariably linked to addressing present concerns about contemporary issues and 
problems. The mechanisms by which individual political systems manage the 
exchange of power is reliant upon their institutional frameworks. However, the 
presence of a professionalised civil service, which adheres to the principles of a 
Weberian bureaucracy, enables the transfer of power to take place both promptly 
and with little disruption to the day to day operation of government. 
An exception to this observation, however, is the United States. Unique 
in so many ways from her European liberal democratic cousins, the process of 
regime change continues this trend. The transfer of executive power from old to 
new, from vanquished to victor, is a matter of considerable planning, management 
and construction. It is a reflection of the institutional necessities and 
constitutional prerogatives of the executive within the United States' political 
system. There is a period of transformation during which the victor assembles his 
future administration, but possesses no formal authority. At the same time the 
vanquished holds the constitutional powers, but has a reduced ability to exercise 
them. Constitutionally mandated powers and historical precedents of patronage 
combine to produce a system requiring an elaborate mechanism for the transfer of 
power. Compounding the complexity of this passing from one to another is the 
scope of the executive within the US political system. Designed by the Founding 
Fathers to be the minor player in the political system, the presidency has grown 
beyond a strict constructionist interpretation of Article 11 of the Constitution. 
Presidential Transitions, An Outline 
The transfer of executive power in the US political system is known as a 
presidential transition. Transitions have become recognised by academics and 
politicians alike as important events within the presidential cycle. They provide 
not only the link between electing and governing, but also establish the 
foundations of an incoming administration and its style of governance. The 
increased importance of transitions is a twentieth century phenomenon. Only with 
the rapid expansion of the scope of federal government, and the executive branch 
in particular, have transitions become crucial in determining the shape and content 
of new administrations. Increasing federal responsibility for, and executive 
involvement in, the shape of policy designed to benefit ordinary Americans has 
swelled the ranks of the federal bureaucracy beyond that which could have been 
imagined by Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln or even Franklin 
Roosevelt. Transitions have progressed from being a process whereby newly 
elected Presidents gathered their closest friends and colleagues around them to 
offer advice and support to an institutionalised mechanism for the take-over of the 
executive branch. 
The increased importance and scope of transitions has heightened interest 
in their conduct. What was once regarded as a time for settling in, setting one's 
house in order, is now considered to be a litmus test for the success or failure of 
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any new administration. Despite their increased importance, serious academic 
analysis of the conduct of transitions and their influence over presidential terms of 
office was lacking until the mid 1980s. Carl Brauer's pioneering work. 
Presidential Transitions: Eisenhower through Reagan, was the first systematic 
appraisal of post-war presidential transitions, and provides the benchmark for all 
subsequent studies. Brauer's work was important because, unlike Laurin 
Henry's^ usefiil study of the Eisenhower transition, it sought to identify principles 
and generalisations which could be applied to all modem transitions. Brauer's 
analysis of the transitions of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Carter and 
Reagan represented the first attempt to uncover common threads in the 
appointment process and the White House personnel and policy making structures 
in a search for a framework or recipe for transition success. 
Subsequent works by scholars such as James Pfiffiier and Paul Light have 
developed many of the principal factors in Brauer's analysis, but from slightly 
different perspectives. Rather than focusing on the transition as a whole, they 
selected elements within the transition - appointments. White House structure, 
policy making, presidential agenda - to highlight essential strengths and 
weaknesses within the individual presidencies. However, it is in combination that 
all these elements form the most accurate and comprehensive picture of a newly 
elected President and his administration. These structural components 
additionally interplay with more personal, psychological factors attributable to the 
President and those central to his transition choices. Transitions can be reduced 
to single elements of explanation, but it is as a whole process that they 
' Henry, Laurin L . Presidential Transitions 
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demonstrate how administrations are constructed and managed. 
Recent studies have revealed the influences and impacts of presidential 
transitions upon the wider worid of presidential politics. It is clear that transitions 
are important determinants in the future prospects of administrations. What is 
unclear is the way in which transitions should be managed to ensure that the 
individual is able to master the institution. Successful presidential transitions are 
not brought about by chance; they are the product of a highly organised, well 
structured, single minded operation. For reasons both personal and structural, 
individual presidential transitions produce surprisingly different results every time 
they are undertaken. History suggests that Presidents do not always take 
advantage of the resources available to them through transition periods and 
consequently do not control effectively the transition from presidential candidate 
to President. 
In taking over the levers of power within the executive branch newly 
elected Presidents have several crucial assessments to make; how they will 
organise their White House? Who they will appoint to key executive positions 
and which policy areas are to be made an administration priority? The diversity of 
these activities means that Presidents-elect are perpetually pulled in different 
directions. During the election their attention was directed towards a singular 
goal, victory. Once elected, they no longer have to be campaign specialists but 
administrative generalists with a capacity to make diflficuh and conflicting 
decisions quickly. 
In a political system which places so much emphasis upon the ability of the 
candidate to construct an effective and durable campaign machinery, the period 
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prescribed in the constitution to undertake the transition into office appears 
alarmingly brief The reverse side of this observation, however, is that any 
extension to the duration of the interregnum would place the incumbent President 
in an increasingly untenable situation in terms of political capital and authority. 
Where transitions are concerned, there appears to be no fortuitous situation. This 
being the case Presidents have to develop mechanisms to make their transitions 
more profitable in the long term and more effective in the short to medium term. 
Defining Presidential Transitions 
In attempting to define and classify transitions several obstacles become 
apparent. Because transitions are so varied and prey to the influences of the 
individual and the institution, the simplest demarcation has to be the difference 
between a change in party control of the presidency and a change of the 
presidency within a party. Intra-party transitions are fundamentally distinct from 
inter-party transitions and have to be considered separately because there are 
diflferent sets of assumptions and pressures in place. New administrations of the 
same party are often viewed as guardians or gatekeepers of the old 
administration's aspirations and ideas, this limits their ability to embark upon 
change - the strongest example of this would be the Bush transition of 1988. A 
similar case can also be made for second transitions when Presidents secure re-
election where continuity is often more important than change. Only inter-party 
transitions reveal the fiil l extent of regime change within the executive branch 
which is essential to the understanding of the presidency as a central institution of 
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government and the workings of the political system as a whole. Only in an inter-
party transition is the scale of the task and its political importance fiiUy exposed. 
Initially it is usefiil to establish the parameters of the discussion of 
transitions, their substance and duration. The basis for any initial skeletal 
definition must be the constitution. As the dates and mechanisms for the election 
and inauguration of Presidents are laid out within the constitution, there is little 
ambiguity about the presence and duration of the interregnum. Where ambiguities 
arise is whether or not the transition can be said to extend beyond the limits of the 
constitutional interregnum and i f so, how it can then be defined. 
Transitions are viewed as the process by which new administrations 
establish themselves and prepare for the authority of the executive office to be 
transferred from one President to another. However, the duration of the 
interregnum is recognised by many to be too short. No new administration has 
completed all the tasks of transition within the meagre eleven week timetable. 
There is a case, therefore, for suggesting that transitions extend beyond the limits 
of the formal interregnum and well into the term of office of a new administration. 
To set an exact date on the duration of transitions is impossible. They are each 
too individual, a reflection of those involved and of their political time. 
Transitions can only be said to be over when the administration has established a 
set pattern of working and is in control of all the levers of power. For some 
administrations this will take six months, for others they may be well into their 
first year in office before the administration is seen to be fiilly functioning and 
complete. While the beginning of a transition can be measured by the 
constitutional calendar, the end can only be recognised by political observation 
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and judgement. 
Additional Transition Influences 
The conduct of presidential transitions is punctuated by a number of 
informal deadlines. Some are set by individual Presidents-elect while others are 
imposed from outside by the wider political community within Washington D.C. 
The most public and consistently pursued is the 'First 100 Days'. Since Franklin 
Rooseveh's first 100 days, its flood of New Deal legislation and presidential 
action. Presidents are now benchmarked for achievement after their first 100 days. 
Despite attempts to play down the significance of this time period it remains a 
constant in transition literature and presidential assessment. All new Presidents 
recognise this fact and respond accordingly. There is also the related notion of a 
'honeymoon' period, a brief period of time when Congress and the Washington 
community in general is supposedly more open to presidential suggestion and are 
more willing to work with the executive branch. Ephemeral in nature, 
'honejmioons' have no guaranteed life span. They can endure for months or 
evaporate in a matter of weeks. Presidents seek to take advantage of 
'honeymoons' in order to achieve appointment and policy success, but they are 
not essential to the conduct of transitions. A honeymoon is seen as a bonus 
because not every President is certain to receive one and not every President is 
able to exploit one. In this time of modem managerial politics the notion of a 
honeymoon period can be seen to be deeply flawed. The principle of the 
separation of powers does not allow there to be a marriage between the 
presidency and the other institutions of government and the sentiment of a 
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honeymoon is thoroughly passive. What is more appropriate is a 'window of 
opportunity'. The openness of this window is determined by the skills, resources 
and actions of the administration rather than being a gift bestowed upon the 
executive branch from outside. By negotiation, persuasion and the use of all their 
political skills. Presidents can maintain the window of opportunity well into their 
terms of office. 
The broad outline of the transition is then set. Every newly elected 
President has the opportunity to construct himself an administration before he is 
inaugurated, but the building of this foundation is rarely complete before 
inauguration due to pressures of time and the scale of the task. In practice, the 
transition process continues into the term of office and in the most extreme of 
cases it is hard to detect the end of the transition as the President is unable to 
settle into a single operational style, adapt to the ways of Washington and manage 
the executive branch effectively. 
Establishing the Role of Presidential Transitions 
The most interesting feature of transitions is how each individual one is 
managed, and how this fits into the historical precedents set by previous 
occupants of the office. In an attempt to bring the consideration of transitions up 
to date the central focus of this work is a study of the presidential transition of 
Bill Clinton in 1992 and 1993. As the first inter-party transition since Ronald 
Reagan's in 1980 and the first Democrat transition since the election of Jimmy 
Carter in 1976, it affords an opportunity to examine whether and how transitions 
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are developing, changing and adapting to contemporary political pressures and 
changing circumstances. By analysing the processes by which this newly elected 
President managed both the personnel and policy aspects of his transition, it is 
hoped to demonstrate that transitions remain a significant element within the cycle 
of American politics and that they remain central to the development of an 
administration's organising principles. The study will also be used to test further 
Brauer's main conclusions about the conduct of transitions, how to achieve 
success and actively avoid failure in the formative months of a new administration. 
The final aim is to explore whether the last President of the twentieth century has 
learned any lessons fi"om those who have gone before him. 
The main focus of study within the Clinton transition is the system of 
personnel appointment and the process of policy formulation in the domestic 
sphere. In policy terms the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign 
policy has become increasingly unclear in this era of global co-operation and the 
rise of 'intermestic' issues, but the distinction is an important one to make with 
reference to transitions, and especially so in the case of Bill Clinton 1992-1993. 
In his analysis of the presidential policy agenda, Paul Light pinpoints some 
fiindamental differences between the domestic and foreign arenas fi^om a 
presidential perspective in that, 
'Toreign and domestic staffs operate in separate environments; their 
decision chains move to different departments and agencies, their 
information contacts are different, their calendars are incompatible, and 
Congress is more willing to grant presidential discretion in foreign policy 
than it is domestic policy."^ 
For the Clinton transition such a distinction is also important . Throughout the 
^ Light, Paul C. The Presidents Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Reagan, p. 7 
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1992 election campaign, candidate Clinton highlighted and heightened concerns 
about certain areas of domestic policy. This was in direct response to the 
apparent preoccupation of the Reagan and Bush administrations with foreign 
policy at the expense of domestic initiatives. 
Personnel appointments are a crucial element within the operation of the 
transition. The majority of the time during the transition is taken up with the 
search for the right person for the right job. Through their appointments 
Presidents seek to achieve a number of ends. Appointments send signals to 
observers both inside and outside the Washington community and can be used as 
a reward for good service during the campaign or the transition. Alternatively 
they can be used to thank important constituencies for their support, provide a 
role for a retired or defeated, loyal/influential Congressman, or fijlfil campaign 
promises about redressing a particular imbalance within government. 
Presidents-elect surround themselves with those who share their own 
goals and ideals, projecting an image of what the administration will be like in the 
future. Such appointments also provide indications of policy priorities and goals. 
There appears to be an indissoluble link between presidential appointments and 
presidential policy priorities. It is impossible to uncover the rationale for one 
without consideration of the other. 
Four Factors for Transition Success 
In his consideration of post war presidential transitions, Brauer identifies 
four factors which directly influence their performance; proactive preparation for 
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the transition, the structure of the White House Office, development of a 
legislative agenda and the ability of the individual to be self-reflective. These 
factors provide a fi-amework for evaluating the actions of newly elected Presidents 
and can be tested by their application to a new presidential transition. In Ught of 
the changes in American politics since the 1980 transition of Ronald Reagan, are 
there further ingredients in the transition process which have become as influential 
as Brauer's four factors? 
The first of Brauer's factors is whether or not there is any evidence of pre-
election planning for the transition. Pre-election planning has developed because 
of the increasing scale and complexity of the task ahead. John Kennedy was the 
first presidential candidate to approach his transition with any sort of preparation. 
A study into the conduct of transitions was undertaken for him by the Brookings 
Institution.^ His own transition experience led him to initiate the Presidential 
Transition Act (1963) to provide federal funds and facilities for transitions. 
Previously newly elected Presidents had to reallocate campaign funds or raise new 
moneys to fiind their persormel and policy operations. Kennedy's intentions in 
formulating this poUcy and bequeathing a helpful legacy to his successors were 
undoubtedly considered to be constructive. However, Brauer contends that the 
availability of federal fiands reveals more personal shortcomings in Presidents-
elect, which could previously have been blamed on lack of financial resources."* 
Pre-transition or pre-election plarming for transitions can take a variety of 
forms, but it is predominantly undertaken in secret. Most energy is devoted to 
identifying possible personnel choices and identifying key personnel positions. 
^ Brauer, Carl M. Presidential Transitions: Eisenhower Through Reagan, p. 36 
' Ibid p.'l83 
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rather than making any substantial decisions about the shape and content of the 
new administration. 
Once in office, the second of the factors which Brauer identified comes 
into effect. It is essential that an effective and efficient White House Office 
structure be put in place. Inhabitants of the White House Office (WHO) are those 
closest to the President and are distinct from the larger Executive Office of the 
President (EOP). The evolution of the executive branch has been such that the 
WHO has become the centre of policy innovation and deliberation. Presidents 
increasingly rely upon their personal advisors and policy councils rather than the 
wider information base of the EOP when making the major decisions of their 
administrations. The temptation during the transition is to concentrate on the 
more public face of the EOP and cabinet appointments in the early weeks of the 
transition. This is an attempt to give the impression of activity and decisiveness. 
However, despite many rhetorical assurances of a belief in cabinet government. 
Presidents continue, on a day to day basis, to rely upon their White House staffs 
rather than their cabinet secretaries. For this reason, it is in a President's best 
interests to first ensure that his White House is flinctioning smoothly and 
facilitating the flow of information to the EOP. 
A third element crucial to transition success is the development of a 
coherent legislative programme. It has been recognised that, without strong 
presidential leadership. Congress will become distracted and unresponsive to 
presidential direction.^ The difficulty for newly elected Presidents is deciding 
which campaign promises should be converted into policy options. These choices 
' Brauer op. cit., p. 27 
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have to be made in response to several conflicting pressures. Firstly, it is 
important for Presidents to know the nature of the policy that they are proposing, 
the end that is sought, and the politically optimal means to that end. Within the 
US political system, policy ends can be achieved by ahemative routes than 
legislation. Secondly, Presidents have to consider the nature of their electoral 
victory. Landslide victories present very different policy opportunities than 
elections where the results are very close or when the vote is divided by three 
candidates. Regardless of their substance, greater faith is placed in mandates, 
honeymoons and public opinion following a landslide, and i f this is matched with a 
strong coattail effect on Congress, attitudes towards the White House can be 
dramatically altered. Furthermore, elections dominated by a single issue require a 
different policy response than those where issues are more general. Finally, the 
pubUc mood and any notion of presidential mandate is also influential. Regardless 
of their position in reality, successfial candidates like to believe in electoral 
mandates and often claim them following election victories. PubUc opinion is 
undoubtedly influential, but is difficult to measure in the early weeks of an 
administration as the pubUc are generally wiUing to give new Presidents the 
benefit of the doubt. Public opinion becomes more important over time as 
presidential decisions come under increasing scrutiny from the public, the media 
and Congress. 
A short cut, which many new administrations find invaluable, is to present 
old issues in new guises. When there is a change of party control in the executive 
branch, this tactic is especially useful. Policies, which have been rejected by 
previous Presidents, but are popular with Congress and the public can be 
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repackaged and introduced at the beginning of the new congressional session. 
This allows Presidents to claim early legislative successes for their administration 
and give to the impression of activism and co-operation with Congress. 
Moreover it gives them valuable breathing space to work on less well prepared 
policy issues. 
Legislative success is not automatic and honeymoons are not assured or 
indefinite. Presidents have to pursue actively legislative success. From the day 
after election, influence and political capital begin declining - "the policy cycle of 
decreasing influence"^. Newly elected Presidents have to begin by presenting a 
coherent set of policy issues for congressional response. For many 
administrations, this is the toughest part of the transition. Senior cabinet positions 
have been filled, but now require Senate approval and White House policy 
structures are still very vague. In order to increase their chances of pushing 
policy through Congress, they have to ensure that there is an effective process of 
legislative Uaison. It is also essential that those working in legislative liaison are 
experienced in dealing with Congressmen and their staffs. Many new 
administrations falter through lack of effective congressional liaison. 
A coherent policy programme is likewise essential for setting the tone of 
the administration. The assessment of presidential performance begins in the early 
stages of the transition. Successes, which come early in the term of office, bring 
about perceptions of general transition success. The odd policy or personnel 
mishap equally brands the transition as ineffective, failed or flawed. For these 
reasons it is essential that the presidential candidates prepare themselves and those 
Light op. cit., p.36 
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around them to arrive in Washington "hitting the ground running"^. 
The final factor which Brauer identifies as being influential in transition 
performance is the ability of the individual seeking office (and when in office) to 
assess their own strengths and weaknesses. Every presidential candidate brings 
with him a different set of experiences and skills but no previous career prepares a 
candidate for the presidential election or for the office. Therefore, the key to 
success is emphasising personal strengths and compensating for weaknesses. This 
can be achieved through appointments and structure within the executive branch, 
but the first step towards this is actually recognising that such adjustments need to 
be made. Brauer notes that in the weeks after the election "confidence, hope, 
sometimes arrogance, hubris and a sense of infallibility run high"^ and this 
scenario invariably leads to clumsy mistakes. Furthermore, newly elected 
Presidents rarely turn to history to aid them through their transition. It is unusual 
for a new office holder to learn from the mistakes of his predecessor. It is more 
likely that he will make every effort to further distinguish himself from the 
incumbent and overreact to perceptions of weakness such as lack of ideology, or a 
'hands ofiP management style.^ This attitude is generally not confined to the 
President or the WHO, it can be seen in many of the relationships which develop 
between EOP staff and their permanent civil service colleagues in the executive 
branch departments. As there is little which can prepare a candidate to be 
President, the learning curve which they experience is particularly sharp, and 
Brauer urges newly elected Presidents, to take advantage of every possible 
' PMher, James P. The Strategic Presidency: Hitting the Ground Running, p. 7 
^ Brauer op. cit., p. 258 
'Ibid. 
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resource, especially the experience of predecessors. 
Assessing the Clinton Transition 
With this in mind, this analysis of the Clinton transition fijrther tests 
Brauer's assumptions about the conduct of transitions. The initial starting point is 
a brief survey of the transitions of Presidents Carter and Reagan. These 
transitions provide useful and natural comparisons as the last Democrat and last 
inter-party transitions. Their style and substance are explored in terms of 
Brauer's theory and conclusions are drawn about the nature of their success or 
failure in transition management. This is complemented by an overview of the 
Clinton approach to the 1992 presidential campaign and the structure and 
character of his transition in terms of personnel appointments and policy priorities. 
Four policy case study chapters are used to illustrate the linkages between 
persormel selection, legislative agenda and executive branch structure. These 
policy areas have been chosen to reflect the full extent of the Clinton domestic 
policy agenda in early months of his presidency; national service legislation, 
economic stimulus programme and the budget, heahh care reform and the use of 
executive orders as a legislative tool. Equally, these policy areas are a reflection 
of the promises that were made to the American people during the 1992 election 
and are, therefore, illustrative of the President's ability to select and deliver on 
campaign promises. The themes and linkages which are revealed in these four 
chapters are pulled together in the penultimate chapter to establish trends in the 
Clinton transition that cut across issue areas. Finally conclusions are drawn about 
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the nature of Clinton transition and its impact upon the conduct of his presidency. 
The Clinton transition is an important episode in American political 
history. A thorough analysis of its foundation and conduct is warranted due to 
the changing nature of the presidency following the Reagan era. The management 
of massive federal deficits and the post-cold war international climate places new 
pressures and limits on the institution. Therefore, by investigating the link 
between personnel selection and policy priorities in the Clinton transition, it is 
hoped to confirm that transitions remain an important formative element in the 
development of the executive branch's ability to cope with change. Moreover this 
analysis will add to our understanding of presidential transitions and their place in 
the wider picture of presidential politics. 
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Chapter 2: Survey of Presidential Transitions 
26 
The Carter Experience. 
The presidency of James Earl Carter has received various assessments since the 
1976 election. At the forefront of these analyses are judgments about his personal 
ability to fulfill the role of President and how this impacted upon the actions of his 
administration. The mid 1970s has been chronicled as one of the most tumultuous 
periods in American political history, and at the centre of this crisis was public 
disillusionment with federal government in general and the executive branch in 
particular. The Watergate scandal rocked the very foundations of American's 
citizens' perceptions of their major political institutions. 
The Ford presidency was unable to repair any of the damage in the time 
available to it, and therefore, the presidential election in 1976 was in part a quest 
for an antidote to the sickness that had overcome the presidency. James Earl 
Carter envisaged the cure to be a candidate who was removed fi-om the dirty 
worid of Washington politics. Throughout his election campaign Jimmy Carter 
unashamedly emphasised the fact that he had no links to Washington; that his 
background was humble and homey in contrast to most other poUticians, who 
were experienced and knowledgeable in the ways of Washington D.C.. Jimmy 
Carter offered, what appeared to be, a fi-esh and untarnished approach to 
government. 
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Carter and the 1976 Presidential Election 
Further strengthening his outsider status. Carter organised his campaign 
outside the Democratic Party. The Carter campaign machine was staffed by the 
same young and enthusiastic individuals who had been central to his governorship 
of Georgia. Moreover, Carter pursued what was viewed as a populist theme, 
reaching out directly to the American people promising to restore the linkages 
between the citizen and the government through openness and truthfulness. 
In addition to perceptions of a government racked with corruption and 
secrecy, there was also the belief that the federal govenmient had become over 
bureaucratised. This raised issues of how to manage government; how to make it 
more responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens. In response to this, the 
overarching theme of the election became honest competence. Carter's own 
experience of managerial reform as Governor of Georgia allowed him to play the 
competence card against an administration struggling to cope with the legacy of 
the Nixon years. 
Finally for Carter, the keystone of his campaign and the force that 
underpirmed every other element was morality. Carter, a southern, evangelical 
Christian, injected morality into every aspect of his campaign. Not as one would 
recognise morality in terms of the New Christian Right - who were just gaining in 
popularity in the late 1970s - but morality in terms of what was good and right 
rather than what was "politically possible or expedient".'" This is central to 
understanding Carter's presidency and the choices he made. 
'° Kaufman,Burton I. The Presidency of James Earl Carter Jr. p.2 
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The final vote was one of the closest in post war presidential election 
history. Carter received 50.1% of the popular vote (41 million votes) which 
translated in to 297 Electoral College votes, as compared with 48% (39 million 
votes) 240 electoral college votes for the incumbent. Carter had won the election, 
but lacked a resounding mandate from the American people in a year of low voter 
turnout. Moreover, his victory was constructed around a very personal coalition 
with a strong southern and north eastern bias. The narrowness of this victory was 
compounded by the nature of the campaign. Having identified himself as a 
outsider. Carter's anti-Washington campaign alienated many legislators, and those 
who had been swept to office in response to Watergate did not owe their success 
to the coattails of Carter or the Democratic party. Carter had hoped to transcend 
politics, but would be reliant, as all Presidents are, on congressional co-operation 
and support for his own legislative agenda. 
In the case of Jimmy Carter the experiences of his transition would be a 
reliable barometer for his four years in office. His approach to his transition set 
the pattern for his approach to the presidency, and only too late did he learn fi-om 
the experiences of his predecessors. 
Transition and White House Structure 
During the election campaign Jimmy Carter did undertake some 
preparation for his transition. Funds diverted from the campaign effort were used 
to establish a group of fifty people under the directorship of Jack H. Watson, Jr. 
Watson had worked with Carter in Georgia, but was not one of his closest 
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advisors or confidants. The Talent Inventory Program dedicated itself to policy 
plarming and personnel selection, but its existence caused a rift in the Carter 
organisation. The diversion of valuable campaign funds alienated campaign 
workers, and the perceived power of those establishing the personnel lists caused 
a rift between the two sets of Carter loyalists. A well documented power struggle 
between Watson and Hamihon Jordan - Carter's campaign chief - ensued with 
Jordan ultimately securing the lion's share of access and responsibility during the 
transition as he claimed responsibility for personnel selection. Watson continued 
to oversee poUcy planning but never effectively gained the ear of the President or 
a place among Carter's intimates. The existence of the Watson group and their 
experience during the campaign and the transition are illustrative of a number of 
things. Firstly, that plarming was central to Carter's conception of the presidency, 
secondly, that Carter was less concerned with the actual operation of the system 
than its design, and finally, that his style of management would be incompatible 
with the institutional and personal requirements of the executive branch. 
Carter based his managerial ideas upon his experiences as Governor of 
Georgia, believing that the same principles could be applied to the White House. 
Having always been at the centre of the decision making process with aides and 
advisors having direct access to him he wanted to continue this pattern in the 
White House. Rejecting the hierarchical system employed by Presidents 
Eisenhower and Nixon, he preferred the more open working environment that 
was said to exist in the Roosevelt and Kennedy White Houses. He did not 
appoint a chief of staff preferring to fulfill that role himself, maintaining a 'spokes 
Brauer, op. cit., p. 180-2 
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of the wheel' managerial structure, with himself at the centre. While not fatally 
flawed as a blueprint for success, it can be seen to be naive in the extreme. As 
Governor, Carter managed no more than half a dozen personal staff, as President 
he would be expected to manage several hundred in addition to the wider 
executive branch community. In addition to this managerial strategy, Carter 
pledged to operate a system of cabinet government whereby White House staff" 
would not undermine or usurp the authority of the cabinet departments. 
The rationale for these structures also owes some credit to the experience 
of government under the Nixon and Johnson administrations. Carter was 
essentially reacting to the shortcomings of his predecessors. It had been 
recognised that secrecy and closed working practices of the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations had added to public and congressional disenchantment with the 
presidency and this was Carter's attempt to redress those concerns. In doing so 
he raised more anxieties about the effectiveness and competence of his own White 
House when the structures in place were found to be unresponsive and inefficient. 
Executive Branch Appointments 
In seeking to fill positions within his administration Carter made certain 
promises. As a candidate, he pledged to bring to Washington individuals who 
would be new to the federal government, but in effect, once the senior cabinet 
positions had been filled, what emerged was a collection of Washington insiders 
who had considerable experience under previous Democrat administrations. A 
second promise to bring greater geographic, racial and gender diversity was 
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fiilfilled as each senior position was required to have a woman and a person of 
colour under consideration. These criteria were not, however, matched in the 
White House where Carter continued the trend of appointing members of his 
campaign staff and close personal friends to senior White House positions. In 
many respects Carter fell into this trap more seriously than his predecessors as so 
few of those with whom he had worked in Georgia had any Washington 
experience. Of his most intimate advisors only one, Stuart Eizenstat, could boast 
any familiarity with the ways of Washington.'^ This placed Carter in a very weak 
position vis a vis the wider Washington community and Congress in particular. 
UnfamiUar with many of the protocols that apply to members of Congress, the 
President-elect and his new administration ruffled the feathers of many influential 
Congressmen and their staffs. 
In defence of Carter's actions, his intention for much of his presidency was 
to bring the institution back down to earth; to reduce the ceremonial nature of the 
executive branch in order to make it more efficient and responsive. This was 
most visible at his inauguration when he eschewed the usual cavalcade of 
Umousines in preference for a stroll to the Capitol. While a revelation to the 
pubUc, this strategy diminished the privileges available to individuals such as 
members of Congress who took the administration's actions as a more personal 
affiont to their status and position in government than an attempt to reclaim the 
presidency from its tarnished image. 
In addition to critiques of Carter's personal staff, the transition was also 
heavily criticised for some of its cabinet choices. Initially, the critical pace of 
'Brauer, op. cit., p. 195 
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appointments was berated. In comparison to his predecessors. Carter's 
appointments process was slow, probably due to the infighting and conflictfiil 
transition structure. More seriously, the suitability of certain individuals selected 
to fill senior administration positions came into question. In particular, attention 
centred upon Carter's selection for Director of 0MB, Bert Lance, Theodore 
Sorenson as CIA director and Griffin Bell as Attorney General. Lance survived 
high pressure scrutiny fi-om the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, as did 
Griffin Bell fi-om the Senate Judiciary Committee. However, Theodore Sorenson 
withdrew fi-om consideration following opposition to his appointment from both 
sides of the Senate due to his conscientious objector status and his use of 
classified documents in writing his acclaimed book about John Kennedy.'^ These 
troubles cannot be considered to be unusual, every President experiences some 
difficulty with appointing some individuals. What is important is how much this is 
allowed to influence the actions of the administration and whether perceptions of 
poor management remain once the crisis has passed. 
The Legislative Agenda 
The second major area of transition activity revolves around the 
identification and selection of policy options. Like personnel appointments, 
decisions surrounding the policy agenda are prey to a variety of influences. New 
administrations have to consider the promises that were made during the 
campaign, and which poHcies are desirable and possible once in the White House. 
" Brauer, op. cit., p. 190 
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There is often a large disjunction between what administrations want to achieve 
and what they can do. The skill during the transition is to determine which 
policies have to be abandoned and which can be vigorously pursued. The 1976 
election prompted Jimmy Carter, like all presidential candidates, to make certain 
promises to the American people. His domestic agenda was broad in its scope 
and typically Democratic in its substance. He promised reforms, which would 
afifect both the citizen - health, welfare and tax - and government - civil service 
reform and government re-organisation. In an attempt to boost the flagging 
economy he proposed a jobs programme, de-regulation of major industries, an 
energy programme and a balanced budget.^ '* 
Carter's policy agenda was bold and adventurous at a time when Congress 
was looking to reduce the power of the President and reassert its own position. 
After a promising start with a number of strategic successes - Natural Gas Act, 
Anti-Recession Fiscal Assistance Act - the fortunes of the administration took a 
down turn. Assessments of Carter's policy choices catalogue a series of disasters 
and misfires.'^ Many of these were of the administration's own making and 
reflected its naivete toward the Washington process. The American legislative 
process is fiindamentally incremental, dramatic switches in policy direction and 
the introduction of new ideas do not fit comfortably with the complex system of 
congressional committees and sub-committees. Furthermore, a variegated policy 
agenda puts additional stress on the legislative process, which is often unable to 
cope with several policy options at one time. 
" Abemathy et al. The Carter Years: The President and Policy Making, p 13 
For a Ml account of the negative coverage of Carter's transition see I>umbrell,.John W. The 
Carter Presidency: A Re-Evaluation, pp. 9-11 
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This is exactly the situation that the Carter Administration faced when it 
started to introduce their policy centrepiece, energy legislation. The national 
energy plan became a leviathan. Having promised a proposal v^thin the first 100 
days Carter had already set himself a virtually impossible task. Even after being 
granted emergency powers to balance the nation's energy requirements during the 
extremely cold Winter of 1977, the fijture of energy legislation was by no means 
certain. While the House accommodated Carter's diverse piece of legislation by 
passing it through an ad hoc committee, the Senate had to consider it through its 
permanent committees and proceeded to dissect it into manageable pieces. The 
differing personalities of the committees and their chairmen guaranteed that the 
legislation which emerged into the conference committee in no way resembled 
Carter's initial proposal or the House version. The final version of the National 
Energy Act'^ was signed into law on 9 November 1978 some 18 months after it 
was first introduced to the House of Representatives; not the desired fate of an 
administration's legislative centrepiece. 
What was troubling for the Carter Administration was not just that the 
energy legislation was delayed, but that it had a knock on effect on every other 
presidential initiative. The system could not cope with the complexity and variety 
of legislation. Furthermore an inexperienced and aloof White House compounded 
problems of poor communication and lack of co-operation between the executive 
and legislative branches. 
For an account of the problems associated with and short comings of the National Energy Act 
see: Uslaner, Eric M. "Energy Politics in the USA and Canada." Ener^ Policy, Vol. 15, No. 5 
(1987) 
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Transition Success or Transition Failure? 
An overall assessment of Carter's transition would have to acknowledge 
that he was less than successfiil in managing his take-over of government. Some 
observers maintain that any President who faced the political climate which 
confronted Carter in 1976 and 1977 would have had similar problems." The 
combination of weak political mandate, resurgent Congress and public scepticism 
of government placed any new President in an intractable position. However, 
Carter's own more personal influence appears to be a stronger explanation for his 
poor transition performance. His conception of the office and his place within the 
institution was incompatible with the practicalities of the modem chief executive. 
To his credit, he did plan for his transition, but not in a formalised way which 
would provide a structural basis for his transition. However, his White House 
structure was only put in place after he had selected the more public faces of his 
administration, and the structure was one which emphasised his own weaknesses; 
lack of Washington knowledge and the tendency to micro manage. Finally, his 
legislative agenda was not coherent or sharply defined. Carter diluted his 
resources by embarking upon a broad and adventurous agenda. Rather than 
developing a focused set of legislative proposals, he attempted to deal with all the 
problems which confronted him. In attempting to give the American people a 
more thoughtfiil and ethical government, Jimmy Carter created the impression of 
a presidency disconnected from the rest of the political system and unable to 
deliver on its promises. 
Hargrove, Erwin C. Timmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public 
Good, p. 192 
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The intervening four years of the Carter presidency ensured that the 1980 
election was no longer about national healing in the wake of political scandal. 
Abroad, the Iranian hostage crisis struck at the very heart of American 
perceptions of their decUning international influence. At home, what can only be 
termed a malaise had befallen the presidency. The normal yardsticks of 
presidential performance, the shape of the economy and foreign relations, led 
voters to bestow the Carter presidency with overwhelmingly negative evaluations. 
As the incumbent, Jimmy Carter became the victim of retrospective electoral 
judgments.^* His presidential record spoke for itself, and candidate Reagan could 
exploit that by promising wholesale change and a new style presidency with little 
personal risk. Ironically twelve years later Reagan's gatekeeper, George Bush, 
would be the casualty as American voters passed their judgment on three 
Republican presidential terms. 
The Reagan Experience 
The most distinctive element of the Reagan campaign and administration 
was its conservatism. Conservatism was not unfamiliar to Americans, but what 
came to be known as the New Right, revolutionised politics in the US in the early 
1980s. The principles of individual freedom and market forces were the defining 
elements of the Reagan poUcy agenda. During the campaign, transition and his 
presidency, personnel and policy choices were directed by a strict adherence to 
these principles and the ideology which they underpinned. Reagan's brand of 
18 Key, V.O.: The Restwnsible Electorate. 
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conservatism was unfamiliar territory for many Americans, but its emphasis on 
traditional values, both economically and socially, brought him a loyal following 
which cut across many of the established electoral cleavages. Additionally, he 
dispelled many fears about ideological leadership with his own affable and 
agreeable personal style. It was a synthesis of these elements which led to 
personal success for Reagan in his first presidential term and institutional 
renovation for the US presidency. 
Reagan and the 1980 Presidential Election 
The foundations for the Reagan presidency can be traced back to a variety 
of experiences throughout his life. While most commonly associated vAth his 
Hollywood career, he also dabbled in politics as President of the Screen Actors' 
Guild, active involvement with the anti-Communist hearings of Senator McCarthy 
and, more significantly, during his two terms as Governor of California. Reagan 
had actively sought the Republican presidential nomination in 1968 and 1976 but 
was unable to attract sufficient support to defeat Nixon and Ford. His nomination 
in 1980 was met with jubilation from the Carter campaign, as he was perceived to 
be a weak candidate.'^ The Democrats' election failure in 1980 resulted in part 
from their underestimation of candidate Reagan. His experiences as twice elected 
Governor of a major state and his ability to project a popular public image 
allowed him to construct an effective and efficient campaign machine. 
'Brauer, op. cit., p. 219 
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Despite all these positive aspects to his campaign, there were serious 
doubts about Reagan's suitability to be President. The majority of these doubts 
rested on his age, his lack of national government experience and his close 
association with the far right of his party. However, his personal style and 
clever use of modem campaign techniques overcame these obstacles and delivered 
campaign victory. The overall shape of the 1980 election and Republican 
Congressional gains led to speculation about a realignment in American politics, 
but more significantly it allowed Reagan to lay claim to a broad mandate and 
assume party control in Washington. With only a bare majority of the popular 
vote, Reagan's victory was no landslide and his mandate was at best ambiguous, 
but he was able to exploit the post election mood and move swiftly on a concise 
and coherent legislative agenda. 
The 1980 election was a crashing defeat for the Democrats in both 
presidential and congressional terms as they lost control of the Senate and faced a 
greatly reduced House majority. However, Reagan's victory was not the 
landslide that the Electoral College votes initially showed. His electoral appeal 
was broad based and consistent throughout the country. The popular vote more 
clearly reflected that not everyone was ready for the Reagan revolution. Reagan 
received 50.7% to Carter's 41%, with a third candidate, Anderson, taking the 
remaining votes. It has also been observed that 1980 was a continuation of the 
trend for American voters not to vote - 55.1% turnout - and to demonstrate no 
strong party allegiance.^ ^ 
Mervin, David. Ronald Reagan and the American Presidency. p.81 
^'Dallek, Robert. Ronald Regan: The Politics of Symbolism. p.60 
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Reagan's conduct as a candidate and a newly elected chief executive can 
be traced back to his successfijl bid for the California governorship. It is widely 
documented that his first few months in Sacramento were less than successfial. 
He arrived at the Governor's mansion having made no preparation for staffing or 
a legislative strategy and possessed no understanding of the workings of 
California State politics.^^ Over time this was remedied and Reagan established a 
relatively successfiil administration, which adapted to work with the Assembly to 
achieve well defined policy goals such as welfare reform. Mervin identifies 
Reagan's greatest attributes to be his ability to learn from his past mistakes and 
his pragmatism, willing "to settle for half a loaf rather than nothing at all".^ It 
can be seen that the foundation of his managerial style was established in 
California. 
Transition Structure 
Unlike many of his predecessors Reagan approached his transition with 
considerable organisation. Recognising his status as a Washington outsider 
Reagan involved himself in fiind raising for Republican congressional candidates 
through the political action committee. Citizens for the Republic, during the late 
1970s. This was a shrewd move at a time when the Republican Party was at a 
low ebb following Watergate. More directly associated with his election his 
transition planning was "modest in scope and clandestine in style".^" 
2^ Mervin, op. cit., p.77 
^3 Ibid. p. 78 
Brauer, op. cit., p. 225 
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Accommodated in an office building in Alexandria, the planning team 
concentrated on identifying which positions within government would be filled, 
required qualifications for appointments and lists of prospective candidates. After 
the election more detailed research into the nature and operation of cabinet 
departments was undertaken by special task forces. All of this transition planning 
was placed in the hands of E. Pendleton James, Nixon's personnel director and 
close personal fiiend of Reagan intimate Edwin Meese. Many of those who had 
been close to Reagan in California and in his previous presidential bids were at the 
centre of the campaign and transition organisation. However, Reagan did not 
make the same mistakes as Carter in surrounding himself with a California mafia. 
Appointments to the EOP and the WHO drew from the experienced ranks of the 
Nixon and Ford White Houses. Recognising his own weakness in terms of 
Washington knowledge Reagan constructed an administration of considerable 
Washington experience. 
Executive Branch Appointments 
Unlike his predecessor, Reagan made few promises about the shape of his 
new administration. The usual criteria of competence and experience were 
augmented with ideological and personal loyalty to Reagan. No previous 
administration had placed so much emphasis upon ideological conformity. This 
would, however, prove to be one of the strengths of the administration in terms of 
controlling the nature and substance of policy decisions. The benefits of 
ideological conformity centred around the notion of the whole administration 
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'singing from the same hymn sheet'. Previous administrations had experienced 
considerable difficuhies in controlling their own appointees and career civil 
servants. Appointees often felt disconnected from the White House because of 
weak communication links between the departments and the President's closest 
advisors. The Reagan White House sought to minimise this disconnection 
through strict control of all appointments, even to the lower levels of cabinet 
departments, and by the establishment of a cabinet council system. Cabinet 
councils were designed to give Cabinet members more involvement in policy 
making decisions by putting them in direct and regular contact with the President 
and his most senior White House advisers. Additionally, they allowed the 
administration to work on policy issues which would usually cut across 
departmental boundaries.^* The uhimate benefit of this system was that the White 
House continually reinforced loyalty ties between political appointees and the 
President, preventing the phenomenon of Secretaries and their subordinates 
'going native' in support of their department's agenda. 
The development of this cabinet system directly complemented Reagan's 
personal management style of collegiality and discussion. It also facilitated his 
preference for delegation. Reagan adopted a Chairman of the Board position 
allowing his most trusted lieutenants considerable scope. Unlike the Nixon White 
House, this trust was not placed in the hands of one individual. Reagan's 'troika' 
of advisors consisted of James A. Baker I I I - Chief of Staff", Edwin Meese lU -
The five initial councils were: Economic Affairs, Commerce and Trade, Human resources, 
Natural Resources and the Environment, Food and Agriculture. Legal Policy and Management 
and Administration were added in 1982 
2^ For a fuller consideration of the Cabinet Council system see Lees John D. and Michael 
Turner Reagan's First Four Years: A New Beginning? p.46 - 53 
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Counselor to the President, and Michael Deaver - Deputy Chief of S ta f f .The i r 
presence in the White House, and therefore its structure, was announced within 
days of the election and they steered the most complex transition machine ever 
seen. Despite its complexity it achieved results and worked effectively towards 
both personnel and poUcy goals. This did not, however, ultimately speed up the 
appointment process, which was slower than any previous administration. In part, 
this can be explained by the passage of the Ethics in Government Act (1978) 
which tightened the regulations regarding conflict of interest and financial 
disclosure for appointment nominees. Additionally the White House maintained 
very strict control over some 2000 sub-cabinet level appointments, ensuring that 
there was no dilution of the administration's ideological commitment from the 
bottom up. 
The most public face of his administration, his cabinet secretaries, were 
representative of the broad range of Republicanism. It has been noted that 
"Reagan's Cabinet was not much different in character from those of his recent 
Republican predecessors; Eisenhower, Nixon and Ford."^* Moreover, the most 
distinctive factor about his appointments was their business experience rather than 
their Washington experience. Those with considerable Washington experience or 
more extreme political opinions were most likely to occupy sub-cabinet level 
appointments to consoUdate Reagan's control and to promote a moderate veneer 
to the American public. 
2^ For a fiiller account of the background and role of Baker, Meese and Deaver see Dallek p.75-
78 
Lees & Turner, op. cit., p. 55 
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The Legislative Agenda 
As previously mentioned, Reagan's presidency was strongly underpinned 
by an ideological commitment to traditional values. Campaign rhetoric simplified 
Reagan's message, "shrink the power and control of government and increase the 
freedom of individuals and private enterprise. "^ ^ Reagan turned his attention to 
economic policy and his own particular brand of policy was christened 
'Reaganomics'. Central to his plan to rectify an economy dogged by problems of 
high unemployment, inflation and interest rates was a departure from the 
Keynesian approach to economic management. Rather than reliance upon 
demand as the defining principle of economic management, Reagan and his 
advisers believed that by boosting supply the economy would flourish. By freeing 
the people and business from the burdens of taxation, government regulation and 
social spending there would be an expansion of economic activity. Market forces 
would regulate the economy and the role of the state would be all but eliminated. 
The economic strategy had four main elements; the reduction of taxation, 
decreases in public spending, government deregulation and the establishment a of 
sound monetary policy. Much of this was consolidated by the first Reagan 
budget, which received swift passage through Congress following an assassination 
attempt in March 1981 and soaring public approval ratings. Further tax cuts were 
endorsed by a slightly more reluctant Congress in July; "the law gave generous 
tax breaks to the oil industry; savings and loan associations; recipients of unearned 
income on stocks, bonds and real estate; married couples with two incomes; all 
29 Dallek, op. cit., p. 63 
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corporations; and people who owed inheritance or estate gift taxes.""" It is clearly 
evident that those who benefited most from Reagan's legislative success were the 
wealthy. 
Those Americans most dependent upon the state for support experienced 
severe cut backs in existing federal programmes. Criteria for the participation in 
programmes such as Medicaid and Aid to Families with Dependent Children were 
tightened reducing the numbers eligible to claim. Tax breaks did little to 
supplement the income of the working poor and many of the most vulnerable 
Americans found themselves to be less well off as a result of Reaganomics. 
This style of economic policy was complemented by a new social agenda. 
While believing that the role of the state should be removed from the lives of the 
American people Reagan and his administration sought to redress the social 
liberalism which had infused American culture. His cultural conservatism rested 
upon traditional, often religious morality and covered issues such as school 
prayer, homosexual rights, affirmative action and abortion. By using the fiiU 
scope of his executive powers Reagan attempted to deal vAth these issues through 
judicial appointments to the federal bench, including the Supreme Court. The 
most public of these appointments was that of Sandra Day O'Connor (first female 
Supreme Court Justice) in 1981. In part he was successfial in changing the face of 
the judiciary, but was less successfiil in securing fiandamental change in abortion 
and equal opportunities legislation. 
'Ibidp. 69 
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Transition Success or Transition Failure? 
The process of the Reagan transition conforms to Brauer's four essential 
transition elements. He embarked upon planning for his transition prior to the 
election; established the structure of his White House in the very early days of the 
transition in order to promote order; developed a coherent and focused legislative 
agenda; and recognised many of his own weaknesses when constructing his 
administration. It is for these reasons that the Reagan transition is seen as a 
blueprint for transition success. In terms of presidential success judgments of the 
two Reagan terms can also rest upon the legacy he left for fiiture Presidents and 
generations of legislators. Budget deficits, which seemingly defied control and a 
military-industrial complex reliant upon federal support, bequeathed an economic 
legacy which has consistently limited subsequent presidential action. The 
presidency, which Bill Clinton embarked upon in 1992, was fiindamentally more 
economically constrained than that which faced Carter in 1976 or Reagan in 1980. 
The Clinton Approach 
As with both Carter and Reagan the nature of the 1992 election directly 
shaped the transition and early presidential experiences of the newly elected Bill 
Clinton. The election was dominated by the presence of a highly visible third 
candidate, Ross Perot, who gained the largest percentage of the popular vote of a 
third party candidate in modem presidential election history. This 19% approval 
denied candidate Clinton of electoral majority - he received only 43% of the 
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popular vote - and deprived him of an convincing electoral mandate. Much like 
Reagan in 1980, however, he utilised the divided vote and claimed a mandate for 
change from the American people. The issues which dominated the stage in 1992 
departed from the usual electoral concerns. Foreign policy success is often of 
great benefit to incumbents, but in 1992 the voters all but forgot President Bush's 
handling of the Gulf war and the end of the Cold War. More general and 
domestic issues such as the federal deficit, global economic competition and rising 
heahh care costs captured their attention. These issues even took on greater 
relevance than pocket book considerations such as taxation and personal 
finance.^^ 
Transition Structure 
In addition to running a very successfiil campaign organisation. Bill 
Clinton also took a very positive approach towards his transition. Like Carter and 
Reagan he estabUshed a pre-election planning team for his transition. The Pre-
Transition Advisory Board was formed during the middle stages of the 
presidential campaign, before he had secured the Democratic nomination. In 
order to fially prepare for the transition, the role of the Pre-Transition Advisory 
Board was three fold. Firstly, they were seeking suitable candidates to fill 
political positions within the new administration. Secondly, they were 
investigating the current institutional and administrative situation, and finally 
'^ Miller, Arthur H.: "Economic, Character and Social Issues in the 1992 Presidential election" 
American Behavioural Scientist. Vol. 37 No. 2 (1993) p.321 
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assessing how this climate would fit with the Clinton policy agenda. 
Recognising that overt transition planning would smack of over confidence, the 
activities of the groups remained low key and distinctly separate from the 
campaign organisation. 
In addition to the desire to keep the planning activities out of the spotlight 
of the campaign, there was another, more practical, reason for the division of 
labour between campaigning and planning organisations. The difference between 
campaigning and governing is vast, transitions often fall foul of the expectation 
that the same group of people can be used to facilitate both operations. 
Separatirig the two Sanctions promoted a structure designed to make the most 
effective use of the resources available to candidate Clinton. Moreover, 
separating the groups was thought likely to reduce the likelihood of infighting as 
fiinctions and responsibilities were clearly delineated. 
This separation distinguishes Clinton's Pre-Transition Advisory Board 
from the organisation of the Reagan pre-transition planning group. Only one 
member, Mickey Kantor - campaign manager, had any close links to the campaign 
organisation. The sbc member team was comprised of Warren Christopher, 
Vernon Jordan, Henry Cisneros, Mickey Kantor, Madelein Kunin and Thomas 
McLarty. They represented a mixture of policy and Washington specialists and 
those with little 'inside the beltway' experience but who were close to Bill Clinton 
and had his trust. Following the election all these individuals took up positions 
within the transition organisation, and only Vernon Jordan did not remain with the 
administration after the inauguration. 
Fessler, Pamela. "Clinton Plans for Smooth Start With Focus on the Economy. CQm 
7/11/92 p.3554 
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The most senior transition positions were filled by the members of the Pre-
Transition Advisory Board. Members of the campaign staff did move into new 
positions within the transition organisation, but none of them were able to achieve 
the same levels of influence that they enjoyed during the presidential campaign. 
Despite attempts to delineate between old campaign staff and transition staff, turf 
battles initially plagued the transition team as individuals vied for seniority. 
During the campaign, a similar situation arose when staff found themselves 
blighted over seniority due to a poor organisational structure, too many titles and 
overlapping responsibilities. Decision-making was a slow process and emerged by 
consensus or not at all. To solve many of these problems, the campaign team was 
reorganised in June 1992. Despite these problems, Clinton delayed structuring 
the transition team until the end of the week following the election. Warren 
Christopher was selected to oversee the transition of power in the White House 
and Vernon Jordan was given responsibility for all other transition fianctions. This 
delay was crucial to the progress of the transition, especially in terms of pubUc 
perceptions. From the very outset of the transition it is essential that Presidents-
elect give the impression of activity and organisation. The Clinton transition 
initially stumbled at this stage. 
Executive Branch Appointments 
The earliest activities of the transition were dedicated to filling 
appointments. As previously mentioned, all Presidents have specific criteria that 
they employ to select appointees and these criteria serve particular goals. For 
49 
Clinton the principal goal was diversity. During his campaign he had promised to 
bring diversity to government, increasing the number of women and ethnic 
minorities, delivering a cabinet which would better represent the ethnic make-up 
of American society. The appointment criteria were encapsulated mto EGG; 
ethnicity, gender and geography. In addition to this far reaching goal Clinton 
declared of his own staff that they must be "Smart, energetic and...care about 
ordinary Americans" also they must have a "high sense of ethical and moral 
standards". Chnton's attachment to diversity can be traced back to the 
campaign, where he sought to construct a coalition of minority groups - women, 
homosexuals and ethnic minorities and the 'forgotten' middle classes. This 
electoral coahtion directly shaped the new administration's personnel choices. 
Following the election victory, these client groups began to exert pressure for an 
indication that the promise of diversity would be fiilfiUed. 
The process of fiUing political appointments in any new administration 
attracts considerable attention from all areas of the political and pubHc 
community. The speed with which the new administration announces its 
nominations for particular cabinet positions is often used as an indicator of 
transition efficiency and organisation. It is therefore preferable for Presidents-
elect to lose little time in announcing early appointment choices. Clinton's first 
cabinet selections were announced on December 10, 1992. These early 
appointees would give a strong indication of the style and substance of the 
administration, and therefore, much critical attention was directed towards them. 
Focusing on economic and domestic policy, the main issue areas of the 
"How I will change the country - Clinton" The Guardian 24/11/92 
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presidential election, Clinton demonstrated his intention to continue working 
towards fiilfiUing campaign commitments of deficit reduction, job creation and 
industrial investment. Furthermore, the individual appointees reflected a desire to 
work with the Washington establishment, but also to bring business acumen to 
government. Lloyd Bentsen, veteran Senator, was the new administration's 
nominee for Treasury Secretary and Representative Leon Panetta was selected to 
head the Office of Management and Budget. Both men possessed extensive 
experience of working within congressional finance committees. 
The new administration's commitment to economic policy was fiarther 
consolidated by the creation, by Executive Order, of the National Economic 
Council - an equivalent executive agency to the National Security Council. The 
head of this agency was announced, along with other appointments in the 
economic policy area, as Wall Street investment banker, Robert E. Rubin. The 
appointment of deputies to Bentsen and Panetta continued to emphasise the link 
between government and business; Roger Altman left Wall Street to become 
Deputy Treasury Secretary and Alice RivUn, former director of the Congressional 
Budget Office and Brookings Institution scholar, stepped into the number two 
position at the 0MB. 
December 11 witnessed the announcement of the next group of nominees. 
These appointments were a reflection of the importance of certain domestic policy 
issues areas to the incoming administration; Robert Reich as Secretary of Labor, 
Donna Shalala as head of Health and Human Services, Carol Browner at the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and Laura D'Andrea Tyson as chair of the 
Council of Economic Advisors. All these appointees had extensive experience 
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inside and outside Washington making them no strangers to the national policy 
process. However, what diflFerentiates them as a group, from the nominees for 
economic appointments, is that they represented an attempt to fiilfill the diversity 
claims of the many constituencies which Clinton had courted. Furthering that 
aim, the December 12 announcement of Democratic National Committee 
Chairman, Ron Brown, as head of the Commerce Department and the December 
17 announcements of Henry Cisneros, Mayor of San Antonio, as Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development and Jesse Brown as Secretary of Veterans' 
Affairs, confirmed that President-elect Clinton was delivering the diverse cabinet 
that he had promised. 
White House Appointments 
Clinton's progress in assembhng his administration had not reached the 
lightning speed achieved by President Carter, but was by no means slow. What 
was not apparent, however, was an emerging White House structure. Every 
transition has its own sense of timing but, in general, successfiil transhions result 
when the structure within the White House is established early. Both Reagan and 
Nixon appointed their Chief of Staff early in the transition in order to help them 
with the personnel and policy process as a whole. Clinton, moving away from this 
tradition, waited until December 12 to appoint his own Chief of Staff", Thomas 
'Mack' McLarty. McLarty, a Clinton childhood fiiend and industrial executive, 
experienced the steepest learning curve of any administration appointee. The role 
of Chief of Staff has become increasingly important within the White House as a 
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resuh of the growth of presidential responsibility. As a quintessentially insider 
role it is thought that the most successfial appointees are those with extensive 
political government experience, in the White House, in Congress or at state level. 
Having none of those attributes, the appointment of McLarty sent a number of 
signals to the Washington Community. Firstly that Clinton seemed to have every 
intention of being his own Chief of Staff and that McLarty would not play the 
traditional gatekeeper role of recent holders of that office. Furthermore the close 
relationship between the two men guaranteed that the White House under Clinton 
would be very different fi-om that of his immediate predecessors. 
In general. Presidents-elect hope to have the nominees for their top 
appointments ready for confirmation by inauguration day. Clinton aimed to have 
his nominations ready by Christmas and on December 24, announced his final 
group of appointments. Within this group were the important foreign policy and 
defense appointments of Les Aspin (Secretary of Defense), James Woolsey (CIA 
director), Anthony Lake (NSA), Warren Christopher (Secretary of State) and 
Madeleine Albright (UN Ambassador). With the exception of Albright, these 
appointments were filled with predictable, experienced white males and not 
subject to the racial and gender quotas apparently in place in other areas of the 
administration. What emerged was a two tier system of organisation: departments 
concerned with economic and budget management, foreign policy and defense in 
one group and departments concerned with domestic policy areas and those issues 
not so high on the Clinton legislative agenda in the other. These latter 
departments were filled with people who were chosen for reasons additional to 
their expertise, i.e. the lobby interests that they might satisfy - Hispanic 
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Americans, African Americans and women. Clinton realised that, ultimately, he 
would be judged upon his legislative progress in the sphere of economic, 
budgetary and defense policy rather than domestic policy and it was essential that 
these political appointees were well qualified and capable of innovation and 
management and acceptable to conservative financiers and the business 
community. 
Trouble at the Justice Department 
The most visible demonstration of Clinton's commitment to diversity was 
his desire to appoint the United States' first female Attorney General. This 
promise opened up one of the most challenging periods of the transition for 
Clinton and his new administration. The first nominee, whose selection was 
armounced on December 24, was Zoe Baird. Baird was one of several women 
initially under consideration; Judge Patricia Wald declined her call to office, 
Brooksley Bom was rejected by Clinton after performing badly in her interview, 
and Zoe Baird was the President-elect's final choice. Relatively unknown within 
the Washington community and with no experience in law enforcement, Baird 
initially appeared to be an unusual choice. Her connection with Washington 
resuhed from a brief stint in the Carter White House and later from working with 
Warren Christopher at the Washington law firm of O'Melveny & Meyers.^ * 
Primarily a corporate lawyer, first with General Electric and then with Aetna Life 
and Casualty, initial worries about her nomination stemmed from a fear that she 
Fessler, Pamela. "Few Senate challenges Expected for Clinton Cabinet Nominees. CQWR. 
2/1/93 p. 14 
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would be unsympathetic to the consumer demands that are placed upon the 
Justice Department. 
While Baird's professional experience might not have been entirely 
appropriate for the Justice Department, more personal factors intervened to 
present the new administration with one of the most challenging incidents of the 
transition. In order to maximise the administration's chances of placing their first 
choice of individual in any department, background checks are conducted into all 
aspects of the candidate's personal life. During interviews with the transition 
team, and later in the Senate hearings, Baird freely revealed that she had 
knowingly broken the law by hiring two illegal workers as domestic help. In 
addition to this Baird and her husband failed to pay the required social security 
and unemployment taxes. These taxes and the fines incurred were paid just days 
before the Senate hearing. The business of the Senate hearing focused upon Zoe 
Baird's domestic arrangements rather than her professional experience or 
orientation to the position of Attorney General. Media attention became focused 
upon what they termed 'Nanny-gate'. 
These revelations placed Baird, the Clinton administration and the Senate 
Judiciary committee in an embarrassing situation. Baird's claim that she and her 
husband had only hired an illegal worker when they had trouble finding affordable, 
legal, domestic help received little sympathy from the Senate committee or the 
general public. The public uproar which resulted from this admission was a 
matter of concern to Senators, who found their offices inundated with protests 
from constituents. This placed many Senators in an awkward position, reluctant 
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to embarrass a new Democrat President but obliged to be responsive to 
constituent demands. 
Recognising that her credibility was fatally flawed, Baird withdrew herself 
from consideration on January 22, 1993.^ ^ The whole debacle raised serious 
questions about the nature of Clinton's appointment process and to what extent he 
was personally involved in the selection and investigation of his staff This was 
compounded by the fact that Clinton had pledged during the election to make 
"high ethical standards paramount in his administration".^^ The fiall extent of 
Clinton's knowledge was never fijlly disclosed by the administration, although 
CUnton accepted responsibility for failing to anticipate the public's reaction to 
these revelations of wrong doing. In a pubhc statement on January 22, 1993, 
President Clinton announced "Cleariy our review process prior to her selection 
failed to evaluate this issue completely, for that I take flill responsibility".^^ 
It was not until the end of February that this event in the transition was 
concluded. Clinton's second potential nominee. Federal district Judge Kimba 
Wood, withdrew her name from consideration because she too had hired an 
undocumented worker. It appeared that Clinton would have difficulty finding a 
suitable female to head the Justice Department. On February 11 Clinton 
announced the nomination of Janet Reno as Attorney General. Reno's experience 
as Dade County state attorney made her famihar with law enforcement issues and 
State level administration, usefiil skills to bring to Washington in the absence of 
For a more detailed analysis of the non-confirmation of presidential nominees see: Krutz, 
GlenS., Richard Fleisher& Jon R. Bond "From Abe Fortas to Zoe Baird: Why Some 
Presidential Nominees Fail in the Senate." American Political Science Review. Vol. 92, No. 4 
(1998) 
"White House Defends Nominee For Justice Post." The Times 22/1/93 
Public Papers of the President of the United States: William JeflFerson Clinton. Book 1 p.5 
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Federal experience. Reno's Senate confirmation hearing accepted her nomination 
without further delay on March 10. Clinton had finally achieved his aim of 
appointing the nation's first female Attorney General. 
The example of the Baird case raises a number of important points about 
the nature of personnel selection during the transition period. Increasing diversity 
within government places increasing demands upon the selection process. Child 
care arrangements had never previously been a consideration in a Senate 
confirmation hearing; was this because no previous nominees had experienced 
child care difficulties or was it more relevant to Zoe Baird as a female nominee? 
By attempting to increase the number of minority groups represented in federal 
government, the Clinton administration faced the task of finding qualified, 
experienced, capable individuals from these minority groups. During the 
transition, much critical attention was focused upon the perceived inability of the 
administration to fill these positions and the problems of extending diversity 
within government were compounded by very slow progress in sub-cabinet level 
appointments throughout the early months of the 1993. 
Initial Observations on the Clinton Transition 
In his objective of bringing diversity to government, Clinton was very 
successfial. The final cabinet line-up contained four African-Americans, two 
Hispanics and three women. In addition, he placed women in senior positions 
within executive agencies and other important bodies: the Environmental 
Protection Agency, Council of Economic Advisors, United Nations and the Office 
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of Management and Budget. These achievements are unprecedented regardless of 
the difficulties he experienced with the nomination of a female Attorney General. 
During the interregnum most of the energies of the transition team were 
given over to selecting the diverse but coherent cabinet. This left httle time for 
the President-elect to establish his White House structure. Political commentators 
have noted that what set the Clinton White House apart from its predecessors was 
its youth, inexperience and diversity. Having campaigned as a Washington 
outsider, it came as no surprise that the Clinton White House would be filled with 
faces unfamiliar to the Washington estabhshment. Having demonstrated his 
awareness of the need to work with Congress through his cabinet appointments, 
an inexperienced White House could have been balanced by a strong cabinet and 
the resort to cabinet government. However, Clinton's own personal passion for 
policy was a guarantee that the White House would remain the power house of 
poUcy deliberation rather than the cabinet. That being the case the youth and 
inexperience of the White House staff" could limit the President's ability to achieve 
his policy objectives. 
Clinton's White House was dominated by two conflictmg factors; his 
personal closeness to many of his advisors and its loose organisational structure. 
Chnton's closest advisors, Hillary Rodham Clmton, Ira Magaziner, Bruce Lindsey, 
were all close to his administration as Governor of Arkansas and their relationship 
with him was intensely personal. This meshed with his own personal style, which 
has been described as exuberant, informal, non-hierarchical and indefatigable.^^ 
^^Pfiffner,op.cit.,p.l52 
Watson, Jack: "The Clinton White House". Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol. 23 No. 3 
(1993) p.4'31 
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Griven the interplay of these two factors, the Clinton White House was destined to 
be dramatically different from its predecessors; neither hierarchical structure, nor 
spokes of the wheel. CUnton borrowed much of his organisational structure from 
the world of management theory; as illustrated by his use of task forces and policy 
councils as problem solving structures. This allowed Clinton to control the policy 
output of his administration by limiting the number of inputs, avoiding inter-
agency competition and infighting over resources from executive departments. 
Criticism of this structure was not a result of its newness or efficiency, but rather 
because certain communities within Washington, particularly in Congress, felt 
excluded from the policy making process. 
The exclusion of important communities within Washington was going to 
play a significant role in the prospects of the early months of the Clinton 
administration. Continuing the campaign strategy of 'narrowcasting' to what 
have been termed 'new media' sources; non-political media outlets such as talk 
shows, MTV and town hall style media events, the new administration sought to 
control its media image and as a consequence alienated the crucial press and 
national media.'*" This was compounded by the attitude of the White House 
Office of Communications towards the White House press corps. Privileges of 
access and information which had been available under previous administrations 
were withheld. It has been commented that, while new Presidents can expect at 
least a momentary honeymoon with the press and Congress, Clinton's "was 
pronounced 'over' before it had even begun."^' In this event, the new 
Delli Carpini, Michael X. "Critical Symbiosis; Three Themes on President-Press Relations." 
Media Studies Journal Vol. 8 No. 2 (1994) p. 196 
Hughes, William J. "The 'Not-So-Genial' Conspiracy: The New York Times and Six 
Presidential 'Honeymoons', 1953-1993" Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, Vol. 
72, No. 4 (1995) p. 843 
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administration laid a rocky path for itself in seeking to promote its policy 
priorities. 
It is through a closer examination of policy making within the Chnton 
administration that the interplay of personnel and policy becomes more clear. To 
illustrate this the following four chapters will analyse these relationships with 
reference to the rejuvenation of an issue area which had existed in a limited way 
within domestic poUcy - national service legislation; the management of the 
budget process and economic investment - the economic stimulus plan; major 
reform of the provision of health care; and finally the use of non-legislative 
powers to bring about policy innovation - Clinton's use of executive orders in the 
cases of homosexuals in the military and the federal funding of abortion. 
Ultimately an assessment will be made as to whether the Clinton transition was 
successful in fulfilling the administrative and legislative goals that it set itself and 
whether Brauer's theory can be tested against this performance. 
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Chapter 3: National Service Trust Act 
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In the first weeks and months of their new term of office newly elected 
Presidents are engaged a frantic effort to gain control of the levers of power, to 
plant the seeds of their new administration and to pubUcise of their legislative and 
poUcy priorities. Certain policy decisions are an institutional priority, for example 
the budget, but the eariy policy choices which reflect campaign issues and 
promises can be even more significant. For Bill Clinton, these early policy choices 
included not just issues which were centrally located within his campaign, the 
economy and health care reform, but also a more peripheral issue, the 
establishment of a programme of national service. This chapter traces the 
development of the national service initiative, examining the theoretical and 
historical background, the influence of the White House over the shape of the 
legislation, the congressional debate and the resultant policy outcome. As an 
early policy priority its progress is assessed in relation to Brauer's framework for 
transition success. 
During the 1992 campaign candidate Bill Clinton gave a personal 
commitment to the development of a civilian national service programme and the 
reform of the student loan system. The development of the National Service 
programme provides a clear example of the elements involved in presidential 
policy initiation during the transition period. Policy development, promotion and 
initiation occurred during the transition period, and implementation took place 
within the first year of the administration. National service legislation faced 
problems within Congress and many of these difficulties were a reflection on the 
CUnton administration's handling of the transition period as a whole. 
Following- Clinton's election, the development of a civilian version of the 
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GI Bill''^ became an eariy administration priority and as a case study the national 
service legislation is of particular interest for a number of reasons. The political 
relevance of national or community service has both historical and contemporary 
links, very little academic attention has been dedicated towards it as a poUcy issue 
at the local, state or national level. Secondly, national service was a well 
pubhcised campaign issue which attracted a lot of support for the Chnton 
campaign and therefore, the progress of this piece of legislation provides a good 
indication of the legislative course of the administration in general. Fmally, 
national service is the most self contained of the five major issues upon which 
President Clinton decided to focus. Heahh care and welfare reform, the economy 
and the deficit, and campaign finance reform all require the co-operation of a 
number of different agencies for development, initiation, debate and 
implementation. Moreover, these pieces of legislation required long term 
development and research because of its inherent complexity; national service 
legislation had none of these limitations. 
The Development of a 'New Democrat' Issue 
The foundations of the Clinton national service legislation can be said to 
come from a number of sources, some historical and others more closely 
connected with the social and poHtical culture developing during the 1980s and 
1990s. The initiation and promotion of this piece of pubUc poUcy served a 
number of political ends for Clinton the candidate and Clinton the President; as 
For an account of the provisions of the Gl Bill (Servicemen's Readjustment Act, 1944) see 
George B. Tindall and David E . Shi. America: A narrative history. (1989) p.791 
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one observer has noted, "in a very real sense national service connects policy with 
politics".'*^ During the 1992 Presidential election national service was one of the 
most popular issues with the electorate. The idea of national service provided 
Clinton with a proposal which was bipartisan in nature and did not discriminate on 
grounds of wealth, social position or race. Every person was eligible to apply, 
and therefore, serve their country. 
The roots of the idea of a civilian form of national service, however, go 
back much further than the 1992 election. Like much of Clinton's election 
campaign this issue has links to earher presidencies. In 1961 John F. Kennedy 
requested that Americans "ask not what your country can do for you; ask what 
you can do for your country." The Chnton Administration saw civihan national 
service as a way to bring these principles up to date to deal with the societal needs 
and issues of the 1990s. 
Frankhn Rooseveh used the concept of national service to develop the 
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), Civil Works Authority (CWA), and the 
Works Progress Administration (WPA). Providing several milhon young men 
aged 18 to 25 with useful jobs and a nominal income during the Great Depression. 
During World War I I President Rooseveh also developed the idea of a GI Bill of 
Rights, offering returning military veterans the opportunity to enter higher 
education in return for their service to their country. This pohcy idea became a 
reality after Roosevelt's death and was implemented by President Truman. 
Rooseveh's New Deal work rehef organisations were, in general, make 
work schemes providing jobs through federal funds for those who had no other 
Mohan, John. "What can you do for your country? Arguments for and against Clinton's 
National Service Legislation" Policy and Politics. Vol.22 No.4 (1994) p258 
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means of support. The benefit of the work done by those enrolled in these 
programmes was evident in the multitude of new roads, airports and schools 
which appeared in the years prior to America entering World War I I . 
Organisations like the CCC, however had a short life span. They were designed 
to provide emergency relief through work for the very poor and working for the 
relief was essential to Roosevelt's concept of welfare. 
President Kennedy also contemplated a form of national service, a 
domestic equivalent to his international Peace Corps but actual legislation for this 
was enacted by President Johnson. With his first piece of major legislation, the 
Economic Opportunity Act 1964, President Johnson intended to conduct a war on 
poverty. This omnibus bill contained several programmes intended to combat 
poverty in the United States and formed the foundations for his Great Society 
programme.'** Much of its content harked back to Roosevelt's ideas embodied in 
the CCC, CWA and WPA. However, there were also additional provisions of 
support to local organisations aimed at alleviating poverty within their own 
communities, aid for small businesses, and the establishment of a domestic Peace 
Corps: Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA). This organisation was said to 
provide a fi"amework for "millions of Americans...willing to serve their less 
fortunate countrymen but have no rallying force to challenge them".'*^ In the late 
1960s Robert Kennedy supported a proposal to establish a police corps, providing 
college scholarships to those who were willing to undertake four years police 
service. Kennedy was assassinated before this proposal could be enacted. 
Fraser, Steve and Gary Gerstle. The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order 1930-1980. p. 196 
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however, 30 years later, it did become part of the crime bill passed by Congress in 
1994. 
More recently George Bush spoke of 'points of light', and the need for 
greater volunteerism in society to solve community problems. President Bush's 
vision for community service was based on the principles of pure volunteerism; 
good deeds done for no monetary incentive or reward. This would provide 
communities with badly needed services at no cost to local. State, or Federal 
government. Individuals who had provided outstanding service in their 
community were rewarded by the Bush administration through news releases 
announcing them to be the 'daily point of light' .'** 
While President Bush was promoting his 'Points of Light Foundation', 
members of Congress were also promoting their own forms of national service. 
Most particularly Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga) and Representative Dave McCurdy 
(D-Ok) were taking the lead in "making military or civilian 'national service' a 
prerequisite for receiving federal student aid".'*' The legislation proposed up to 
two years community service, with pay of $100 per week; or two years active 
duty within the military on two thirds fiill pay followed by six years in the 
reserves. The post service educational awards would amount to $10,000 and 
$24,000 respectively. Much of the impetus towards encouraging service linked to 
federal benefits has been attributed to the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC); 
a moderate think tank established by a group of Democrats after Ronald Reagan's 
presidential election victory in 1984. Bill Clinton and Al Gore were both founder 
Zuckman, Jill. "President's 'Points of Light' Still Only a Dim Twinkle." CQWR 27/1/90 
p.240 
Kuntz, Phil. "Nunn-McCurcfy Plan Ignites National Service Debate." CQWR 25/3/89 
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members of the DLC.'** The DLC's interest in national service dated from 1988 
when sociologist Charles Moskos presented his idea of national service to a DLC 
conference in Virginia. "The plan was quite dramatic: every American who 
wanted federal financial aid for college would have to perform 'national 
service'".'*^ Moskos's idea of national service became the central focus of the 
legislation proposed by Senator Nunn and Representative McCurdy. Several 
other leading Democrats in Congress were interested in the concept of national 
service and also proposed legislation for Congressional consideration. National 
service gave Congressional Democrats an issue which they could define and stand 
behind, while Republicans waited for Presidential initiatives. 
When President Bush finally put his legislation before Congress in 1990, 
his emphasis was still upon pure volunteerism. The National and Community 
Service Act 1990 authorised the Points of Light Foundation as proposed by 
President Bush. It also authorised grants to establish "national, community and 
school-based volunteer service programs" '^* run under the auspices of the 
Commission on National and Community Service; but within these organisations 
there was no organised framework for serving the country as a whole. 
By raising public awareness of the issue Clinton's intention was to 
promote the notion that it could move fijrther away from the idea of entitlement 
and pure volunteerism to that of social responsibility. In Senator Kennedy's 
words "democracy means not only the right to pursue one's own interest, but the 
responsibility to participate in the life of the nation in return."'* A long time 
"Stage Set for Fierce Democrat Fight on Wages and Welfare." IheTimes 19/1/93 p. 13 
Waldman, Steven. The Bill, p.3 
Zuckman, Jill. "Bush Initiative, aher Measures Move in Adjournment Rush." CQWR 
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exponent of national service and communitarianism in general, Amitai Etzioni, 
said that "national service is desirable to build and express civil commitment"." 
This concept allowed Clinton to distance himself fi-om traditional liberal welfare 
Democrats and emphasise his "New Democrat' credentials. CUnton was directly 
involved in the DLC's adoption of the Moskos plan for national service in 1988-
89. In 1991 when he was considering his candidacy for the presidency, national 
service resurfaced as a viable campaign issue. Problems of group alienation which 
had plagued the Nunn-McCurdy legislation were bom in mind and the concept 
was revised. Instead of requiring students to undertake service to receive federal 
financial support, Clinton proposed to "offer extra aid to those willing to do 
service". Tied to the performance of service was a reform of the student loan 
system, allowing graduates to accept lower salaries without fear of loan default. 
In addition to fostering a tradition of service, national service was seen as 
a way of opening education to those who may have previously considered it 
beyond their financial reach. It was also promoted as a way to make higher 
education more affordable for the middle classes, those hardest hit by the rapid 
increase in the cost of college level education. Through a revision of the current 
student loan procedures and also through what was labelled the 'Domestic GI 
Bill ' the Clinton campaign hoped to enable students to borrow money for college 
and then pay it back as a "percentage of their income over time or through 
national service addressing unmet community needs".^ '* The Clinton team 
p.669 
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believed that this would "revolutionise the way student loan programs are run".^^ 
Clinton also saw national service as a way of ameliorating urgent social 
problems and identified four critical issue areas which national and community 
service would address: education, public safety, human needs and the 
environment. Volunteers would take part in programmes developed at the local 
level, serving the community's specific needs. Provision of these services through 
normal employment opportunities would be impossible as individuals had been 
unwilling to accept the low wage levels that the market provided for these 
positions. 
Building on the precedents set by Presidents Roosevelt, Kennedy and 
Johnson, Clinton was also hoping to tap American's rising awareness of the decay 
of community and society. In conjunction with this, there had been an increase in 
the desire of many Americans to contribute towards the improvement of their 
communities. At the local level, public service programmes aiming to redress the 
social balance have been emerging over the past few years; for example the New 
Jersey Youth Corps, the Delta Service Corps and the Boston City Year 
programme. While at the Federal level a number of national service type 
programmes were administered by ACTION (of which VISTA was a part), the 
Commission on National and Community Service (created by the National and 
Community Service Act, 1990), and the Departments of Defense, Housing and 
Urban Development, Agriculture and Interior. It represented a disconnected 
network of programmes which had no integrative effect upon community service. 
The Clinton Administration's proposal would consolidate all these programmes 
Ibid. 
Congressional Digest. October 1993 p.225 
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within a new governmental organisation, providing a national rather than agency 
specific view. The new governmental organisation would not, however, supplant 
the state and local organisations. At the state and local level non-profit 
organisations would be responsible for the development and administration of 
their own service programmes to meet specific community needs. 
The Clinton Initiative: Linking Service & Education 
Clinton announced his proposal for the national service legislation on 
March 1 1993, at Rutgers University, New Jersey. He proclaimed that "National 
service was nothing less than the American way to change America"." The 
significance of March 1 could not be escaped (or more importantly ignored) as 
thirty two years earlier President Kennedy had announced his intention to create 
the Peace Corps. While Clinton intended his national service programmes to be 
based solely in the United States the principles of service, civic education and 
responsibility were directly comparable. During his speech Clinton also sought to 
establish links with the GI Bill, proposing that his service plan would be built 
upon the same notion of linking service with higher educational opportunities. 
Attention was also paid to outlining his plan for the reform of the student 
loan system. Changing the methods by which students could finance their 
education was to be an integral part of the call to service. At that time students 
borrowed money from financial institutions and made repayments based on how 
much they had borrowed regardless of income. The suggested loan reform would 
" Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. March 8, 1993. Vol. 29 No.9 p.342 
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enable students to borrow money directly fi-om the Federal government and then 
repay the loan as a percentage of their income over time. Under the existing 
system Federal government guaranteed to cover 90 percent of any student loan 
default to banks, thus providing the banks with little incentive to make 
repayments easier for students and the burden of financing the loans was 
transferred to the tax-payer, to the tune of $4 billion per year. Student loan 
reform had the potential to save the American tax payer billions of dollars.'* 
Through covering bank loan defaults federal fiinds, tax dollars, were being paid 
out to banks with no return. By lending to students on more flexible terms, the 
federal government could reduce defaults, guarantee a return on their loan and 
reduce the burden on the tax payer. 
Using examples fi-om programmes that had been running in cities 
throughout the United States, President Clinton illustrated his vision for national 
service. He promised that these programmes would continue to be supported and 
expanded under the auspices of the new government organisation. The exact 
details of the educational grants that would be available to individuals completing 
their period of service, or the type of new programmes that the President 
envisaged local communities establishing, were not given during his address. 
Instead, as the Washington Post noted; "Clinton rallied an enthusiastic audience of 
young people behind the concept".'^ 
The choice of universities as the forum for Clinton's promotional speeches 
underlined the importance that was being placed on linking service with 
education. Moreover, one of the aims of the national service legislation was to 
5« Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. March 8, 1993. Vol. 29 No.9 p.344 
Devroy, Ann. "Get involved. President TeUs Youths." Washington Post: 2/3/93 p.A08 
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provide more financial security to existing students. With the cost of college level 
education rising even more rapidly than health care costs, more flexible financial 
options for students would hopefiilly stem the tide of college drop out rates; 
which had risen to two and a half times that of high school drop out rates, mainly 
due to financial insecurity.*^ Keeping students within education was of at least 
equal importance to attracting students who may never have previously 
considered entering higher education. 
The Role of the White House 
The development of national service legislation was placed in the hands of 
Eli J. Segal, businessman, chief of staff to Clinton during the 1992 presidential 
campaign, and lifetime Clinton fiiend. Segal's political background was shaped 
by student activism in the 1960s and 1970s and the McGovem presidential bids of 
1968 and 1972. He replaced politics with a career in business, but remained 
active via the Gary Hart campaign in 1987 and as a major fimd-raiser for the 
Democratic National Committee. More than any other aspect in his political past, 
his personal closeness to Bill Clinton and the President-elect's faith in Segal's 
organisational abilities, placed him at the pinnacle of one of the key policy 
initiatives of the new administration. 
Policy development took place within the newly created White House 
Office of National Service rather than within one specific government department 
such as Education or Health and Human Services. While much of the underlying 
60 wpeklv Compilation nf Presidential Documents. March 8, 1993. Vol. 29 No.9 p.344 
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research and information came fi-om the Democratic Leadership Council, which 
formulated many of the pohcy ideas he adopted during the campaign, the final 
legislative proposal was the work of Shiriey Sagawa and Jack Lew. Sagawa had 
been closely associated with the Nunn-McCurdy proposal and Lew was a former 
policy aide to Tip O'Neill. Their credentials were very much liberal, old 
Democrat, but the policy proposal represented a fine blend of such liberalism and 
DLC principles. 
The strength of Sagawa's and Lew's credentials within Washington were 
never in doubt; what did trouble some observers, however, was the inexperience 
of both Segal and his deputy Richard Allen, in all matters concerning service 
issues. Their inexperience was also extended to the rest of the staff in the OflBce 
of National Service. Like much of the early Clinton White House, it was 
populated by young, twentysomething individuals who were more likely to be 
completing their Bachelors degrees by correspondence than to have experience in 
the finer points of policy development and implementation. However, in his 
appointment of Eli Segal, Clinton placed national service legislation in the hands 
of a trusted fiiend in whom he had total confidence. 
Even after President Clinton's speech at Rutgers University, little was 
known about the exact nature of national service; whether it would be mandatory 
for those hoping to take advantage of loan reform, how many people would be 
able to take part in the programmes, the minimum and maximum duration of any 
service period, and what the remuneration would be for service. Such details 
could only be worked out by Congress in its deliberations of the legislation. A 
pilot programme 'The Summer of Service' was established between June and 
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August 1993. The $15 million appropriated for this scheme was distributed to 
partnerships between higher education institutions and public organisations. The 
programmes were targeted at meeting urban needs in a variety of cities 
throughout the United States. The 1,500 participants received the Federal 
minimum wage and a post service educational grant of $1,000.^ * 
Congressional Deliberations 
The national service legislation was sponsored through Congress by 
Senators Edward Kennedy (D - Mass), Harris Wofford (D - Pa), and Dave 
Durenberger (R - Minn), and Representative Matthew G. Martinez (D - Ca). 
After committee deliberations in the House Education and Labour Committee and 
the Senate Labour and Human Resources Committee, both committees moved to 
pass HR2010 and S919 respectively to the floor of their chambers on June 16 
1993, just five weeks after the White House had announced the legislation. The 
proposal called for up to two years fiill time service in order to receive an 
educational award. This award would be $5000 for every year of service 
performed by an individual aged seventeen or older. The period of service could 
be performed before, during or after entering post-secondary education. While in 
service, volunteers would receive a minimum wage stipend of $7400, financed up 
to 85 percent by the federal government. In addition to this the federal 
government would finance 85 percent any health care or child-care costs. The 
programmes would be initiated and administered at the local level by non-profit 
Mohan, op. cit., p.261 
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organisations, with fiands for the programmes raised at federal level.'"'' 
The House of Representative began its deliberation of HR2010 on July 13; 
the legislation was passed on July 28 by a vote of 275 to 152. An amendment 
offered by Representative Bob Stamp (R - AZ) reduced the post service annual 
award by $275, fi-om $5000 per year to $4725. The Senate began its 
consideration of the legislation on July 29; it was passed on August 3, with voted 
of 58-42. The conference report was adopted by the House (275-152) on August 
6, and by the Senate (57-40) on September 8. President Clinton signed The 
National Service Trust Act on September 21,1993.*^ 
The Obstacle Course 
The passage of President Clinton's national service initiative might have 
been speedy, but these appearances are deceptive as its journey was far from 
smooth; opposition to the legislation was raised on several levels. Firstly, as 
organisations already existed which administered community service programmes 
along similar lines to the Clinton proposal, the additional bureaucracy and expense 
which would come with the Corporation for National Service was thought to be 
unnecessary. Moreover, given that the Clinton campaign emphasised the need to 
reduce bureaucracy in Federal government, the establishment of yet another 
monolithic organisation would contradict one of their key election issues; the need 
to re-invent government, reduce government personnel levels and spending. 
Zuckman, Jill. "National Service Goes to Floor in Both Chambers." CQWR 19/6/93 
p. 1577 
Cnnpressional Digest. October 1993 p.235 
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Secondly, existing educational grants had been subject to reductions in funding 
over previous years; for example. Pell grants - means tested educational grants 
available from the Federal government had been reduced in value by $100 for the 
previous two fiscal years. Providing funds for the national service programmes 
from the same budget areas as other educational funding would come at the 
expense of grants programmes which ab-eady helped students pay for their post 
secondary education.^ "* Thirdly, veterans' organisations were concerned that the 
level of the educational awards would undermine the attractiveness of the GI Bill, 
especially i f performing civilian national service would provide grants of similar 
value. Finally, the provision of volunteers to perform community work was seen 
as a possible threat to those already working in that sphere. As national service 
volunteers would provide cheap labour for community based projects would 
existing employees have any job security? All of these objections made the 
passage of the Clinton national service legislation less of a certainty and brought 
about a piece of legislation which was a shadow of that initially proposed. 
The appropriation of fiinds for the National Service legislation was always 
going to be a contentious issue. Whichever appropriations committee was 
required to distribute fiinds would find other existing programmes' financial 
security threatened. Originally, the appropriations committee designated to deal 
with national service was the one which funded veteran's, housing and space 
programmes rather than the Labor and Heahh and Human services committee, 
which has traditionally funded education.^' 
During congressional debates on the legislation, as a result of lobbying by 
^ Zuckman. CQWR 19/6/93 p. 1577 
Ibid 
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veterans' organisations and an amendment to the bill table by Representative 
Gerald B. H. Soloman (R - NY), appropriations for the bill were moved to the 
Labor and Health and Human Services committee, therefore, any funds 
appropriated by this committee for national service would come at the expense of 
existing educational fianding of grants and scholarships. 
Critical attention also focused upon the concept of loan reform; not only 
the idea that educational grants for service would undermine existing student 
fimding options, but also the notion that federal government should begin to 
finance student loans that would be repaid on any basis other than on how much 
had been borrowed. The Chnton proposal for reforming student loan procedures 
sought to overhaul the present system. It envisaged that a national trust fiand 
would be established which would loan money to students. These Federal 
government loans could then be repaid through national service, but they could 
also be repaid by "contributing a fixed proportion of their subsequent income for a 
specified number of years".^ ^ Other than perceived problems of collection, 
which would have to be performed through a national organisation such as the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), federal government financing of student loans 
would take a reliable source of income away from the banks which had previously 
provided such loans. However, collecting student loans through the IRS would 
reduce the amount of loan default as the agency would have access to all the 
relevant information about borrower's incomes, employment and the like. In the 
long run, this would remove the burden of financing the student loan programmes 
away from the average American taxpayer. 
^ Krueger, Alan.B. & William G. Bowen "Income-Contingent College Loans" Journal of 
Economic Perspectives Vol.7 No. 3 (1993) p. 193 
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Of the objections to the national service bill, some carried more legitimacy 
than others. The creation of a new organisation to administer all national service 
type activities was essential i f there was to be a coherent strategy for national 
service. Since the creation of the Peace Corps, and every subsequent similar 
initiative, a new agency was established to administer that project, without 
reference to existing organisations. The most comprehensive agency was 
ACTION, which was created under the Johnson administration to handle the 
voluntary programmes of the Economic Opportunity Act. The weakness of the 
existing system was that there were too many different agencies working in the 
same field and not co-ordinating their efforts. Under the Corporation for National 
and Community Service, which was to be created by the legislation, duplication in 
administration would be avoided. Rather than adding to the federal bureaucracy, 
it had the potential to reduce the number of administrators needed, thereby 
keeping the Clinton campaign promise to reduce the size of Federal government. 
As Representative Matthew Martinez stated in the House of Representatives on 
July 13, "This bill...reinvents government by consoUdating and streamlining the 
existing federal administration of service and volunteer programs".*' The idea of 
re-inventing government was not popular within the civil service and with 
ACTION employees in particular. Lobbying of the White House by the National 
Association of Service and Conservation Corps forced the administration to 
guarantee the jobs of four hundred ACTION employees, either within the new 
Corporation or within another area of federal government.** 
The concern that National Service would be an expensive method of 
Congressional Digest October, 1993 p.240 
^ Waldman, op. cit., p. 162-164 
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meeting community needs was investigated in a cost benefit analysis carried out 
by Neumann et al.^ ^ Their study of three different National Service programmes 
in numerous US cities found that for every federal dollar spent there was a net 
return of between $1.60 and $2.60.™ It is stressed in their analysis that this is just 
the financial benefit, and that total human benefit is impossible to measure. It can 
be seen, therefore, that national service programmes have the potential to be 
financially viable. 
The change in appropriations sub-committee for the national service bill 
threatened the fiature of existing educational grant schemes, as was feared by 
Republican opponents of the initiative. However, these concerns would have 
been balanced against the lobbying of veterans' organisations. Their assertion that 
the Clinton national service bill would draw potential volunteers away from the 
military and the GI Bill was probably more persuasive than fears for fiiture 
fiinding of educational grants. It seems unlikely, given the value of the post 
service award that individuals would, i f so inclined, be persuaded to perform 
civilian rather than military national service Changing the appropriations sub-
committee fijrther guaranteed high level of fijnding for veterans' programmes and 
threatened any future plans for the expansion of any educational grant 
programme. 
Finally there was little foundation to concerns that the participation of 
individuals in community based service would threaten the employment security of 
those already working within those areas because "The bill would require 
George Neumann, Roger Kormendi, Robert F. Tamura, Cyras J. Gardner. "The Benefits and 
Costs of National Service; Metiiods for benefit assessments witii application to tiiree 
AmeriCorps programs". Washington D.C.: Corporation for National Service, 1995. 
™ Neumann et al: op. cit., p.27 
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consultation with employee representatives to ensure that it does not displace 
wage-earning workers".'* The whole focus of the Clinton Administration's 
legislation was that it was aimed at addressing unmet community needs; not 
providing an inexpensive source of labour to carry out social welfare policy at 
reduced cost to the government. 
The Results 
The main question which needs to be addressed now is whether the 
progress of this national service legislation can provide some broader insight into 
the policy process within the Clinton Administration, or whether it is simply a 
singular example of legislative success within this transition period. What was 
most striking about this piece of legislation was, that despite administration claims 
that it was a new policy idea, in reality it was a consolidation of existing policy 
areas. This may be a key to its relative success. 
The American political system, through its institutional arrangements and 
the political style of it actors, is resistant to large scale change in short spaces of 
time. A brief examination of Clinton's plans to reform health care provides a 
prime example of legislative deadlock caused by an attempt at wholesale 
institutional reform. Reform of the heahh care industry was a principal campaign 
promise of the Clinton Administration. In attempting these reforms, Clinton came 
across numerous obstacles: opposition from organised interests within the 
industry-the American Medical Association, hospital trusts, insurance companies 
Rep. William D. Ford quoted in Congressional Digest October 1993 p.238 
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and the pharmaceutical industry-Congressional resistance due to lack of 
consultation and the complex nature of the legislation, and public and institutional 
distrust of the policy development process-Clinton's delegation of policy 
development to a secret task force with his wife as chairperson. All of these 
factors contributed to the ultimate failure of health care reform. The legislation 
was too complex, too far-reaching in its aims, and furthermore it was unpopular 
with business and Congress as it appeared to be unworkable. 
In comparison. National Service legislation was simple, attractive, easy to 
implement, and not attempting to reform the whole system of higher education 
within the United States. Moreover, the limited scale of the programmes and 
benefits, due to low levels of funding, posed little threat to the interests of 
veterans' organisations, institutions of higher education and existing employees 
within the community service area. As with all policy options, it is the ability of 
the administration to balance principles with practicalities which determines 
whether or not the policy will be successful. By building its national service 
legislation upon the existing framework of similar programmes dating back to the 
Johnson administration, the Clinton administration had an increased chance of 
'hitting the ground running' with this piece of legislation during the transition 
period. Without such a framework, policy development within the health care 
sphere was dramatically complicated. Such an assessment of the nature of policy 
development questions the future of policy innovation within the American 
system. If large scale reform is virtually impossible to achieve, it is possible that a 
more incremental approach toward reform is needed? 
National service legislation is possibly illustrative of this approach. The 
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reform of the student loan system, which formed part of the CUnton 
Administration's vision for national service, was poUcy innovation, but policy 
innovation on a small scale. While it moved federal government into an area with 
which it was unfamiliar, it was not replacing the existing system of student loans 
and removing banks totally from the equation. The role of federal government 
was to supplement that of banks rather than to replace them. Comparing this with 
health care reform where the administration sought to completely change the 
whole system of health care provision, and not just expand the government's role, 
it can be seen that poUcy innovation is possible within certain parameters. 
Given that national service legislation was popular with the electorate and 
simple to legislate for, it encountered severe opposition within Congress. The 
majority of the reasons for this have been discussed; however, there is one 
overarching factor which cannot be avoided within American government and 
society as a whole. Americans are generally distrustful of large government 
solutions to social problems; such an approach was tried and failed during the 
1960s. When President Kennedy asked for more social reciprocity during the 
1960s he was asking during a time of great affluence. In the 1990s Clinton was 
asking for more civic responsibility in a time of perceived social crisis and 
financial insecurity. His legislative and electoral support was slim; with low voter 
turnout in 1992 and only 43% of the vote any mandate which Clinton believed he 
held was very fragile. In addition. Congress appeared in the early 1990s to be 
wary of finding federal government solutions to local problems. 
However, there is no denying that the notion of national service was 
popular among the electorate, especially with the young. Such enthusiasm could 
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be attributed to youthful idealism, or a continuation of the trend towards 
candidates raising expectations above the realities which governments are able to 
achieve and provide. National service did become a legislative reality, moreover, 
the programmes proved themselves to be financially viable. However, 
expectations were not met with reference to the scale of activities. Funding for 
AmeriCorps has been continually reduced since September 1993, and 
consequently the number of individuals taking part in programmes has never 
reached the projected figures. 
Conclusion 
Clinton's national service legislation is illustrative of a number of factors 
within policy development and implementation during the presidential transition 
period. It is not, however, exceptional as a piece of legislation. Its simplicity and 
popularity were attractive to legislators; however the problems which the 
administration faced in getting this legislation through Congress confirm that such 
factors are not sufficient on their ovm to secure legislative success. Subsequent 
legislative problems with health care reform prove that the development of large 
pieces of legislation have many more potential pitfalls; and that the development 
of smaller, more coherent policies may be the blueprint for policy innovation and 
success during the presidential transition period. 
In terms of transition success or effectiveness the passage of Clinton's 
national service legislation exemplifies a number of conflicting issues. In terms of 
the four criteria by which this transition is being judged national service provides 
very mixed results. Preparation for the initiative was systematic, but not 
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integrated within the planning or transition structure. The DLC and their research 
organisation (Progressive Policy Institute) were close to the Clinton campaign in 
many areas, but the integration of personnel and ideas was not complete. Policy 
ideas were formulated outside the planning structure and then fed into the 
administration, rather than being centrally located within any one area of the 
campaign or transition. Much of the complicated work of adapting the ideas into 
policy was embarked upon during the interregnum and immediately after the 
election. Even when the policy proposal was announced many of the details were 
still uncertain. This indicates that the preparation stage of the initiative was either 
ineffective in determining the poUcy needs of the administration or in shaping the 
policy to fit the requirements of the administration. 
The formation of the White House Office of National Service was a strong 
indication of the administration's commitment to the issue. Most significantly its 
internal structure was not best designed for the task, with too many 
inexperienced, ahhough enthusiastic, staff attempting to steer a symbolically 
important piece of legislation through the departmental and congressional maze. 
This was, in part, complicated by the wider legislative agenda. As will be 
discussed in fiiture chapters the progress of national service was directly impacted 
upon by the legislative priorities of the budget and health care reform. Unlike 
Ronald Reagan, who was successfial precisely because of his limited legislative 
agenda, Clinton embarked upon an expansive agenda, of which national service 
was just one element. In not learning this important lesson from his predecessor 
Clinton made a damaging mistake, which affected the progress of other more 
significant pieces of legislation. 
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To enthusiasts who saw it as too little and too weak, the National Service 
Bill failed to meet expectations. But to policy makers conscious of the basic rule-
promises are cheap but policies are costly-the National Service Trust Act 
represents successfijl policy innovation and the honouring of an important 
campaign commitment. 
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Chapter 4: Economic Policy Management 
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"Republican mismanagement has disarmed government as an instrument to 
make our economy work and support the people's most basic values, 
needs and hopes."'^  
Having detected popular feelings of economic insecurity, and having 
persuaded the American electorate into beUeving that their economy was still in 
recession, that the mismanagement of the Bush Administration was primarily to 
blame, newly elected President Bill Clinton promised to 'focus like a laser beam' 
on the economy. While this pledge was not as far reaching as President Bush's 
'Watch my lips, no new taxes', it provided Clinton's critics with a potentially 
strong hold early in his administration. It was Clinton's uitention to concentrate 
on reducing the federal deficit and to stimulate the economy in order to generate 
thousands of new jobs. Forty three per cent of the American electorate had voted 
for candidate Clinton, in part supporting his contention that the failure of the 
economy in the 1990s was at the root of their domestic problems, and the 
economy and the deficit were overwhelmingly cited as the most important issues 
of the 1992 election. Furthermore, from the time of the Democratic convention in 
July 1992 Clinton maintained a substantial lead over President Bush in the pubhc's 
perceptions of who was best able to manage the economy (his lead over Ross 
Perot was less convincing).'^  This being the case, the shape and content of the 
Clinton economic plan was the most important piece of policy planning to be 
undertaken during the 1992-93 presidential transition. 
This chapter discusses the evolution of the Clinton economic vision 
encapsulated in his early economic policy initiatives. Of particular interest are the 
1992 Democratic Party Platform p. 1 
" See Table 1 p. 118. Taken from Gerald Pomper. The Election of 1992. p. 125 
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provisions for deficit reduction and stimulus spending. In combination they 
represented a distinct divergence from the economic orthodoxy of previous 
RepubUcan and Democrat administrations. As a 'New Democrat' Clinton was 
eager to move away fi-om the traditional tax and spend liberal label attached to 
Democrat Presidents. Additionally, Clinton's management of this policy area was 
greatly influenced by his choice of political appointees and personal advisors, 
distinguishing it fi'om other issue areas concurrently being developed in the White 
House for the policy agenda. 
The Republican Economic Legacy 
The economic legacy of the previous two Republican administrations 
presented the first Democrat administration for twelve years with a major 
challenge if it was going to keep all of its campaign commitments. The recession 
of autumn 1990, which some relate to the excesses of the Reagan years, left 7.4% 
of the population unemployed by 1992, the highest level of unemployment since 
1984, with the highest proportion of long-term unemployed since World War n. 
During the Reagan administrations, the budget deficit soared due to a 
combination of reductions in taxation and large spending increases in areas such 
as defence. While there was concern that the deficit should be brought under 
control, the continued growth of the economy during this period discouraged the 
perception that crisis point had been reached. It was not until the end of the 
second Reagan term and President Bush was elected that the deficit was seen to 
'"^  Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995. U.S. Bureau of the Census Table 626 & 658. 
Long-term is defined as persons without work for 26 or more weeks. 
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be a huge burden on the performance of the economy and that deficit reduction 
policies had to be undertaken. During this period there was a downturn in the 
economy but no substantial change in the Republican administration's attitude 
towards the Federal deficit. 
As a candidate in 1988, George Bush made the now famous pledge to 
introduce no new taxes. This promise can now be seen to have been instrumental 
in his undoing in 1992. His initial reluctance and subsequent u-tum on increased 
taxation revenues to help reduce the deficit was the focus of critical attention. 
This combined with a non-interventionist stance with relation to promoting 
American industrial interests, and poor relations with a Democrat controlled 
Congress eager to protect important social programmes such as Medicare and 
Medicaid, translated into a poor record on economic poUcy which the Clinton 
campaign could exploit during the 1992 election.'^  
In an attempt to bring the deficit under control President Bush negotiated 
a deficit reduction package with Congress in 1990. It aimed to reduce the deficit 
by $492 billion over five years. Within this budget deal, spending caps were set 
and spending organised into three areas: domestic, defence and international! 
These spending caps were designed so that fiinds could not be appropriated from 
one area and spent in another unless it could be proven that an emergency existed. 
Unfortunately the Bush administration was unable to fijifil its deficit reduction 
promise and, in fact the deficit increased by $655 billion by 1992. This increase 
was caused by a combination of emergency spending, over optimistic forecasts of 
growth and the unprecedented rise in cost of Medicare and Medicaid. However, 
" Dylis M. Hill & Phil Williams Eds. The Bush Presidency: Trimnphs and Adversities p.l09-
110 
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by 1992 the fiiiits of the limited economic poUcies of the Bush administration 
were beginning to pay off and the 'green shoots' of recovery were evident to 
those who paid close attention to the economic figures. But for the average 
American, unemployment was still high and perceptions of economic and 
employment insecurity permeated the work force as industries continued to 
downsize in response to the declining economy and the federal deficit had been 
further increased rather than reduced by the current Republican administration. 
The Electoral Connection 
Since the publication of the work of Edward Tufte in the mid 1970s, it has 
been recognised that there is an electoral-economic cycle. Tufte contends that an 
incumbent administration may seek to manipulate economic benefits in order to 
secure electoral victory.^ ^ This ability to manipulate the economy has been made 
more difficult since Tufte's work by the reclamation of the budgetary power of a 
more assertive Congress, in addition to which the apolitical role of the Federal 
Reserve in managing the economy also limits presidential scope for action in any 
attempt to manipulate the economy. While this theory may not be well illustrated 
by the activities of the Bush administration during the 1992 campaign, it does 
provide evidence for the political belief that economic performance is a strong 
determinant of electoral success. Alesina, Londregan and Rosenthal go further to 
prove that the level of economic growth, regardless of the reasons for this growth 
Edward R. Tufte Chapter 1 reprinted firom Political Control of the Economy (Princeton 
University Press, 1978) in Paul Peretz Ed. The Politics of American Economic Policy Making. 
p.422 
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(government competence or 'luck'), has a strong influence upon the retrospective 
voting preferences of the electorate.^ ' The way an individual votes not only 
reflects his or her own economic circumstances, but also that of the economy in 
general.'* This makes economic poUcy management on a macro and a micro level 
one of the most influential deciding factors in Presidential elections. 
Reagan's electoral performance in 1980 was not only influenced by his 
campaign tactics but also by weak performance of the economy under the Carter 
administration. The strong performance of the economy during the second 
Reagan administration went a long way to ensuring that Ronald Reagan left office 
as the most popular President since Eisenhower. George Bush's association with 
that administration and its successes were consolidated in his electoral victory in 
1988. 
The influence of independent candidate, Ross Perot, on the issue content 
of the 1992 election is made evident by candidate Clinton's adoption of the deficit 
reduction as one of his central campaign themes. By presenting the deficit as one 
of his own concerns Clinton was able to appeal to Perot supporters to 'make their 
vote count' and support his candidacy at the ballot box. While it was apparent 
that Ross Perot was not a direct threat to the Clinton campaign, it was necessary 
for him to court these floating voters in order to secure victory over George 
Bush. In addition to which Clinton could not afford to ignore an issue which had 
captured the hearts and minds of the public and the media throughout the 
campaign. Clinton concentrated his economic policy ideas on deficit reduction, a 
" Alberto Alesina, John Longregan & Howard Rosenthal. "A model of the Political Economy of 
the United States" in Peretz, op. cit., p.483 
™ Fiorina in Peretz, op. cit., p.443 
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short term stimulus package which would jump-start the sluggish American 
economy out of recession, and a series of major investment initiatives - for which 
read spending - in education and infrastructure development. Given the 
electorate's concern over the size of the Federal deficit, deficit reduction was of 
primary importance to the administration. Furthermore, providing a convincing or 
effective strategy for reducing the deficit appeared to be a precondition of the 
Clinton administration's aim of getting the other two key elements of its economic 
package through Congress. 
Personnel Choices 
The centrality of the economy to the ideas of the Clinton administration 
was demonstrated by the care which was taken over economic appointments and 
the development of an economic policy-making machine. During the campaign 
Clinton proposed to establish an organisation based upon the National Security 
Council to formulate and co-ordinate economic policy. The National Economic 
Council was to become the main engine room of economic policy within the 
Clinton administration. The early establishment of this advisory network allowed 
Clinton to work on the mammoth task of designing an economic policy agenda 
early in his administration. The economic team that Clinton assembled around 
himself indicated a desire to aggressively pursue deficit reduction policies. The 
director of the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) Leon Panetta had been 
Chairman of the House Budget Committee and was a self confessed deficit hawk. 
Among Clinton's other economic appointments, Lloyd Bentsen (Treasury 
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Secretary), Robert Rubin (Chairman, National Economic Council), Roger Altman 
(Deputy Treasury Secretary), and Alice Rivlin (Deputy Director 0MB), wereall 
indicators pointing towards deficit reduction as being of primary importance on 
the administration's agenda. Appearances can be deceptive, however, and this 
combination of personnel within the economic line-up was not a guarantee of 
policy coherence within the economic sphere. 
With his economic appointments, Clinton was indicating a number of 
different things to the Washington community - Congress, the media and lobbyists 
- those who work within the financial field, and the electorate. Lloyd Bentsen, 
veteran Senator and chairman of the Senate Finance Committee from 1987-1992, 
brought not only experience of the complex nature of taxation and budget 
legislation but also the respect of a large portion of the Washington community to 
the Clinton administration. Not only was his appointment popular in Washington 
DC but, as the Congressional Quarterly notes, "By putting the chairman of the 
Finance Committee in his Cabinet, Clinton gets one of the Senate's true titans, a 
conservative, business-minded Democrat who is comforting to Wall Street and 
adept as the ultimate insider game of taxation legislating."^^ In addition, his 
knowledge of the workings of Congress and personal contacts within the 
congressional machinery would be invaluable to the administration. Much the 
same can be said of Leon Panetta. Having served in Congress since 1977, 
following his resignation from the Nixon White House in 1970, he served on the 
House Budget Committee for the maximum period allowed, six years. After the 
designated waiting period, he returned to the committee as its Chairman in 1989. 
Cloud, David S. "In Bentsen, Clinton Summons a Texas Titan to Treasury." CQWR. 
12/12/92 p.3801 
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During his congressional career, he made the budget his area of special expertise, 
a skill which placed him in a leading position during the 1990 budget negotiations 
with the Bush Administration. His position of primacy at the 0MB situated him 
in one of the most influential jobs in the Clinton White House, allowing him a 
considerable degree of influence over the shape of the whole economic agenda. 
The fiscal persuasions of these two appointees differed by a degree, Bentsen - in 
line with Clinton's own economic incUnations - was more predisposed to the 
stimulus side of the economic agenda, favouring tax incentives and business 
investments. Panetta on the other hand - more in line with the congressional 
agenda - was committed to long-term deficit reduction, with investments, while 
necessary and important, as a secondary consideration. 
The deputies of both these men brought different skills to their respective 
appointments. Alice Rivlin, number two at the 0MB, was the first director of the 
Congressional Budget Office after its formation in 1975. Her current position at 
the Brookings Institution, consolidated her credentials as a poUcy analyst and 
economic thinker. Roger Altman was, prior to taking up his position as Deputy 
Treasury Secretary, vice-chairman of the Blackstone Group, a Wall Street 
investment house.*" His appointment, along with that of Robert Rubin, formerly 
co-chairman of the Goldman-Sachs Corporation, to the National Economic 
Council, sent strong signals to the financial markets of the administration's intent 
to deal with the country's economic problems as a whole and the deficit in 
particular. Gaining the confidence of the financial markets was of particular 
importance because their performance would be used as an indicator of the 
*° Cranford, John P. "New Clinton Economic Team Veers Toward Center." CQWR. 12/12/92 
p.3799 
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success of any policies which the administration was to implement. 
For the period of the campaign the economic indicators which would 
show Clinton's campaign rhetoric as alarmist or at least inaccurate were not 
available for public consumption. Strong growth in the US economy was not 
apparent until mid 1992, the statistics for this were not available until well after 
the election in November.^ ' However, it has been estimated that the US economy 
started to grow as early as the second quarter of 1991, casting doubt over the 
depth of the recession and the allegations of economic mismanagement charged at 
the Bush Administration during the 1992 election. It was not until several months 
after the end of the 1991 recession that the media began to focus its attention on 
the economic crisis, until this time they had been preoccupied with the Gulf War 
and the changing nature of foreign policy. The media's ability to set the issue 
agenda in politics is well documented; "Voters form opinions and make 
decisions...with particular attention to the information that is most accessible. In 
1992, the bulk of the news about the economy was negative and became more 
negative as the campaign progressed."*^ Retrospective voting, media bias against 
George Bush and the late availability of economic growth figures conspired 
against the incumbent, as they are always judged on their performance in office, 
while challengers are judged on their ability to promote issues consistent with the 
electorates hopes and fears. 
Satisfying Institutional Imperatives 
GDP growth July-September 1992 3.4%, October-December 1992 3.8%. "No Need For a 
Boost." The Economist 13/2/93 p. 15 
Hetherington, Marc J. "The Media's Role In Forming Voters' National Economic Evaluations 
in 1992" American Journal of Political Science Vol. 40 No 2 (1996) p.375 
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The economic package as a whole was initially timetabled for release 
directly after the presidential inauguration. Unlike other policy initiatives which 
the administration would present during the first few months of 1993, the 
economic plan was restricted in when it could be presented for congressional 
deliberation. Timing for the presentation of this piece of legislation was 
particularly important because of its relationship with the federal budget. The 
Clinton administration had to present Congress with a budget at some point in the 
early months of 1993 following the inauguration, therefore, it was essential that 
all the constituent parts of the package be complete and ready for presentation at 
the same time. Setting a legislative agenda is the most important act a new 
President can undertake, for Bill Clinton setting the appropriate legislative agenda 
became a crucial test of his ability to manage not only political issues and 
campaign promises, but also the executive branch and the White House itself It 
became apparent during the interregnum that it would be several weeks before the 
plan was ready for release on to the political stage and that the day after the 
inauguration was an overly ambitious deadline. The delay in deUvering this key 
piece of policy to the nation was caused by a number of different factors reflecting 
the three main elements of the Clinton economic package: stimulus package, 
investments and deficit reduction. 
In order to estabhsh some parameters for the substance of Clinton's 
economic policy agenda, he took the unprecedented step of holding an economic 
summit in Little Rock just weeks after the election. What was intended to be a 
small scale gathering of academics and businessmen became a huge conference 
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which attracted considerable media attention. The guest list was diverse and there 
was provision for public participation via the telephone, but conspicuous by their 
absence were politicians. At this stage, Clinton's economic plans evidently did 
not include the Washington community.*^ 
The Policy Framework 
The first dilemma for the administration appears to be that the three 
elements of the economic package do not represent a cohesive policy bundle, in 
fact the elements can easily be seen to be contradictory. Government spending in 
the form of economic stimulus programmes and infi"astructure investments do not 
go hand in hand with tough deficit reduction policies. This inconsistency is 
magnified when examined in the light of the GDP growth figures for the second 
half of 1992 and the adjusted deficit projections produced by the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) in the third quarter of 1992. The original deficit projections 
produced by the Bush Administration in July 1992 were found to be $189.2 billion 
less than the CBO's calculations for the deficit for the years 1994-1997.*'' The 
emergence of this new set of figures not only complicated the Clinton 
administration's promise to halve the deficit in four years, but also questioned the 
administration's motives for embarking upon a series of investments and stimulus 
spending. 
With the deficit figures being higher than was initially expected, President 
Fletcher, Martin. "Clinton OuUines Economic Targets" The Times 15 December 1992. 
Hagar, George & David S. Cloud. "Clinton Team's Similar Lines Focus on Deficit 
Reduction." COWR. 16/1/93 p. 122 
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Clinton was confronted by a number of opportunities and dilemmas. The Bush 
administration's miscalculations allowed Clinton to further capitalise on the 
perception that the previous administration had neglected domestic policy 
initiatives and the economy in particular. However, the new administration was 
also faced with a number of difficult choices regarding the size of the deficit 
reduction package and the size of the stimulus package. No Congress, regardless 
of its composition, was going wholeheartedly to support a very large spending 
measure with the deficit being even higher than initially predicted, regardless of 
the need for that spending. In addition to which, the Clinton administration's 
pledge to halve the deficit had not anticipated the deficit being almost $200 billion 
larger. 
Secondly, the administration had to justify its spending in the form of the 
economic stimulus package. Funding for the variety of programmes which came 
under this catch all title was available in the form of $16.3 bn of appropriations 
left on the table after appropriators had completed their Fiscal 1993 appropriation 
bills. However the problem that the administration faced was that these funds 
were actually earmarked for defence and foreign aid spending rather than 
domestic initiatives. Budgetary rules allow funds to be moved fi^om one spending 
area to another only in the event of an economic emergency or with a 
supermajority vote; i.e. Clinton had to demonstrate to appropriators that an 
economic emergency existed to justify the spending which the economic stimulus 
package entailed. Given the release of promising growth figures fi^om 1992, the 
production of a convincing argument for passing the stimulus package would 
become increasingly difficult. The eventual size of the stimulus package was a 
98 
compromise by the Clinton administration in recognition of the fact that there was 
a definite limit on congressional generosity and that a smaller package would be 
more likely to gain support within Congress and provide the administration Avith a 
legislative success. 
During the campaign, in an attempt to gain public support for a policy 
which would increase the deficit rather than reduce it, the stimulus package was 
promoted as a jobs bill, legislation directed specifically to help reduce 
unemployment. But which social group was this legislation aimed at? Studies of 
the American electorate have shown that the propensity to vote increases with 
educational level, age, and financial security. In 1992 66% of the unemployed 
attained a high school level of education or less, one third of whom were under 
24. The question needs to be asked whether the Clinton administration was 
focusing its attention on those constituents who were already unemployed, or 
those who were increasingly concerned about their employment and financial 
security? The generation of thousands of new jobs would obviously benefit the 
unemployed, but it would also promote feelings of greater security among those 
middle class voters who were fearful of the recent trends in industry down-sizing 
and the increasingly unpredictable employment market. By the time the 
administration was promoting its legislative agenda the stimulus package had 
become, as Clinton stated in his address to a the Joint Session of Congress, "a 
down payment on the administration's long-run investment program, for example 
our long-run investments plan puts major emphasis on ensuring all our children 
get a heahhy start in life and come to school ready to learn."*' 
Address by the President to the Joint Session of Congress 17/2/93. 
[http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov] 
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The continued level of high unemployment was a matter of concern to the 
electorate in general and Bill Clinton in particular. The level of economic growth 
which the American economy experienced in 1992 was effectively growth without 
job creation. Industries utilised their existing assets to increase production 
without increasing employment levels; employees were working harder to receive 
the same benefits of employment, personal incomes stagnated and job security 
was reduced. The Clinton administration needed some economic policies to be 
seen to be effective in the short term. A jobs bill would provide such evidence 
and demonstrate, in contrast to the Bush administration, the Clinton, 'New 
Democrat', administration's commitment to activist economic and domestic 
policies. 
Selling Both Spending & Deficit Reduction 
The Administration's economic package was revealed on February 17, 
1993 during President Clinton's State of the Union address. The President's 
economic programme was outlined as a trinity of policies: firstly a $30 bn 
economic stimulus package; secondly, an investment package which would 
"correct an infi-astructure deficit that allegedly had arisen under the previous 
Republican administrations"**^ ; and thirdly, $704 bn in deficit reduction over five 
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years. 
During his address to the Joint Session of Congress President Clinton 
made this request. 
Campbell Colin & Bert A. Rockman Eds. The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals, p.269 
Ibid. 
100 
" I call on Congress to enact an immediate package of jobs investments of 
over $30 billion, to put people to work now, to create half a million jobs; 
to rebuild our highways and airports, to renovate housing, to bring life to 
rural communities and spread hope and opportunity among our nation's 
youth".** 
From this announcement, it would appear that the main thrust of the Clinton 
administration's stimulus package would be job creation. However, upon closer 
examination it becomes clear that job creation was just one part of a much 
broader spending agenda. Less than half of the fiinds appropriated for this project 
would be dedicated to so called public works schemes and job creation. In the 
immediate spending portion the moneys were allocated thus: 
• $16.26 bn new budget authority 
• $3.24 bn transportation trust fund spending 
• $3.3 bn loans (FY 1993) 
• $ 12 bn tax cuts for business (FY 1993 & 1994) 
Of these four elements the most important is the $16.26 billion of new budget 
authority, i.e. the stimulus package. Rather than the bulk of the money being 
earmarked for job creation, it becomes clear that the stimulus package was in fact 
a vehicle for providing fiinds for social welfare programmes such as child 
immunisation, housing loans, meat and poultry inspection, and unemployment 
insurance. The breakdown of the actual spending schedule is a shadow of its 
initial promise. 
• $4 bn unemployment insurance 
• $4.2 bn (of which $3.2 bn in trust fund) transportation 
Address by the President to the Joint Session of Congress 17/2/93. 
[http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov] 
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• $4.9 bn other construction and maintenance 
• $3.4 bn education 
• $ 1.5 bn other social programmes 
• $ 900 m business and technology programmes 
• $700 m summer jobs programmes for youths 
• $ 60 m variety of governments funded jobs*^  
Approximately 40 per cent of this spending was targeted at construction 
projects, providing funds for an industry with continued high unemployment. 
However, many of the programmes which have received funding bear little 
relation to the supposed focus of this spending initiative. The package appears to 
have been assembled fi^om a collection of needy projects within each of the 
cabinet departments. As Elizabeth Drew suggests, "The 0MB asked cabinet 
departments to suggest programmes that could get money into the economy 
without regard for coherence."^ 
Following the address to the Joint Session of Congress, public and 
congressional support for the President's budgetary initiatives was high. '^ The 
stimulus package garnered a high level of support fi-om public officials at the local 
level; legislators, mayors, county officials. This grass roots support was purely 
the support of self interest as these officials were fully aware of the range of 
benefits which they could derive for their districts fi-om the provisions of the 
stimulus package. This support was augmented at the national level through 
Senate and House liberal Democrats, in effect, equally those who beUeved that 
«'Healey,Jon. "Clinton's Stimulus Plan Is Picking Up Speed." CQWR. 13/3/93 p.580-81 
°^ Drew Pii^^toh On The Hdge: The Clinton Presidency. (1994) p. 115 
Hagar, George. "Clinton Program Sails Ahead Despite Turmoil on ffiU." CQWR. 27/2/93 
p.442 
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their constituencies had most to gain from the passing of the legislation.^ ^ 
The presentation of the stimulus package as a supplemental appropriations 
bill confronted many legislators with a serious dilemma. The electorate had 
whole-heartedly endorsed deficit reduction as the most important issue of the 
1992 election, and this elevated proposals to deal with the problem to a position 
of primacy on the legislative agenda. The Clinton administration was attempting 
to present the stimulus package concurrently with its budget proposals, which in 
turn would attempt to fialfil the campaign promise to reduce the federal deficit. 
Congressional legislative agendas necessitated that deficit reduction remained the 
primary objective, regardless of impulses to deliver the new President a positive 
result for his stimulus measures. Additionally, the varied provisions of the 
stimulus package provided distractions from the primary objective of the stimulus 
package - job creation. For many legislators job creation was almost of equal 
importance to deficit reduction. With this measure so well concealed beneath 
layers of unrelated social programmes, it became increasingly diflficuh for 
Representatives and Senators to justify increased spending in areas that were not 
job related. 
The budget resolution, while not providing any new legislation, does 
provide Congress with the operational guidelines for that year's fiscal legislation, 
in other words it bound Congress to the overall figures for 1994 including the 
levels for appropriations, taxation and entitlements. By passing the budget 
resolution before the stimulus package Democrat leaders were able to 
demonstrate their commitment to cutting the federal deficit, and their willingness 
Healey, Jon. "Even Foes Predict Some Version of Stimulus Plan Will Pass." CQWR. 
27/3/93 p.736 
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to embark upon spending cuts in areas such as entitlements and tax increases on 
the wealthy. This commitment would stand them in good stead with their 
constituents when it came to authorising the spending measures included in the 
stimulus package. 
The Stimulus Package: Republican Opposition 
Congressional work on the stimulus plan started almost directly after 
President Clinton's State of the Union Address. Democrat leaders worked hard 
to ensure that all ten appropriations subcommittees approved President Clinton's 
proposal by February 24. Key Democrats, including Senate Budget Committee 
Chairman Jim Sasser and Joint Economic Committee Chairman Representative 
David Obey, had lobbied the administration on the content of the stimulus 
package thereby ensuring their own involvement in the crafting of the legislation 
as a whole. After a quick start on the stimulus package, progress was slowed as 
the leadership within the House of Representatives decided that a different 
approach would be necessary in order to guarantee the passage of the legislation. 
The stimulus package was delayed until the House had voted upon the budget 
resolution because this would tie members to Clinton's full budget agenda, 
including some popular spending cuts. In addition to which, during the 
subcommittee stage, many Republicans embarked upon delaying tactics in a vain 
attempt to force a compromise on the provisions of the bill. 
Throughout their attempts to delay the entire economic plan, the 
Republicans never seemed to be completely unified in their objective. Clinton's 
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deficit reduction plans were attacked because they focused too heavily on taxation 
rather than spending cuts to achieve their aim. However, Republicans themselves 
were divided over whether there were instances in which increased taxation could 
be justified, especially in the field of deficit reduction. More than anything else 
however, the Republicans' inability or unwillingness to provide an alternative to 
the Clinton plan reduced the effectiveness of their negative campaign. 
Republicans realised that, if they provided an ahemative plan, the focus of the 
debate would move away from the broad ideas of budgetary policy to more 
specific issues such as welfare entitlements, food assistance, and child 
immunisation.^ ^ These spending areas would all be targets for Republican 
spending cuts, cuts which would be unpopular in comparison to the options which 
the Clinton administration were promoting. 
A fijrther limitation on the RepubUcans' assauh on the CHnton economic 
plan was the differing rules and operating procedures of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. Under House rules, budgetary poUcies are 
protected from major revision through amendment. In the Senate, no such 
protection is accorded the legislative proposal; Senate RepubUcans possessed 
considerably more scope for blocking or amending the stimulus package than their 
House counterparts. Furthermore, a slimmer Democrat majority in the Senate 
(57-43) than in the House (258-176) presented Democrats with an increasingly 
difficuh task when attempting to construct the super-majority needed to override 
Senate filibusters. Democrats would be able to fend off Republican amendments 
with a simple 51% vote but in order to override a filibuster they would require 
Hagar, George. "Clinton Program Sails Ahead Despite Turmoil on Hill." CQWR. 27/2/93 
p.445 
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two thirds majority vote - 10 votes over their majority. 
All of these factors made the progress of the economic plan in general, and 
the stimulus package in particular, a test of the new administration's ability to 
construct a workable congressional coalition, to develop policy which satisfied a 
variety of constituencies and to secure a significant legislative victory within the 
first few months of the administration. At the centre of congressional 
Republicans' opposition to the stimulus package was the actual necessity for such 
a piece of legislation given the strong growth figures for both 1991 and 1992. 
How could the administration claim that an economic emergency existed - belief 
in which was required for the funds for be moved from defence to domestic 
appropriations - when the economy was so obviously expanding? Republican 
attempts to slow the bill on their own failed, however, they gained the support of 
some House Democrats equally concerned with administration requests for 
further deficit spending. This development focused attention on the need for cuts 
in some programmes associated with the stimulus package and also the possibility 
that the administration would have to be willing to compromise in order to secure 
the passage of legislation through Congress.^ "* 
The Stimulus Package Struggle 
By March 9, House Appropriations committees had approved Clinton's 
stimulus package with virtually no changes. Democrats in the House of 
Representatives remained unified throughout the appropriations stage of the 
Healey, Jon. "Rushed Stimulus Package Held Pending Spending Cuts Bill." CQWR. 27/2/93 
p.448 
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debate but this did not prevent conservative House Democrats from trying to trim 
certain programmes. Only two changes were eventually made to Clinton's 
proposal: energy efficiency improvements at the Defense Department and loans to 
businesses on Indian reservations. This came to just $11 million of the whole 
proposal. All in all, the House spent just 20 days considering the President's 
request; illustrating the possibilities of overcoming congressional gridlock when 
both the President and Congress have similar objectives. 
The budget resolution and the economic stimulus package cleared the 
House of Representatives on March 18 by votes of 243 - 183 and 235 - 190 
respectively, just over one month after it was first presented to the nation. It is 
claimed that the White House success can be attributed to ground work pursued 
by President Clinton prior to the floor vote.^ ^ Taking advantage of the 
Democratic party's links at the local level Clinton initiated grassroots lobbying for 
his stimulus package as well as to courting House members to secure their 
support. Having overcome this first battle, the administration had then to 
prepare for a different type of conflict in the Senate. 
The difficulties which the administration would face were numerous. 
Timing was of crucial importance given that the Easter recess was imminent. If 
the Senate was to break in the middle of its deliberations, any momentum which 
the stimulus package had gained would be lost. Such a delay would also affect 
the viability of some of the programmes which required appropriations to be 
approved early in order to enact summer programmes. As well as the agenda 
Berke, Richard L. "Looking for Alliance, Clinton Courts Congress Nonstop." New York 
Times. 8/3/93 p.Al „ . * „ nf\K\rx> inn/o^ ^^H^ey, Jon. "Stimulus Bill Prevails in House, But Senate BatUe Awaits. CQWR. 20/3/93 
p.649 
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limitations, the new administration had to cope with institutional limitations. As 
previously mentioned the Democrat majority in the Senate, being slimmer, 
combined with differing procedural rules would make it more difficult for the 
Democrats to secure a vote on the supplemental bill. Individual Senators possess 
more power, and are more assertive and protective of their own agenda than 
members of the House of Representatives. Courting Senators takes considerable 
amounts of political skill and capital. 
The Stimulus package was supported in the Senate by a number of 
moderate - liberal Democrats including Sen. Robert C. Byrd of the Appropriations 
Committee. He indicated that, like House Appropriations Chairman William H. 
Natcher, he would like to pass the CUnton package without alterations. However, 
other Democrat members of the committee had doubts about the content of the 
supplemental. So strong were these doubts that two leading Democrats, John B. 
Breaux and David L. Boren presented an alternative to the Clinton package, 
which would act as a compromise for many conservative Senators. The 
amendment aimed to tie half of the appropriations to congressional acceptance of 
the budget reconciliation bill and therefore the spending cuts contained therein. 
The development of such events at the committee stage gave a strong indication 
to the White House that unlike in the House of Representatives, they would need 
to be more willing to compromise in order to secure the 50 votes needed for the 
stimulus to pass. 
The amendment proposed by Boren and Breaux brought them into direct 
conflict with Byrd, undermining the Democrat position within the Senate and 
97 Healey,CQWR. 20/3/93 p.651 
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allowing the Republicans to concentrate their efforts on finding a way to block the 
stimulus package. The Congressional Quarterly notes that the 'T)emocrats saw it 
as a key test of Clinton's authority. Republicans saw it as a battle over their role 
in the new era of Democrat dominance in Washington".'* In an attempt to secure 
more RepubUcan support the White House trimmed down the stimulus package, 
cutting several programmes including summer jobs for youths, highway 
construction, child immunisation, AIDS treatment, construction of wastewater 
treatment facilities, meat inspection and small business assistance.^  
However, these concessions proved insufficient for the White House to 
force a decision before the Easter recess. Democrat Senators also consistently 
failed to secure enough votes to cut off the debate and ultimately the Republicans 
filibustered the stimulus package to death. On April 21, after four failed attempts 
at cloture. Senate majority leader George Mitchell decided not to proceed any 
further with the stimulus package and conceded defeat. This decision dealt a huge 
blow to the Clinton presidency just 92 days after the inauguration. 
Unwilling to accept total defeat. Senate Democrats pushed individual 
pieces of the stimulus package through on their own. Ahnost immediately the $4 
bn provision for extended unemployment benefits was passed by a voice vote; the 
House followed suit on April 22. I f Congress had not acted upon this 
appropriation before the end of April, some 1.8 million Americans would have 
stopped receiving benefits. While Republicans were willing to block 
appropriations to social programmes which were not job related, it would have 
^ Healey, Jon. "Republicans Slam the Brakes On Economic Stimulus Plan. CQWR. 3/4/93 
p.817 
''Hea 
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Healey, Jon. "Some Projects Could Wither As Stimulus Bill Languishes." CQWR. 17/4/93 
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been political suicide for them not to support appropriations for an important 
entitlement area. The failure of the stimulus package provided the Clinton 
administration with a practical illustration of not only the institutional differences 
between the House of Representatives and the Senate, but also the necessity, in 
this era of slim congressional margins, of seeking out bipartisan support for 
important legislative measures. Although the stimulus package was an integral 
part of the economic plan, its failure did not directly jeopardise the future of the 
budget or deficit reduction measures, these provisions were capable of standing 
on their own. However, the defeat of the stimulus package, and, by association, 
the investment initiative, gave added importance to the success of deficit 
reduction measures. The most important part of the Clinton package was left to 
stand alone and it was clear that the success or failure of this provision would 
mark the success or failure of the Clinton administration as a whole. 
The Battle for the Budget 
The annual budget can be seen to be the single most important piece of legislation 
to come from the White House and Clinton's deficit reduction package was an 
integral part of the 1993 budget reconciliation. Whereas the budget resolution 
provided Congress with targets to aim at in their consideration of the annual 
budget, the reconciUation requires that the House and the Senate thrash out their 
differences with regard to appropriations, and that the President compromise his 
own objectives in order to produce a single piece of legislation detailing 
government spending and taxation for the next fiscal year. Deficit reduction 
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Clinton style required Congress to accept increased taxation on businesses and the 
wealthy, cuts in entitlements and a new fiiel tax based on the heat content of fijels 
consumed (Btu). 
All of these areas proved to be highly contentious and pitted members of 
both parties against one another: Democrats determined to hold on to 
entitlements, and Republicans equally determined to prevent tax increases in any 
form. The budget reconciUation can normally be viewed as a battle of wills; a 
demonstration of the power of congressional committees and sub-committees, and 
particularly their chairs; the differing personalities of the House and the Senate, 
and the differing agendas represented by the two institutions at either end of 
Pennsylvania Avenue. That is, the White House's objective to fulfil campaign 
commitments versus congressional loyalty to constituents and local interests. 
In 1993, the additional factor of Republican Party unity within both the 
House and the Senate combined with a Democratic Party divided over loyalty to 
constituency, party or President, brought about a close decision on the fate of 
Clinton's attempts to reduce the federal deficit. From the outset, congressional 
Republicans refiised to play any part in approving the Clinton budget proposals 
and the ultimate test for Clinton, therefore, was whether he was able to build the 
coalition necessary to secure the passage of the budget. 
CUnton presented his budget proposal to Congress on April 8, 1993. 
Work on the budget traditionally starts annually in February. However, 
exceptional circumstances, brought about by President Bush's unv^ngness to 
present his own detailed budget proposal, left Clinton with no budget to rework 
for his own ends. Most incoming Presidents use the budget of their predecessor 
I l l 
as a template, without such a template the Clinton administration started from 
scratch directly after the election.'"" As noted earlier. Congress diverted from its 
usual course and approved the resolution on the promise of deficit reduction 
before considering the stimulus package, thus allowing the administration time to 
work on its own line-by-line budget. The contents of the budget were little 
different from the condensed version of the proposal which was delivered to 
Capitol Hill in mid February. This new document outlined in detail programme by 
programme spending requests and policy proposals. Committee action on these 
proposals would finally lead to the thirteen individual appropriations bills and the 
single budget reconciliation. 
The committee which centred its attention on crafting the huge deficit 
reduction bill was the House Ways and Means committee. This committee's 
primary responsibility is the shaping of taxation policy and health and welfare 
entitlements; consequently, it falls to this committee to find most of the savings. 
Deliberations began in early May in an attempt to meet the May 14 deadline, by 
which time it was apparent that the objectives of the White House and the 
members of the committee were very divergent. The membership of the 
committee was overwhelmingly Democrat but this did not necessarily mean that 
members would embrace all of Clinton's tax proposals. The most contentious 
areas were investment tax credits, the Btu tax, empowerment zones, and taxation 
on the overseas royalty income of multi-national corporations. 
The reasons for the differing opinions were numerous; Clinton's 
attachment to investment tax credits goes back to his support of the stimulus 
Hagar, George. "$1.8 Billion Spring Supplemental To Be Paired With Jobs Bill." CQWR-
10/4/93 p.886 
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package and the tax credits which would have been available under the investment 
portion of that proposal, congressional resistance to it is related to their rejection 
of the stimulus package. As one of the largest energy consumers in the world, the 
US pays little for its consumption. Clinton's proposal for a tax on the 
consumption of energy in relation to its heat content was an attempt to tap an 
unused revenue source and also to tax users of wasteful fuels. However, 
Congressmen from a variety of states wanted concessions for particular groups, 
for example, farmers, industrial producers such as the aluminium industry, and 
energy producers who might be forced to absorb the tax if it could not be levied 
on the consumer. Without concessions for these groups. Congressmen refused to 
support any such energy tax. Representatives of distressed urban areas objected to 
Clinton's plan to designate empowerment zones with tax breaks and federal 
assistance, not because of what they would receive, but rather because they 
beUeved that it did not go far enough. 
The single area of consensus, especially among Democrats was the 
planned increases in corporate taxation. The White House proposed to increase 
the tax rate from 34% to 36%, whereas the majority of Committee Democrats 
supported a l%i increase to 35%. Such a change in the rate would roughly halve 
the revenue raised, but still raise $15 billion over five years. The largest revenue 
income increases were destined to come from income tax increases on high 
income earners. Republican members unified to prevent any increases insisting 
that the real losers in any income tax increases will be the middle classes who 
would be doubly hit by any energy tax.^ "' 
Cloud, David S. "Tension, Closed Meeting Mark Early Work on Clinton Plan." CQWR. 
8/5/93 p. 1129-1130 
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Republican attempts to push through amendments to the Btu tax and the 
Social Security tax were overturned wholeheartedly by the committee Democrats 
who united behind President Clinton's proposals. Following the example of the 
Ways and Means Committee, twelve other committees had turned the budget 
blueprint into $340 billion of specific deficit reduction legislation by the 
appropriations deadline of May 14. This deficit reduction legislation closely 
resembled the whole package which Clinton had initially requested; it illustrated 
Clinton's vision for the US economy in 1998 and by promising to halve the 
federal deficit by 1998 Clinton placed much of his fijture in the success of this 
single important piece of legislation. The endorsement of the Ways and Means 
Committee and its Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, provided the Clinton 
administration with the reassurance that the House of Representatives would 
stand behind his budget and they were willing to work with him to secure its 
passage. The final obstacle for Clinton's budget in the House was the 
reconciliation of the thirteen appropriations bills by the Budget Committee and the 
final floor debate. 
Successfiil passage could only be secured through coalition building on the 
part of the White House. It was evident fi^om the committee stage that the 
Republicans would do little to assist the reconciliation or compromise on certain 
issues, therefore Clinton's only option was to ensure that all House Democrats 
were willing to support his programme. Wooing conservative Democrats to 
support the tax increases, and liberal Democrats to support entitlement cuts was 
crucial. Despite having control of the House, the Democrats did not have a large 
enough majority to be assured of wiiming. Concessions fi-om the White House on 
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the size of the energy tax and cuts in entitlements were needed to guarantee 
enough votes for the reconciliation to clear the House. The final vote was just 
three Democrats away fi"om failure, with thirty eight Democrats voting with the 
Republicans (219-213).*"^ The passage of the reconciliation was far fi-om the 
landslide for which the Clinton Administration was hoping. Certain agreements 
were made with House Democrats which held the Clinton administration to the 
content of the reconciliation to be produced by the Senate. One of these 
conditions was the presence of an energy based tax. With a slimmer Senate 
majority to work with the concessions and debates within the finance committee 
would be even more heated than in the House, and it looked likely that the White 
House would have to be more willing to settle for less than it had initially asked. 
In the Senate's deliberations, the same issues which caused controversy in 
the House continued to make the passage of the budget reconciliation less certain. 
There was great impetus to reduce the levels of taxes and increase the spending 
cuts. The balancing act was very delicate as the White House could not afford to 
lose votes because of certain concessions designed to win votes. So difficuh was 
the balancing act that the Btu tax, which would have raised $72 billion, was 
dropped by the Senate Finance Committee in order to assure that the whole 
budget plan was not discarded. With a Democrat majority of just two (11-9) on 
the Finance Committee, it was important that all Democrats could be united 
behind the budget and the Btu tax was the most divisive issue, pitting energy 
states against farm states and both wanting concessions for their constituents. 
The revenue gap caused by abandoning the Btu tax had to be filled with 
Hagar, George & David S. Cloud. "Democrats Pull Off Scpjeaker In Approving Clinton 
Plan. CQWR. 29/5/93 p. 1341 
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revenue savings from other areas. With increasing uncertainty over whether 
another type of fiiel tax would be on the agenda. Senators were seeking out other 
areas which could raise the additional funds to help Clinton reach his deficit 
reduction target. Medicare and Medicaid were two programmes to come under 
pressure, despite the fact that Medicare was due to experience a $48 billion cut in 
its appropriations. House Democrats had protected these programmes on the 
understanding that the Btu tax would be taken up by the Senate. This U-turn 
threatened to de-rail the final conference bill as it would possibly "provoke a 
backlash from House liberals"'"^ who had voted for the Btu tax because of the 
promise of its presence in the final Senate bill. 
The final and most spectacular event in this whole deficit reduction saga 
was to come with the final Senate vote. President Clinton had found it difficult to 
keep all of the Senate Democrats behind his proposal. So much so that Al Gore 
had to cast the Vice-President's tie breaking vote for the first time in seventeen 
years. With the passage of the deficit reduction bill through the Senate (50 - 49), 
President Clinton finally secured one of his major poUcy initiatives, despite 
receiving limited levels of support from Congress. 
The Final Outcome 
The example of the Clinton economic package raises a number of 
interesting questions about policy initiation within the administration. The 
importance of the economic package was stressed from the time of the campaign 
Cloud, David S. & Alissa J. Rubin. "Energy Tax, Medicare Cuts Focus of Senate BatUe.' 
COWR. 12/6/93 p. 1463 
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and illustrated by the care and consideration which Clinton gave to his economic 
appointments. More than in any other sphere of his administration Clinton 
worked towards greater ideological coherence rather than diversity. The White 
House and Executive Branch were organised and directed in a manner consistent 
with the demands of the policy area and familiar to external actors. The result of 
this diligence, however, was that the legislation which was presented to Congress 
was overwhelmingly rejected by a hostile and unified RepubUcan party and 
reluctantly supported by the Democratic party. While the economic poUcy 
community within the administration were focused upon its task, its interaction 
with other, less organised, areas of the administration resulted in an incoherent 
message being passed from the White House to Capitol Hill. In addition, the 
economic package was put in the hands of Congressmen who were unfamiliar 
with the role of supporting presidential initiatives and fighting for them in the face 
of a united opposition. Weatherford and McDonnell cite these as just two of the 
several reasons why Clinton was unable to achieve all that he might have desired 
from his economic policy initiatives.'"'* 
Despite a united attempt from the RepubUcans to destroy the whole 
economic package, their only large scale success was forcing the administration to 
abandon the Stimulus Package, but later to resurrect a portion of it purely as an 
extension of unemployment insurance. Through the budget reconciliation Clinton 
secured his deficit reduction measures in line with his initial spending requests and 
tax increases (top individual tax rate raised to 36%, corporate tax raised to 35%, 
104 Weatherford, M. Stephen & Lorraine M. McDonnell. "Clinton and the Economy: The 
Paradox of Policy Success and Political Mishap" Political Science Quarterly Vol. lll,No.3 
(1996) 
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Social Security recipients to be taxed on 85% of their income, 8c per gallon 
gasoline tax and the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit). In addition this 
part of his investment package remained intact and passed through Congress.'"' 
This is not the record of a failed economic package, but it is a record that could 
have done with some improvement. 
Conclusion 
The loss of the stimulus package, while a psychological blow for the 
administration and disastrous for the public's perception of the Clinton 
administration, was not a great loss for the economy. As has already been shown, 
the need for such a package had passed and it was always strongly debated 
whether a package of that size would ever have achieved all that it promised. 
Clinton's planning mechanisms during the transition, and exemplified by the 
economic summit, should have revealed the weaknesses in the policy rationale, 
however, the culture of box scoring presidential promises and achievements 
undoubtedly sustained presidential interest in continuing with the stimulus 
package. 
In light of the level of economic growth in the final quarter of 1992, the 
focus of the administration upon reducing the deficit made both political and 
economic sense, but the results of such a focus would be long term, not satisfying 
the short term political needs which new Presidents constantly seek to address in 
the first months of their term of office. In terms of his transition, the stimulus 
package made political sense, demonstrating presidential activity and the ability to 
105 Weatherford & McDonnell, op. cit., p. 423 
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keep promises. However, the more central role of economic and budgetary policy 
within the annual legislative cycle necessarily took precedence. Clinton's 
experiences with his economic poUcy provided him with a glimpse of the 
challenges he would face in seeking to realise other aspects of his policy agenda. 
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Table 1 
Question: Regardless of how you intend to vote, which candidate do you think 
would do the best job of solving the country's economic problems? 
1992 Clinton Perot Bush 
July 36% 28% 17% 
12-14 October 37 29 23 
16-17 October 36 30 21 
31 October-
2 November 
35 33 25 
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Any discussion of the early policy choices of the new 
Clintonadministration would be incomplete without a consideration of health care 
reform, a defining issue of the Clinton campaign. Clinton believed that the 
provision of health care services in the U.S. had reached a crisis point and the only 
solution was to bring about significant reforms. These reforms would bring an 
end to the piecemeal nature of care and coverage and reduce the ever rising costs 
of providing care to all members of society. Success in reforming the provision of 
health care in the United States could produce the defining element of the Clinton 
presidency, failure to secure this reform had the potential to jeopardise the fiiture 
of his legislative agenda and brand the Clinton presidency as a failure. 
The following discussion of Clinton's health care reform proposals 
analyses the practical and theoretical foundations upon which it was built, the 
organisational mechanisms by which the reforms were developed, the policy 
options available to the administration and the outcome of the deliberative 
process. Additionally, the influence of actors beyond the executive branch is 
related to the process of policy development and the substance of the reforms 
proposed. Finally, consideration is given to the role of health care reform in the 
transition process. 
For Bill Clinton the 1992 election campaign was about change; change 
rather than more of the same. Central to this vision of change was health care 
reform. Providing some form of national health insurance for all Americans 
would allow Clinton to put in place the "great missing piece of the liberal 
agenda".^ "* Health care reform, like many other issues, became part of the 
Ranade, Wendy. "US Health Care Reform: The Strategy that Failed" Public Money and 
Management July-September 1995) p.9 
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Clinton agenda through his links to the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) 
and it was introduced into the campaign agenda during the nomination contest. 
Health care reform was seen as a way of attracting middle class voters and would 
also be instrumental in achieving the goal of deficit reduction. Clinton's intention 
was to put a halt to the rising costs of health care for those with insurance, and to 
provide adequate coverage for those who had either insuflBcient insurance or no 
cover at all. The impetus for such an ambitious programme of reform came from 
a number of directions. Primarily, on an economic level, reform was necessary for 
a number of reasons: the health care system of the United States consumed 14% 
of its gross domestic product (GDP)-that is one dollar in every seven is spent on 
health care-and health care costs were rising at twice the rate of inflation; health 
insurance insecurity hindered the free movement of labour within the market; and 
rising costs of personal cover resulted in up to 60 million Americans having 
inadequate insurance to pay for their own health care in time of need. 
The question facing any administration attempting to change the system of 
health care provision was whether controlling costs or securing universal 
coverage was more important. Such a dilemma was made more difficuh when 
considered in relation to Clinton's aims to cut the federal deficit. Would cutting 
the cost of health care ultimately allow him to provide universal coverage without 
harming the progress of reducing the deficit? If this was not the case, would both 
objectives be attainable and should the administration even attempt to legislate for 
both? 
Despite the limitations the economy placed on President Clinton's scope 
for reform within the heath care arena, it soon became clear that it was his 
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intention to tackle both costs and coverage. It was necessary for Clinton to 
attempt to reduce costs to counter allegations of him being a 'tax and spend 
liberal'. Moreover, the political importance of providing universal coverage went 
beyond providing health care for the uninsured, universal coverage was also an 
important issue for middle class Americans. Under the present system the 
working poor and the elderly received medical coverage from the government 
through Medicaid and Medicare. Rising medical costs had had the greatest 
impact on the lives of middle class Americans who suddenly found themselves to 
be insufl5ciently covered-for a number of reasons-or had to constantly renegotiate 
with employers for more affordable health insurance. In consequence "As more 
of the middle classes experienced the fear and degradation the uninsured poor had 
lived with for years, calls for action became more urgent"."" 
Health Care Reform: A Historical Perspective 
Reform of the health care system has been attempted four times in the 
past: during the Progressive era, under the New Deal, as part of Truman's Fair 
Deal, and also by the Nixon Administration.'"* Reform during the Progressive era 
was an elite led movement which never generated popular support. Franklin D. 
Roosevelt considered providing universal health insurance during the New Deal, 
however tackling unemployment was his main priority and health care was never 
promoted as a priority issue. The most comprehensive attempts at health care 
reform have been those of Presidents Truman and Nixon. Health care was an 
Ranade, op. cit., p.9 
'"^  Marmor, Theodore, R. Understanding Health Care Refonn. p.6 
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important issue in the 1948 election and Truman's ambitions to provide health 
insurance for social security recipients eventually became reality as Medicare 
under President Johnson in 1965. Nixon attempted a mandated heahh insurance 
plan for employed Americans, the Comprehensive Heahh Insurance Plan, but it 
enjoyed little congressional support. Historical precedent, for health care reform 
existed, but, previous attempts did not achieve cost reduction or universal 
coverage for a variety of reasons. Since at least the 1970s when President Nixon 
proposed the Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan (1972), there has been little 
change in the circumstances of the crisis or in the solutions proposed to that crisis. 
Bill Clinton's campaign rhetoric in relation to heahh care was slim on specifics; 
uniting a disgruntled middle class with the under and uninsured around the 
concept of accessible and affordable health care. 
Certain issues combined in the late 1980s and early 1990s to make health 
care reform thinkable. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union gave greater saliency to domestic issues. There is evidence to 
suggest that citizens had been aware of the crisis in health care long before the 
nation's leaders began offering alternatives, they were uncertain of their job 
prospects because of the recession and acutely aware of the need to hold on to 
jobs which provided them with health insurance.'"^ Insurance companies had 
become the victims of fraudulent billing practices by some doctors, laboratories 
and hospitals (who were themselves facing serious debt problems)."" It was not 
Brodie, Mollyann & Robert J. Blendon. "The Public's Contribution to Congressional 
Gridlock on Health Care Reform." Journal of Health Politics. Pohcv & Law. Vol. 20, No. 2 
(1995) p.404: In a 1991 poll respondants stated that the cost of health care (65.1%) was a more 
serious economic and social concern than AIDS (57.5%), the federal deficit (52.7%) and crime 
(46.8%). 
"° Braithwaite, Jeffrey. "Health-Care Reform Under President Clinton; Issues, Ideas and 
Implications." Australian Journal of Public Administration. Vol.54, No. 1 (1995) p. 103 
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until the 1992 presidential election and candidate Clinton's campaign pledge to 
tackle the health care problem in America that it returned as a major domestic 
issue v^th a distinctive policy profile. 
What had become apparent to reformers was that all other western 
democracies managed to provide comprehensive health care for their citizens at a 
fraction of the cost spent by the United States.'" In addition, it appeared that 
without reform the trend was going to continue and that the longer reform was 
delayed the harder it would be to make any kind of meaningfiil impact upon the 
process. Before any change to the system could be embarked upon a coherent 
plan had to be developed. In 'Understanding Health Care Reform' it is contended 
that to succeed such reform needs to be buih upon three principles: firstly the 
three elements of the current medical crisis-cost, access, and quality; secondly that 
any reform has to have the ability to be implemented quickly; and thirdly, there is 
a need to be prudent in the choice of reform: "The stakes are too high. . . to put all 
our faith in one theory, model or mechanism.""^ Bearing this in mind, did the 
Clinton plan ever have any chance of success? 
Creation of the Presidential Task Force 
In an attempt to put health care at the top of the legislative agenda during 
the first year of his administration. President Clinton announced the estabUshment 
of the Task Force on National Health Care Reform on January 25 1993 (just five 
Per citizen expenditure on health care in the US in 1991 was $2868, as compared with 
$1915 in Canada, $1659 in Germany, and $1307 in Britain. Taken from data presented in 
Marmor p. 3 supplied by OECD. 
Marmor, op. cit., p. 14 -15 
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days after his inauguration). He stated that the Task Force's mission was simple: 
"to build on the work of the campaign and transition, to listen to all parties, and to 
prepare health care reform legislation that I will submit to Congress this 
spring.""^ Rather than placing the responsibility for devising a plan for health 
care reform within one of the government departments such as Health and Human 
Services, he placed Hillary Rodham Clinton at the head of this extra governmental 
organisation. His initial promise was that Mrs Clinton and her team, which 
included Donna Shalala (Secretary of Health and Human Services), Lloyd Bentsen 
(Treasury Secretary), Ira Magaziner (White House Advisor), and other senior 
members of the White House staff would produce a health care plan by May 1, 
1993. The keeping of this initial promise may have been crucial to the success of 
the whole reform agenda. 
Since the passage of nepotism legislation following President Kennedy's 
appointment of his brother, Robert Kennedy, as Attorney General, Presidents 
have been prevented fi^om placing members of their family in positions of 
authority within government. During the transition period it became apparent that 
Hillary Rodham Clinton would have a decisive role within the Clinton 
administration. During the transition it was decided that Mrs Clinton would 
establish her office in the West Wmg of the White House"* where the President 
and his top aides have their offices; the First Lady traditionally establishes her 
office within the East Wing. The announcement of her position, as head of the 
Task Force, came as little surprise to spectators throughout Washington D.C. 
This did not, however, prevent the initial debates over health care reform focusing 
Statement of President Clinton. 25 January, 1993 [http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov]. 
Drew, op. cit., p.23 
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upon the nature of the planning body rather than the substance of the proposed 
reform. 
The formation of such a Task Force is not unusual in American politics. 
Presidents throughout the modem era have used presidential advisory mechanisms 
of one type or another. Thomas R. Wolanin, in his book Presidential Advisory 
Commissions, identifies six properties which distinguish presidential advisory 
commissions from all other types of information gathering organisations: they are 
a corporate group created by a pubUc act; which is advisory to the presidential; all 
members of which are appointed by the President; which is ad hoc; at least one 
member of which is public; and whose report is public."^ The Clinton Task Force 
on health care reform fulfils these requirements. Therefore, it was not the lack of 
precedent for such an organisation which caused critical comment, but rather its 
membership and procedures. 
In addition to the Task Force headed by Hillary Clinton, an 
interdepartmental working group was formed under the leadership of Ira 
Magaziner. Magaziner had been engaged, during the transition in defining the 
focus areas for any discussion of health care reform. The workmg group of some 
five hundred people, divided into thirty four sub-groups each addressing diBFerent 
questions within the health care reform area, worked in complete isolation from 
the rest of the policy process "to assemble information and ideas and to provide 
poUcy options for the Task Force.""* It was the role of the Task Force to use the 
information gathered by the working groups in its recommendations to the 
Wolanin, Thomas R. Presidential Advisory Commissions, p.7 
Gregory S. Walden On Best Behaviour: The Clinton Administration and Ethics in 
Government, p. 104 
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President; and only the Task Force would be able to provide the President with 
policy options. Health care experts from throughout the United States served on 
the Task Force's working groups, as did congressional and White House staff. 
The press, members of Congress and lobbyists were all by-passed by secret 
meetings. Before the Task Force had an opportunity to develop a plan for health 
care reform, its composition and the nature of its deliberations came under critical 
attention from some of the most powerfiil groups within Washington. 
The process which Clinton chose to refine the health care policy debate 
came under formal attack before the Task Force had had an opportunity to hold 
any meetings. The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, the 
American Council for Health Care Reform, and the National Legal Centre filed a 
lawsuit in the federal court on February 24, 1993. They claimed that the White 
House was violating Federal open meeting laws and sought access to their 
meetings and records. On March 10, 1993, US District Judge Royce C. Lamberth 
ruled that the "Task Force's informational meetings must be open to the public, 
on the ground that Hillary CUnton is not a federal employee"."^ However, the 
Task Force was exempt from holding open meetings when it was giving advice 
directly to the President. The distinction of the Task Force's responsibilities in 
this case was made more complicated by the presence of the working group. It 
was ruled that, as this was just a fact gathering organisation, it was exempt from 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act and their meetings could be held in private. 
It was the intention of the administration not to reveal the identities of the 
consultants and staff aides who were working towards a legislative proposal. 
m AlissaJ. Rubin "Hush-Hush Ruled No-No". COWR 13 March 1993 p.598 
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Under the 1972 Federal Advisory Committee Act, the decisions on policy and the 
discussions of the Task Force may be kept private, but the identities of the 
members of working groups and the information which they passed to the Task 
Force must be made pubUc."^ The March ruling was overturned by the Federal 
Appeals court on June 22, 1993, by Judge Lawrence Silberman of the District of 
Colombia Circuit Court, declaring that Hillary Clinton was a de facto federal 
employee and, therefore, it was legal for the Task Force to hold its meetings in 
secret. By this time the Task Force had been disbanded and the court's decision 
was a mere formality and had no effect upon the decision making process. 
The legality of holding secret meetings was only one criticism which faced 
the Task Force. Special interest organisations contended that while the Task 
Force's meetings were secret they could not be certain who was providing 
information to the Task Force and whether their interests were being accurately 
represented to decision makers. As information providers themselves, special 
interests also believed that they would be unable to present valuable information 
to their own constituents without open meetings. Therefore, before President 
Clinton had even started his attempt at health care reform he had begun to alienate 
several important groups within the Washington community. 
It can be argued that with such a complex task facing any organisation 
seeking to develop a legislative strategy for health care reform, the formation of 
an isolated group of analysts was the only strategy open to the Clinton 
Administration. Consultation with other interested parties would increase the 
amount of time needed to develop the policy, making it impossible to meet the 
For a fiill discussion of the provisions and aims of the 1972 Federal Advisory Committee Act 
see Wolanin, op. cit., p.71. 
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deadline of May 1993. President Carter, when developing his energy programme 
in 1977, faced similar problems. Placing the responsibility for poUcy development 
within the newly created Department of Energy-which had no Congressional 
Uaison office at this time-Carter effectively isolated all other parties from the 
consultative process. However, having given the Department of Energy just 90 
days in which to produce a comprehensive plan the Carter Administration realised 
that there was insufficient time in which to engage in consuhation with interest 
groups and Congress."^ The fiindamental difference between Carter's Energy 
initiative and Clinton's health care reform is that the Department of Energy did 
present President Carter with a policy option by his stated deadUne of April 18, 
1977. The Clinton Task Force on health care reform was dogged by delays and 
the final plan was not presented to the President until four months after his initial 
deadline. The disconcerting similarity of these two cases is that neither of these 
two proposals successfully made it into legislative reality. 
The Potential of the Reforms 
Meeting the original administration deadline of May 1 would have allowed 
the President to claim the development of a plan for heath care reform as an 
achievement of his first one hundred days; failure to meet this dead line would 
cast doubts upon the effectiveness of the poUcy development process within the 
White House. The development of this poUcy option would also allow the 
administration to maintain its political momentum and present a coherent policy 
Jones, Charles O. The Trusteeship Presidency. (1988) p. 138 
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agenda to Congress. There were a number of reasons why the Task Force failed 
to present its findings to the President by the designated date. Some of these 
delays were preventable, others were not, however, these delays had certain 
implications for the fiiture of the legislation in Congress. 
Observers of the policy process would contend that the formulation of 
health reform policy within one hundred days was always an unrealistic goal. 
Policy of such complexity and with such far-reaching aims required far longer 
consideration and investigation than the administration had allowed. However, 
this has to be weighed against the need of expediency as President Clinton's 
limited political capital within the Washington community would start to dwindle 
progressively following his inauguration. Because of narrow Democrat margins 
in both houses of Congress, President Clinton could not hope to pass such a piece 
of legislation through Congress without bipartisan support; the development of 
such support would require considerable amounts of time and persuasion. 
Additionally, the organised interests of the medical profession, insurance 
companies and corporate business would all require concessions in order to give 
their support to legislation which would radically change their industry. It is 
apparent from the proposed date of presentation that the Clinton Administration 
believed that all of these obstacles could be overcome within the first one hundred 
days of his administration, and that a coherent and workable plan for fiindamental 
change within a multi-billion dollar industry would be ready for him to transform 
into a credible policy option. 
Health care, as an election issue, came second only to the economy and 
the deficit and one dilemma for Clinton after the election was how to channel 
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public support for what had the potential to become a minority issue in legislative 
t e r m s . T h e majority of Americans (60%) receive their health care insurance 
through their employer, a fiirther 27% through government programmes such as 
Medicare, Medicaid and by virtue of their Veteran status. This leaves just 13% 
With no insurance at all. Clinton contended that health care reform would benefit 
many more people than those who lacked health insurance, but the problem he 
faced was convincing the majority of Americans, who already had suflacient health 
insurance, that these reforms were in their interests as well. 
Any attempt at reform required the support of those who were content 
with their coverage and would most likely be reluctant to sacrifice their existing 
coverage for something untested and unproven. Furthermore, many Americans 
fail to see the state, or federal government, in a paternalistic light. Rather they 
strive to limit government's influence over the everyday lives of citizens. 
Therefore, universal health insurance, provided at whatever level by the state, 
would be a direct departure from the majority belief about the proper role of 
government. And possibly the largest limiting factor on Clinton's prospects was 
the group of people who would potentially gain most from the legislation. The 
uninsured would gain more than any other group as a result of health care reform. 
However, the uninsured are generally the unemployed, the poor, ethnic minorities 
and other marginal groups vsdthin society, the least politically active and those 
seen to be least deserving of help as they appear not to be helping themselves. 
Clinton's strategy was to unite those who were becoming fearfiil for their 
A Voter Research and Surveys Exit Poll cited in Pomper op. cit., p. 146 demonstrates that the 
economy was of concern to 28%, the deficit to 13%, and health care to 12.5% of the electorate. 
So while health care was the second most important issue, is came a poor second to the economy 
and the deficit. 
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health care security with those who had always been fearfiil. He sought to 
develop a notion of urgency in the need for change, that change now was essential 
for long term social and economic success and security. The gloomy figures of 
how health care costs were affecting the economy as a whole were weU 
pubUcised, and people could be forgiven for thinking that there really was a crisis 
in health care provision, despite reasonable levels of satisfaction among those who 
possessed adequate coverage. If Clinton was unable to persuade the majority of 
the population that there was a necessity for change, he would have Uttle hope of 
persuading associated industries that there was an urgent need for change and that 
they should sacrifice their position within the market for the overall good of the 
nation. 
The tasks facing the CUnton administration were to change perceptions of 
the deserving and undeserving, and to question the influence of insurance 
companies over the quality and accessibihty of health care provision for all 
Americans. Moreover, Clinton aimed to make health care provision a social 
responsibility rather than an individual responsibility; an enthlement rather than a 
privilege. It was also intended that all Americans take responsibility by 
contributing for their health care rather than continuing the current system where 
by the majority subsidised the emergency care of the minority with no health 
insurance. 
Options for Reform 
Before any definite decisions were made about the shape and content of 
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the health care reform plan, a number of different options needed to be 
considered. The first decision was how to secure universal coverage; given that 
most other western democracies provided models for attaining this objective, the 
difficulty was not finding a method, but deciding upon one which would be most 
easily and efficiently implemented within the American economy. Clinton 
stipulated from the outset that the only option open for policy planners was 
managed competition, and that all research was to be undertaken with this fact in 
mind. The other options, 'single-payer' and 'pay-or-play', were passed over for a 
variety of reasons. The single payer option, as used in Canada and Great Britain, 
where the government rather than private insurance companies pay for health care 
was rejected primarily because it was perceived as being 'socialised medicine' 
providing few choices for consumers and providers. In addition to which it 
symboUsed 'big government', an association which President Clinton was 
attempting to avoid. 
Pay-or-Play would mandate employers to provide health care insurance 
for their employees (the play option) or enrol them in a pubUc health insurance 
plan (the pay option). However this option would not necessarily guarantee 
universal coverage for the unemployed.'^ ' It is apparent that neither of these 
options were going to provide an American solution to the health care provision 
crisis. To some extent both models would exclude private insurance companies 
from the health care market place, and the federal government would be 
regulating not only a considerable part of Americans' lives, but also up to one 
seventh of the economy. Managed competition, although an ill-defined model in 
Skocpol, Theda. Boomerang: Clinton's Health Security Effort and the Turn Against 
Government in US Politics, p.33-34 
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the early stages of the administration, was thought of as a compromise between 
these two models, which provided a market based, government regulated system 
to facilitate universal coverage. Moreover, it "preserved the illusion of a self-
regulating market in health care"'^ ^ and presented the possibility of incremental 
rather than radical change. 
Managed competition, like the concept of national service, surfaced in the 
academic sphere during the 1980s. Alan Enthoven, a professor of economics at 
Stanford University, exported his health care reform ideas to Margaret Thatcher 
in the late 1980s. In the United States, discussion of managed competition was 
initially limited to an informal group of academics, representatives from large 
insurance companies, hospitals, the pharmaceutical industry and some 
corporations, who came to be known as the Jackson Hole Group, after the 
Wyoming ski resort where they met. The essence of their solution was to 
intensify market incentives to promote savings. As neither individuals or 
employers were cost conscious about their health care consumption, because 
either they did not directly pay for care in the case of the individual or they 
received tax breaks on the premiums in the case of employers, health care 
resources were over used. 
The Jackson Hole Group recognised that the solution lay in making 
individuals more cost conscious by taxing them for their health benefits and 
disciplining providers by eliminating fee for service payments and forcing them 
into insurance owned managed care systems. The contention was that managed 
care operators would compete for employer contracts and therefore drive down 
Marmor, op. cit., p. 155 
136 
costs. The market would ensure that expensive and ineflScient managed care 
systems would be weeded out and government taxation would ensure that 
employers chose reasonably priced health care plans for their employees. 
Managed competition had all the hallmarks of an 'All American' solution to 
market based health care reform; the insurance companies still retained control of 
the system, the concept of choice was still enshrined within the broad framework, 
and government involvement was limited to that of regulator rather than a 
provider. 
The DLC, and the Progressive Policy Institute, developed its 'Progressive 
Plan' for health care reform around the concepts developed by the Jackson Hole 
Group. The theory of managed competition had been tested at a number of levels 
and the existence of health plans running under the system of managed 
competition provided practical illustrations of the possibilities for health plans 
which would cover the whole country. Managed competition had been working 
successfiilly in health care plans for public employees in California, Minnesota, 
and the federal government. These plans had consistently provided health care 
coverage for almost ten million people, controlled costs and reduced premium 
increases in relation to those experienced in the private sector. The coexistence of 
these managed competition driven plans with the current system provided a strong 
indication that managed competition could be applied effectively throughout the 
nation, but it could not be administered at the national level as this would not 
allow it to be responsive to the locaUsed needs of the American population. The 
health care needs of inner city Americans are vastly different to those living in 
123 Ranade, op. cit., p. 12 
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sparsely populated rural area and the DLC, along with the Jackson Hole Group, 
recognised that managed competition had to be managed at the local level. 
The Clinton Option: Managed Competition 
Managed competition under the Chnton plan was designed to be operated 
at a local level. The administration anticipated that consumers would join 
together in local groups to purchase their health care. For some this would be 
through their employer if they worked for a large enough company, for others, it 
would be through a state based non profit organisation called a Health Insurance 
Purchasing Co-operative (HIPC). HIPC's would present a number of different 
plans to their customers who would choose the package most suitable to their 
heakh care needs. The bottom line was that all of the packages would be based 
around a standardised package of benefits set out at the national level, but 
consumers could choose packages with additional benefits by purchasing the 
excess themselves. Each year customers would have the opportunity to select a 
different plan if their existing cover did not fully fit their needs. In designing his 
plan Clinton used many of the principles espoused by the Jackson Hole Group, 
however, pressures from different constituencies within the health care field 
resuked in a hybrid of the original theory being developed. These compromises 
came together to form a 1350 page document which, in attempting to please 
everyone, pleased noone. 
Clinton's involvement with the concept of managed competition can be 
linked again to his involvement with the DLC. Its plan, developed by the 
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Progressive Policy Institute and published in Mandate For Change, demonstrates 
how managed competition could reform health care through a "state based, 
market driven, pluralistic approach to achieve universal coverage and restore the 
link between health spending and health value".'^ '^  Its influence upon the final 
substance of the Clinton health care reform legislation is clearly demonstrated 
when the main principles of both plans are compared. Ranade has summarised the 
final legislative proposal and has broken it down into eight sections: universal 
coverage, standard benefits, regional health alliances, consumer choice, 
community rating, federal oversight, cost sharing, and cost containment.^ '^ The 
PPI's plan almost mirrors these provisions, for example: it details the need for 
universal coverage on a number of levels; "Universal coverage is fiiUy justified on 
the grounds of equity, humanitarianism, and individual opportunity. But it is 
particularly important, on grounds of eflHciency, in a market based system."'^ ^ 
Also, there should be a "standardized package of benefits, to be set by a new 
national board."* '^ Both President Clinton and the PPI saw that the individual 
health plans should be managed at a local level. Chnton envisaged that 'health 
alliances' would be established at the state level to structure the market, the PPI 
"would make states the primary engine of reform, to spur responsiveness and 
innovation."^ *^ 
Managed competition appeared to guarantee reasonable prices for the 
consumer, universal access and quality care, all the requirements desired of any 
systematic reform programme. However, managed competition came under 
William Marshall & Martin Schram Eds. Mandate for Change, p. 110 
'^ ^ Ranade, op. cit., p. 12-13 
Marshall & Schram, op. cit., p. 112 
Ibid 
'^Ibid p. 115 
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considerable scrutiny from organised interests and Congress. As it was so 
obviously a plan devised to meet the interests of a number of conflicting 
constituencies, it was unclear how such compromises could work as a coherent 
whole and whether it would actually provide rehef from the problems which 
blighted the existing system. 
When the legislative proposal was finally presented to Congress, its 
complexity, size, and detail only fiirther compounded fears that the Clinton reform 
was going to be unworkable. The complexity of the 1350 page document made it 
impossible for client groups to identify with its provisions and difficuU for the 
administration and Congress to sell the legislation to constituents. Furthermore, it 
failed to address the major issue of cost containment, by continuing the 
relationship between employment and insurance, consumers were not going to be 
more obliged to be cost conscious in their use of heakh care resources. 
The final outcome of months of deliberations failed to meet the 
expectations of all but a few within the health care arena. Even for strong 
supporters of health care reform within Congress, there was little attachment to 
legislation that they had no involvement in crafting. If the legislation was passed, 
it would secure coverage for the uninsured, but at what cost to those who already 
had coverage? The individual costs and benefits of the legislation were too 
ambiguous for individuals to determine whether they would be better off 
Furthermore, the highly successfiil negative promotional campaign run by a 
variety of organised interests increased public doubts about the benefits, costs and 
effectiveness of reform. 
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The Influence of Organised Interests 
Organised special interest groups within the heakh care arena consistently 
caught the administration unawares. The Task Force, despke the media depiction 
of their methods, embarked upon a consultative process with interest groups but 
only later in the deliberative process. Delays in consukation initially created 
doubts about the Task Force's methods and motivations, delays in presenting the 
facts to the pubUc gave special interests the opportunity to lobby both in 
Washington and at the grass roots level. The timing of health care reform 
legislation proved to be inopportune at a number of levels, and special interest 
groups exploked the numerous delays and public perceptions of the reform 
agenda. 
Organised special interests used a variety of different methods to confuse 
the health care debate and to consistently erode public support for the presidential 
initiative. The administration throughout this period appeared totally incapable of 
producing any effective response to these negative campaigns. Only the fooUsh 
would ignore the fact that such opposkion was inevitable and fail to have planned 
for such a contingency, but the Clinton administration was consistently caught 
unawares. In attempting to craft a piece of legislation to please certain 
constituencies, others were excluded; for example in settUng for managed 
competkion and the subsequent development of a variety of Health Maintenance 
Organisations (HMOs), the administration courted the favours of the major 
insurance companies, many of whom had already formed their own HMOs m 
Peterson, Mark A. "The Health Care Debate: All Heat and No Light." Journal of Health 
Politics. Policy & Law. Vol. 20, No. 2 (1995) p 428 
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some areas. This policy decision put in jeopardy the existence of smaller and 
medium sized insurance companies, who believed that they would never be able to 
compete in the controlled market of managed competition. The response of the 
lobby group for such companies, the Health Insurance Association of America, 
was to mount one of the most effective negative media campaigns. Focused at 
the grassroots level, what became known as the 'Harry and Louise' commercials 
depicted Mr & Mrs Middle-America - Harry and Louise - discussing their doubts 
about the benefits of the Clinton Health Care Security Act. The questions they 
asked each other mirrored the concerns of average Americans and, in 
consequence, raised similar doubts in the minds of the electorate. One observer 
has noted that the Harry and Louise commercials were "skilfijlly manipulating our 
deepest fears and beliefs to maintain their privileges."^ "^ The administration's 
rebuttal to the Harry and Louise advertisements parodied the scenario with 
President Clinton and Mrs. Clinton as plaid shirted Middle-Americans explaining 
the reform agenda. Rather than being the driving force behind reform, the 
Clintons were in the uncomfortable position of having to respond to an agenda set 
by special interests. The administration never provided an adequate counter 
campaign to inform the public and was never able to regain the levels of support it 
had originally enjoyed throughout the election campaign and the early weeks of 
the administration. 
Lobbyists did not just focus on grassroots support for the legislation, the 
pluralistic nature of American politics allows for far more effective and direct 
action. The National Federation of Independent Business, the representative 
130 Marmor, op. cit., p.205 
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organisation for the owners of small businesses, mobihsed ks members to lobby 
Representatives in their home districts. The power of businessmen wdthin the 
local community and the impending Congressional elections in November 1994 
gave many congressmen food for thought, forcing them to consider whether 
supporting the President was as important as their own reelection. Small 
businesses were concerned with the provision within the Health Care Security 
Act, which would mandate them to provide insurance for their employees, 
whereas previously they had been exempt. 
It would be wrong to assume that only opponents of the Clinton proposal 
were working hard to promote their cause. The proposal had 'heavy weight' 
support m the form of the AFL-CIO and the large insurance companies, but these 
groups were never vocal and the administration did not seek to mobiUse thek 
resources in support of the legislation. There are a number of possible reasons for 
this: firstly, the complexity of the legislative proposal was so great that the 
administration found k difficult to counter opposition in a clear and concise 
manner. Explanations of the proposal always appeared to be confiismg and 
jargonistic where as opponent's criticisms were always straight forward and 
sknple. Secondly, the administration was always ill prepared for such criticisms 
and unaware of the resources available to the opposition. Given that Chnton 
came to the presidency better prepared than many of his predecessors, how could 
he have been so short-sighted? 
The answer to that damning question can be found in a complex 
combination of personal, admmistrative and institutional influences. Primarily, the 
failure of the administration hes in the fact that polkical impulses override poUcy 
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preferences; that is President Clinton's desire to complete the jigsaw of American 
social policy was greater than his ability to develop a systematic approach to 
fiilfiUing his legislative agenda. His attention was focused on the big picture of 
heahh care reform rather than the essential policy details. Competing political 
influences distracted the administration from its main objective of developing a 
radical reform of the health care industry. The pluralistic nature of American 
politics ensures that a variety of client groups are guaranteed access to the policy 
making process and, in turn, influence the development of legislative proposals. 
The size and complexity of the Clinton proposal is evidence of the compromises 
that the administration felt it needed to make in order to produce a piece of 
legislation that they believed could be put into practice. These compromises are, 
in turn, a reflection of the inconsistencies within the administration itself and the 
task it was undertaking. 
In attempting to legislate for both costs and coverage the administration 
came up against its first policy inconsistency. Universal coverage came with a 
large price tag and had to be paid for by somebody. Increasing personal taxes and 
'big government' programmes were not an option for a President who was 
consistently trying to avoid the traditional identification of a traditional 'tax-and-
spend liberal'. In trying to prove his 'New Democrat' credentials. President 
Clinton settled on a proposal which was riddled with compromises designed to 
satisfy influential constituencies with disparate objectives, very few of which 
would result in the development of affordable universal coverage. 
The second inconsistency can be found within the administration itself It 
is well documented that the President and the First Lady have slightly different 
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approaches to the solution of social problems. While Bill Clinton is attempting to 
assert a more centrist approach to policy making, the First Lady can be seen to 
have a more traditional, liberal approach. This dichotomy is further complicated 
by the presence of Ira Magaziner as one of the chief architects of policy options 
for the health care reform. As a 'Friend of Bill ' , involved in researching health 
care as a campaign issue during 1992, he was placed in a position of authority 
during the transition and later within the administration. His political alignment 
was closer to that of the President than Mrs. Clinton, but his single minded pursuit 
of a managed competition solution to the health care crisis insured that any 
alternatives were given little consideration within the working groups and later the 
Task Force. 
In 1993, the President's legislative agenda was ambitious, with a number 
of his own initiatives and some residual initiatives from the Bush administration. 
In the first few months, both President Clinton and Congress were preoccupied 
with the Economic Stimulus package, and its defeat in April made the release of 
another large piece of legislation politically unwise. When the President finally 
outUned his proposals for health care reform before a joint session of Congress in 
September, it was well received, but still not ready for presentation to Congress. 
Two months later when President Clinton finally presented the legislation to 
Congress for deliberation, they were again preoccupied, but this time Avith the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Large pieces of legislation 
require single minded attention. Part of the failure of the economic stimulus plan 
was due to the fact that other policy initiatives; gays in the military and the 
131 Drew, op. cit., p. 190 
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formation of the Task Force on health care reform distracted the administration. 
And not only was the Clinton administration distracted. Congress found it equally 
diflBcult to work effectively on a number of contentious and compUcated pieces of 
legislation. Not providing Congress with a single goal to aim for during the early 
months of the administration can be seen to have influenced the long term success 
of the Clinton legislative agenda. 
The Clinton administration's lack of success with health care reform 
carmot be solely attributed to the actions of the administration, individuals within 
the administration and other actors within the Washington political community. 
The nature of the American political system inhibits the formulation, deliberation 
and implementation of large scale reform. The institutional framework of 
American government severely limits the President's ability to bring about 
sweeping reform. In the case of health care this was further complicated by the 
administration's attempts to develop a piece of legislation which sought to 
produce radical reform through a single act of poUcy making with little 
consultation with the rest of the policy making community; the two principles 
proved to be wholly incompatible. 
Health care reform during the Clinton administration was billed as 
America's last best hope for decisive public policy making in the health care 
arena. Handled differently, this could have been the case. The impetus for reform 
was in place in the form of public, corporate and institutional support. The 
opportunity was lost due to strategic errors on the part of the Clinton 
administration, and such strategic errors have become the hallmark of this 
administration. 
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Conclusion 
As a test of transition performance, the Clinton experience with health 
care reform reveals several fundamental flaws in both the administrative and 
policy strategies. The single, most damaging element in the policy process was 
the sheer scope of the reform agenda. In seeking extensive reform of a multi-
billion dollar industry, the new administration failed to consider the simple fact 
that reform was not desired by the majority of those either providing or 
consuming health care services. As an issue, universal health care provision 
additionally failed to consolidate support from all areas of society. 
The early preparation work, provided by the PPI abstracted the policy 
development from the transition process. The ground work for the reforms was 
not performed by the Pre-Transition Advisory Board and, therefore, integration 
into the transition structures during the interregnum did not take place smoothly. 
In structuring his White House to develop the reform strategy. Bill Clinton used a 
complex Task Force structure that cut across normal administrative boundaries. 
While a useful artangement to provide the bigger policy picture, it did not reflect 
the institutional needs of to separate the responsibilities of individual departments 
who would be required to implement reforms or organisational imperatives 
associated with allocating congressional committees and appropriations. 
Moreover, the complicated structure and covert nature of the Task Force itself 
did little to accommodate the production of a legislative proposal that could be 
owned or adopted by any other actor than those directly involved in its formation. 
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The timing of the Clinton legislative agenda as a whole was not tempered 
with any recognition of the workings of Washington or of Congress. The 
calendar of consideration was constantly extended in response to the demands of 
competing legislative priorities and elaborate committee assignments. The 
analogy of President Carter's energy policy is again appropriate as its complexity 
became its downfall in Congress. 
Health care reform was the victim of not only the incrementalist nature of 
the American legislative process, but also of the transition process itself Bill 
Clinton's policy focus was never incremental and his desire to see the wholesale 
reform of health care influenced his choice of the task force and Hillary CUnton's 
involvement. The underlying influence budgetary poUcy on the timing of the 
wider legislative agenda necessitated that announcement of any health care reform 
initiative be pushed into the autumn of 1993 rather than the spring/summer as 
initially envisaged by President Clinton and the task force. The process of 
preparation and organisation for the Clinton health care reform initiative greatly 
influenced its content, timing and the nature of public and institutional opinion. 
The case of health care reform exemplifies the consequences of not 
designing appropriate White House structures, integrating policy into a 
manageable legislative agenda or being a reflective practitioner. The impact of the 
failure of health care reform was feh throughout the first CUnton term and was 
exemplified by the Republican congressional gains in the 1994 mid-term elections. 
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Chapter 6: Executive Orders as Policy-
Making Tools 
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The aim of every President is to bring about policy success and deliver on 
campaign promises. The majority of these policy priorities will be developed 
through the traditional policy route of presidential announcement, proposal to 
Congress, congressional debate and hopefully the emergence of a bill after the 
final floor vote. But many Presidents have found that this may not be the most 
effective or efflcient means of achieving the desired policy ends. Many factors 
can come together to make the use of traditional policy pathways impossible or 
undesirable, these include: divided government, unpopular policy objectives, 
highly contentious policy issues and political expediency. 
In an attempt to highlight the extra-constitutional processes at work within 
presidential policy-making, this chapter seeks to examine the status and efiBcacy of 
Executive Orders within the American political system. From the early stages of 
his candidacy. Bill Clinton promised, i f elected, to make use of this executive 
poUcy tool to reverse the ban on homosexuals serving in the military and to lift 
restrictions on abortion practices and counseUing. Through examining these cases 
conclusions will be drawn concerning the desirability of Executive Orders as 
policy making tools and the appropriateness of Executive Orders in connection 
with the issues selected by the Clinton Administration. 
Since the presidency of George Washington, alternative means of policy-
making have been employed by the executive branch to overcome difBculties 
associated with policy making in controversial or contentious issue areas. 
Although undefined by the constitution, presidential proclamations and Executive 
Orders have given Presidents rule making powers outside the legislative 
jurisdiction of Congress. Proclamations and Executive Orders derive their 
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authority not from the constitution or statute but from precedent. Such 
precedents have been set during times of social and political upheaval such as war 
and economic depression. Once estabUshed, such a powerflil tool is hard to 
ignore, let alone not use and therefore Executive Orders continue to be a 
powerfiil weapon in the presidential armoury. 
In examining the extra constitutional nature of such presidential power, 
Michael Foley asserts that 'constitutional abeyances'are part of the fabric of 
the American poUtical system. He argues they are endorsed by the actions of the 
Supreme Court and "are unwritten because it is recognised that any attempt to 
define them would be not merely unnecessary or impossible, but positively 
misguided and even potentially threatening to the constitution itself Even 
after periods of great crisis, for example the Watergate crisis, constitutional 
abeyances continue to occupy important positions within the framework of 
executive power. 
The Historical Position of Executive Orders 
For newly elected Presidents, Executive Orders are an attractive 
instrument for poHcy change. They can be instantaneous in their effect and allow 
Presidents to shape their immediate political environment (the bureaucracy and 
the Executive Branch) in such a way as to maximise their chances for success. 
The negative aspect of Executive Orders is that they can be perceived as a policy 
"implicit understandings and tacit agreements" Foley, Michael. The Silence of 
Constitutions p.9 
133 Ibid. 
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tool that operates outside the strict constitutional role of the presidency and that 
sustains the usurpation of power from the legislative branch. Whichever 
perspective is taken, it is clear that Executive Orders have the ability to change 
the course of any President's term of office. 
The official history of Executive Orders and presidential proclamations is 
very sparse. For over one hundred years there was no central record of Executive 
Orders, they were not numbered or catalogued and their history has been 
described as, at best, chaotic.'^ '* In 1907, the State Department collected together 
Executive Order documents from 1862 and numbered them for ease of reference. 
Documents uncovered from before 1862 are also numbered but it is believed that 
there are tens of thousands of Executive Orders that still remain undiscovered. 
Since 1936, Executive Orders have been published in the Federal Register. 
Despite the undocumented and disorganised nature of their history. 
Executive Orders are powerful policy making tools. Although mainly used for 
administrative purposes. Executive Orders have been used by Presidents to bring 
about fundamental political change. Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus 
during the Civil War and declared the emancipation of the slaves with Executive 
Orders. Franklin Roosevelt authorised the relocation of thousands of Japanese 
Americans from Western States at the outbreak of the war in the Pacific. These 
are examples of extreme cases in times of national emergency. In more peacefiil 
times. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson used Executive Orders to improve the 
progress of Civil Rights reforms in the 1960s. The use of Executive Orders 
allows Presidents to pursue a variety of ends; they are instruments of both reform 
Woodward, Mary. "Executive Orders: A Journey". Legal Reference Services Quarterly. 
Vol. 10 No. 3 (1990) p. 128 
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and control within the American political system. 
The Limits on Use 
A strict definition of precisely what constitutes an Executive Order is hard 
to find. With no constitutional or statutory guidelines to follow, scholars are in 
agreement that "there is no strict definition of an Executive O r d e r " . T h i s 
makes the study of this particular part of presidential policy making particularly 
diflficuh. Executive Orders do not differ from any other presidential proclamation 
or document other than the fact that they are called Executive Orders. Used 
mainly in the area of executive administration, "policies established under 
Executive Order have the force of law... they prescribe individual and institutional 
behaviour."'^^ However, critics of presidential power claim that the use of 
Executive Orders moves the President into the congressional realm and violates 
the principle of the separation of powers."' In defense of their use. Presidents 
claim their authority through the principle of 'executive power', the 'take care' 
clause and the commander in chief power outlined in the constitution, but strictly, 
"executive orders are a source of law only when they draw upon the 
consititutional powers of the President or powers expressly delegated by 
Congress."'^* 
The limits of poUcy making by Executive Order are considerable. It is 
only as powerfiil as the prestige of the President and the willingness of the subject 
Woodward, M. op. cit., p. 126 
Morgan, Ruth P. The President and Civil Rights: Policy Making By Executive Order, p.4 
Ibid Hugo L . Black ( Assoc SC Justice) opinion in Peters v. Hobby 349 US 331, 350 
(1955).. 
Fisher, Louis. Consititutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President, p. 113 
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to conform to the orders, obstruction and delaying tactics are common in 
bureaucracies when unpopular orders are given. I f the Executive Order requires 
an appropriation for its completion, congressional approval through legislation is 
necessary. I f an Executive Order is unpopular, it will firstly reflect negatively 
upon the President and secondly it will be hard to ensure the co-operation of 
those required to administer it. Executive Orders are powerful policy making 
tools but they have limitations and cannot be used in every policy area with equal 
success. Additionally, the role of the bureaucracy is a powerful check on the 
implementation of Executive Orders. Presidents may issue Executive Orders, but 
they are reUant upon agencies and departments to implement fully these 
declarations which have force of law but are not part of the legislative process. 
Finally there is a clear distinction between the scope of Executive Orders when 
applied to foreign and domestic policy. Congress traditionally accords the 
President greater latitude in the area of foreign policy, this is fijrther extended to 
Executive Orders concerned with foreign policy. 
Executive Orders are most frequently used to ensure the smooth running 
of the federal bureaucracy and the creation of new executive agencies, 
investigative committees and commissions. Being primarily an administrative 
tool. Executive Orders do not generate a high level of public, congressional or 
academic attention. Publicity is only accorded to those Executive Orders that 
attempt to achieve poUcy outside of the administrative arena and therefore have a 
wider social impact. 
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President Clinton's Executive Orders 
In 1992 issues which had never previously attracted or demanded 
presidential attention came to the foreground of American politics. As a 
presidential contender Bill Clinton made promises to certain constituency groups 
who would later demand action. This was well demonstrated by his pledge to 
bring greater diversity to government by placing more women, African-Americans 
and Hispanics in high level political appointments. This pledge consumed much of 
Clinton's energies as President-elect, however, it was not the issue which 
consumed public, congressional and presidential attention during the first weeks 
of the transition and the new administration. 
President Clinton promised to use Executive Orders in two contentious 
policy areas; ending the ban on homosexuals servmg in the military and 
reauthorising federal fianding of abortion clinics, abortion counselUng and foetal 
tissue research. These were areas in which the previous two Republican 
administrations had tightened military and federal regulations and which were 
identified as ripe for reform by the new Democrat administration. While the use 
of Executive Orders in these policy areas has historical precedent, their 
contentious nature proved to be an obstacle to speedy policy making. 
Campaigning for Military Reform or Gay Civil Rights? 
A campaign pledge to end the ban on homosexuals serving in the military. 
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announced at a meeting with gay leaders in October 199l'^^, spiralled into a 
potentially major conflict between Congress, military leaders and the President by 
January 1993. The background to the issue is complex and extends beyond the 
bounds of the election campaign. For many groups representing gay interests, the 
ban on homosexuals in the military was as much an issue of civil rights as the issue 
of racial integration and desegregation within the miUtary. The constitution 
provides certain protections for Americans, equality is guaranteed under the law, 
but many believe that homosexuals do not receive the same level of protection as 
their heterosexual counterparts. Lifting the ban was seen as the first step towards 
equality for those campaigning for gay civil rights. 
The historical precedent of African-Americans and women in the military 
provided activists with examples of how minority groups could be accepted into 
military culture and how presidential authority could be used to achieve such 
acceptance. When examined more closely these examples do not provide such 
useful precedents. In both cases, the integration of women and African-
Americans required no changes to military law. This de facto segregation had no 
substance in military law and thus integration became the responsibility of military 
commanders rather than the legislature or the judiciary. Furthermore, unlike 
sexual orientation, race and gender are easily recognisable rather than latent traits. 
As General CoUn Powell stated "Homosexuality is not a benign behavioral 
characteristic such as skin color. It goes to the core of the most fundamental 
aspect of human behavior."**" Being able to identify the focus of integration or 
Drew, op. cit., p.42 The meeting took place in Los Angeles between Clinton, David Mixner 
and ANGLE, a group of prominent gay leaders and fund raisers. At this time Clinton was 
standing 3rd in public opinion polls behind Paul Tsongas and Jeny Brown. 
'"^  Quoted in Drew, op. cit., p.43 
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desegregation changes perceptions of the outsider group, reducing feelings of 
threat. Furthermore, it is easier to monitor the progress of such policies given the 
visibility of differences in race and gender. The desegregation or integration of 
homosexuals was more problematic given the legal provisions regulating sexual 
conduct under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (military law) and the legal 
restrictions placed on homosexuals in the civilian worid. 
The sexual conduct of all military personnel is closely restricted when on 
base or while on duty. There are constraints upon male and female service 
personnel's relationships to the extent that any behaviour unbecoming can lead to 
expulsion from the military.''*^ Homosexual behaviour or the public 
acknowledgement that one is homosexual is completely banned and will also lead 
to a dishonourable discharge. The behaviour of all personnel is governed by the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice and any changes to those regulations require a 
change of law, which, of course, is the role of Congress. 
Homosexuals have fiirther legal restrictions placed upon them under state 
or federal law,there is no age of consent for homosexuals under federal law and 
anal and oral sex are illegal in many US states.''*^ Changes in military law, 
therefore, would not afford gay military personnel with any greater protection of 
their civil rights and fiirther amendments to the US Constitution would be 
required to guarantee them equal protection under the federal law. 
A good example of this policy is the case of Lt. Kelly Flinn. The first female B-52 bomber 
pilot in the US Air Force who was discharged for having an adulterous affair with a civilian 
while serving in North Dakota. See Dejevsky, Mary. "Female B-52 pilot quits over charges of 
adultery". The Independent. 19/5/97, 
'''^  Some states make distinctions between homosexual and heterosexual sexual conduct, some 
do not. There is little consistency in the individual pieces of legislation. 
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The History of Homosexuality and Military Service 
The history of homosexuals in the American military is as old as the 
revolution, but the history of the ban on homosexuals in the military is a twentieth 
century phenomenon. Recognition that the presence of gay personnel in the 
military was unacceptable emerged formally during Worid War I and the focus of 
concern was sexual conduct. The Articles of War (1916) define assault with 
intent to commit sodomy as a felony under military law. However, it was not 
until after World War I I that regulations specifically banning homosexuals from 
military service were enforced.''*^ The rationale behind banning homosexuals was 
that they posed a threat to military security, troop morale and good order. Ideas 
of homosexuality being an 'unnatural state' and a beUef in the predatory nature of 
gay men who would corrupt or abuse other servicemen was also very dominant at 
this time. 
Changes in psychological theory and assessment procedures at the 
recruitment stage led to the eventual tightening of regulations. However, the 
tumultuous mid-century years and increased demands upon the American military 
resulted in there being certain periods of time during which the need for 
manpower was of greater concern than strict adherence to the regulations. 
American involvement in World War I I , the Korean and Vietnam wars resulted in 
the presence of gay servicemen being more tacitly tolerated than explicitly 
accepted when the supply of men to fight was short. 
Restrictions were further formalised in 1982 when the Pentagon directive 
'''^  Meyers, Marian. "Defining Homosexuality: News coverage of the 'repeal the ban' 
controversy." Discourse and Society. Vol. 5 No.3 (1994) p.323 
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explicitly stated that homosexuality was completely incompatible with military Ufe 
because of morale, discipline and security concerns.'*^ In the wider legal 
environment the debate about gay civil rights; the right to privacy and personal 
liberty, have been considered by the Supreme Court. In Bowers v. Hardwick 
(1986) the Supreme Court considered the constitutional basis of a Georgia State 
law prohibiting sodomy and whether there should be Due Process protection of 
gay rights. In a 5-4 decision against the respondent, Michael Hardwick, the Court 
determined that the constitution gave no protection to the private sexual activities 
of homosexuals and upheld the right of States to regulate such conduct. In 
delivering the opinion of the Court Justice White said 
"The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution 
confers a fiindamental right upon homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of many 
States...Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient 
roots...Sodomy was a criminal offence at common law and was 
forbidden by the original 13 states when they ratified the Bill of 
Rights...Against this background, to claim that a right to 
engage in such conduct is "deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition" or "impUcit in the concept of ordered 
liberty" is, at best, facetious...We do not agree, and are 
unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 States should be 
invalidated on that basis. Accordingly, the judgement of the 
Court of Appeals is reversed. "^ "^  
This decision, while not directly impacting upon the gays in the milhary debate, is 
illustrative of the conservative nature of institutional opinion towards gay rights 
during the Reagan years. In his dissent. Justice Blackmun noted that rather than 
endorsing homosexuality, sodomy or a "crime against nature"^ "** a positive 
decision from the Court would demonstrate that 
'""Ibid. 
'"' Bowers V. Hardwick (4^7 U.S. 186 1986) [http://www.uscaselaw.com/US/487/186.html] 
146 , ' Opcit. Chief Justice Burger concurring opinion. 
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"depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves 
how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far greater 
threat to the values most deeply rooted in our Nation's history 
than tolerance of nonconformity could ever do".^ "^ ' 
The public presidency of Ronald Reagan was infiised with rhetoric demanding the 
removal of government from the everyday lives of Americans. However, where 
socio-moral issues were concerned, the administration emphasised the duty of the 
state to regulate private conduct in areas such as abortion, school prayer and gay 
civil rights. Much of this can be linked to the growing popularity of the Christian 
Right and their acceptance into the mainstream of the Republican Party during the 
mid 1980s. Their presence within the GOP greatly influenced the temper of 
socio-moral attitudes in government and, consequently, the shape of social policy. 
It was, in part, in response to this social conservatism that the Clinton campaign 
adopted the issue of changing the status of homosexuals in the military. 
The Campaign Promise 
The aim of the Clinton pledge was to end restrictions upon homosexuals 
entering the military and to separate the notions of status and conduct under 
military law. This would allow homosexuals who observed the sexual conduct 
regulations to serve without fear of dismissal for being homosexual. The means 
of achieving this goal was never specifically explained. His objectives were, 
however, directly contrary to the wishes of military leaders and appeared to be 
too liberal for many congressmen. The combination of these two factors, together 
147 Opcit. Justice Blackmim dissent. 
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with low levels of public support, prevented President Clinton from acting on his 
campaign pledge during the early months of his administration. 
Clinton's attachment to the issue placed him in the unique position of 
being the first presidential candidate, and later President, to tackle an explicitly 
gay issue. By bringing this issue on board in his campaign, Clinton was also the 
first candidate to explicitly court the gay community as an electoral bloc. 
Assessing the strength and size of the gay electorate is particularly difficuh given 
the closed and sometimes secretive nature of the community. Many gay men and 
women do not openly admit their sexual orientation in surveys and polls, and 
consequently the number of gay voters in the electorate is difficult to estimate. 
The political system itself adds fiirther uncertainty to the electoral power of the 
gay community. The Electoral College system increases the power of the gay 
community by concentrating the vote within certain electorally powerfiil states, 
for example. New York and California. One estimate following the election 
suggests that one in seven of Clinton's voters were gay.'''* 
The uncertain nature of their electoral power was not, however, matched 
by a financial uncertainty. The gay community provided significant financial 
support in response to Clinton's campaign initiative. It is estimated that one gay 
rights organisation, the Human Rights Campaign Fund, raised $2.5 million for the 
Clinton presidential campaign. In total, the gay community is thought to have 
contributed as much as $4 miUion which suggests that gay organisations were 
significant financial contributors to the 1992 Clinton presidential campaign. With 
fewer dependants, it is argued that the gay community has more disposable 
148 Drew, op. cit., p. 43 
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income than their 'straight' contemporaries do and are, therefore, an important 
and previously neglected source of campaign finance. Many of these fiinds had 
previously been directed towards AIDS charities and civil rights organisations and 
the significant campaign donations suggested that a great deal of faith was placed 
in candidate CUnton. Expectations for change were high both during and after the 
campaign. 
As much as Bill Clinton was breaking new political ground with his 
courting of the gay community, ending the ban on homosexuals serving in the 
military did not become a central theme in the 1992 campaign. The economy 
remained the major concern of the electorate. The Republican convention 
attracted harsh publicity because of its anti-gay and extreme family values 
rhetoric, and subsequently inhibited Republican attacks on gay civil rights during 
the campaign proper. The Congressional Quarterly noted that this lack of 
opposition to Clinton's proposal gave gay rights groups even more hope for the 
fiiture and the belief that this could be the first of the many achievements in their 
quest for equality. 
The issue of gays in the military was not just promoted by the Clinton 
presidential campaign. A number of high profile legal cases involving dismissed 
military persormel ensured that the issue had legal as well as electoral dimensions. 
The case, which reopened the debate after the election, was that of Petty Officer 
Keith Meinhold. In a ruling announced in Los Angeles on November 9, 1992 a 
federal district court judge found that the US Navy was acting unconstitutionally 
when it dismissed Meinhold following his declaration of homosexuality on 
"^^^ Fessler, Pamela. "Evolution of an Explosive Issue" COWR. 30/1/93. p. 227 
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television. In ordering Meinhold's reinstatement, the court noted that the 
"Department of Defense's policy of barring gays and lesbians based merely on 
status, and not on conduct, violated the equal protection clause".'^ " The Navy 
unsuccessfijlly appealed against the ruling in January 1993 and the subsequent 
publicity prompted Clinton to reconfirm his commitment to ending the ban during 
the transition. 
In his first major address as President-elect, on Veteran's Day'^', Bill 
Clinton made it clear that he had every intention of working towards Ufting the 
ban after his inauguration.'^^ While the issue had not been the focus of the 
election, it became an early focus of the President-elect's attention, distracting the 
transition team , media and the pubUc from the main election priority, the 
economy. During the transition, Clinton placed the issue in the hands of Rep. 
Barney Frank (D-Mass) and Secretary of Defense designate, Les Aspin. 
Representative Frank was an ideal candidate to work with the administration. 
Congress and the gay community because he had been openly gay since 1987. 
Les Aspin, with his experience within the defence community, provided the 
administration with links to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Pentagon. The 
combination of these two individuals potentially provided equal representation to 
both sides in the gay-military debate. 
Shortly after the inauguration, a leaked White House memo revealed that 
Les Aspin had serious doubts about congressional support and military acceptance 
Meinholdv. Department of Defense 808 F Supp 1455 61 USLW 2485 (1993). Quoted in 
Jones and Koshes "Homosexuality and the Military." American Journal of Psychiatry. Vol 152, 
No. 1 (1995) p.20 
11 November 1992 
'^ ^ Schmitt, Eric. "The Transition: News Analysis - Challenging the Military; In promising to 
End Ban on Homosexuals, Clinton is Confronting a Wall of Tradition". New York Times. 
12/11/92 p.Al 
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of the ban. This revitalised media interest in the issue and the leak prepared the 
way for groups to mobilise and lobby for their position. At first, many gay rights 
groups believed that President Clinton would use the fiall extent of his executive 
powers to rescind the ban. However, the tone of the debate, which had become 
part of the public domain for the first time, became so negative that such 
sweeping changes were no longer an option for the new administration and a 
more incremental approach was necessary. A compromise would have to be 
reached between the administration, the military and Congress. 
The Announcement 
Les Aspin armounced the administration's policy on January 25. It 
involved a two step process: initially, all actions against homosexual service 
personnel would be suspended, any discovered homosexuals would be put on 
standby reserve and new recruits would no longer be asked their sexual 
orientation. Then, in six months the President would announce an Executive 
Order formally ending the ban. This announcement ignited the debate in Congress 
over the shape of the new policy. The congressional response to the 
administration's announcement underlined the fragility of the Democratic coalition 
and the depth of opposition faced by the President. 
Congressional and military leaders galvanised opposition against the 
administration's intentions to repeal the ban. In Congress, opposition was led by 
Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, Sam Nunn (D-Ga). Conservatives 
of both parties and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were united in their resistance to the 
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new administration's proposal. Colin Powell continued to assert that "the 
presence of homosexuals within the armed forces would be prejudicial to good 
order and discipline."'" In response to Clinton's initiative, the Senate threatened 
legislative action which would not only slow down the ending of the ban, but 
would also threaten other legislative initiatives important to the new 
administration.'^'* By putting forward a legislative amendment that would seal the 
military ban into law, congressional Republicans hoped to stop Clinton in his 
tracks. 
Sam Nunn became a power broker in the negotiations between all parties, 
as a Senator, defence specialist and Southern Democrat. This became as much of 
a battle for his own political turf as it was for the maintenance of the military 
status quo. Nunn and Aspin, as defence specialists, were in direct conflict for pre-
eminence in their field. Nunn's pivotal role in the negotiation of a compromise 
between the administration and the military allowed him to secure considerable 
political power vis a vis Aspin and the Clinton administration. 
The compromise which the Clinton administration negotiated with 
Democratic Senators, led by Sam Nunn, ensured that conservative Democrats 
would not block Clinton's plan to suspend the ban, but Clinton had to limit the 
extent of proposed changes to the status of homosexuals in the military. 
Although negotiations still had to take place between Aspin and senior military 
officials, the congressional compromise provided Clinton with a six month period 
during which he could hammer out the essential details with the Pentagon. 
Drew, op. cit., p.43 
The threatened amendment was to be attached to the Family and Medical Leave Act, a 
popular piece of legislation with the Clinton White House and Congress. The Republicans' 
ultimatum tested Clinton's attachment to a perceived minority issue in the face of legislative 
failure. 
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President Clinton announced: 
" I have asked Secretary of Defense to submit by July 15 a draft 
Executive Order after fiiU consultation with military and 
congressional leaders and concerned individuals outside of 
government, which would end the present policy of exclusion 
from military service solely on the basis of sexual orientation 
and at the same time establishing rigorous standards regarding 
sexual conduct to be applied to all military personnel.' ,155 
This two step process was an effort to diffuse the highly charged atmosphere 
which surrounded the issue. It gave Congress the opportunity to discuss the 
available options for a more acceptable policy and put gay rights activists one step 
closer to their ultimate goal of integration.'^^ President Clinton said of the 
compromise: 
"We...all agree that a very high standard of conduct can and 
must be appUed. So the single area of disagreement is this: 
Should someone be able to serve their country in uniform i f 
they say they are homosexual but they do nothing which 
violates the code of conduct, undermines unit cohesion or 
morale apart from that statement."'" 
Additional opposition to the Clinton initiative derived from the campaign 
scandal of his dodging the draft for the Vietnam war. Many Presidents have 
distinguished themselves on the field of battle, Theodore Roosevelt, Eisenhower, 
Keimedy, and Bush, all had distinguished war records. Heroism is part and parcel 
of the American electorate's expectations for their Presidents. Having evaded 
military service, Clinton was placed in a precarious position with the military and 
those involved in the area of defence. Perceived as, at best, inexperienced, it was 
Press Conference by the President. [Httpiwww.pub.whitehouse.gov] 29/1/93 
Towell, Pat. "Campaign Promise, Social Debate Collide on Military Battle Field." CQWR, 
30/1/93. pp. 226 & 228 
Press Conference by the President, [http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov] 29/1/93 
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difficult for him to command the military authority of his office. Public 
perceptions of his presidency declined during the first two weeks of the 
administration while the debate over gays in the military raged. Perceptions that 
President Clinton's decisions had been ill judged and out of touch with popular 
and institutional sentiment were supported by a 20% drop in Clinton's 
favourability ratings.''* 
The Congressional Debate 
During the six-month interim period, congressional debate continued. 
Senate minority leader. Bob Dole, renewed RepubUcan attempts to tie up the 
issue of gays in the military in legislative red tape. An amendment, which would 
require the President to seek congressional approval before issuing an Executive 
Order lifting the ban, was put before the Senate. A Democrat backed alternative 
proposal gave Senators the opportunity to uphold officially the compromise 
reached between the President and leading Democrats announced on January 25. 
Additionally, a non-binding resolution was proposed that would allow the 
President and Congress to investigate current policy towards gays in the military. 
The Senate's wholehearted endorsement of the proposal and the resolution hid 
divisions within the Democratic Party. The united stand was promoted to support 
the Family Leave bill (S5) that had provided the forum for the initial Dole 
amendment rather than an endorsement of the campaign commitment, the Clinton 
administration poUcy or the compromise.''^ These events paved the way for 
Drew, op. cit., p.48 
Doherty, Carroll J. & Pat Towell. "Fireworks Over Ban in Gays Temporarily Snuffed Out." 
CQWR 6/2/93 p.272 
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congressional committee hearings throughoiit the spring of 1993. 
Senate Armed Services committee hearings underlined the general 
opposition of many congressmen and military leaders to a substantial change in 
military policy on homosexual service personnel. Reforms which went fiirther 
than those embodied in the interim agreement began to look unlikely and 
President Clinton had to accept that he would be unable to lift the ban completely 
as he had promised during the campaign. Again Senator Nunn offered a 
compromise. Labelled 'Don't Ask/Don't Tell', the policy represented a very 
minimalist reform of the existing regulation and little change from the interim 
policy in place since January. Much of the impetus behind this compromise can 
be seen to come from the testimony of several senior military servicemen. 
Without exception, they agreed that open homosexuality within the military would 
be prejudicial to its good order and discipline. Retired Army General H. Norman 
Schwarzkopf said at the May 10 committee hearing: 
"The introduction of an open homosexual into a small unit 
immediately polarizes that unity and destroys the very bonding 
that is so important for [its] survival in time of war."'^" 
Additional testimony from gay servicemen and supporters of lifting the ban 
asserted that service with honour was possible for homosexuals and that their 
presence did not jeopardise morale or discipline. The testimonies from junior 
officers and enlisted servicemen were not as persuasive as that of General 
Schwarzkopf Committee members still contended that any major changes to the 
existing poUcy would be extremely difficult to achieve and that there would have 
Quoted in Fessler, Pamela "Nunn Offers a Compromise: 'Don't Ask/Don't TeU'" CQWR 
15/5/97 p. 1242 
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to be limits to the openness of homosexuals in service. 
The Substance of the Executive Order 
The shape of the final Executive Order was such that it fiilfilled few of the 
promises that Bill Clinton first made to gay leaders in October 1991. Announced 
on 19 July, and known as 'Don't Ask/Don't Tell' the Executive Order promised 
homosexuals access to military service so long as they never revealed their sexual 
orientation. The military for its side of the contract, would remove from 
enlistment papers questions about sexual orientation and would no longer seek 
out homosexual personnel without credible information that they had or intended 
to engage in homosexual behaviour. President Clinton announced the policy at 
the National Defense University at Fort McNair: 
" I have ordered Secretary Aspin to issue a directive consisting 
of these essential elements; One, service men and women will 
be judged, based on their conduct, not their sexual orientation. 
Two, therefore the practice, now six months old, of not asking 
about sexual orientation in the enlistment procedure will 
continue. Three, an open statement by a service member that 
he or she is homosexual will recreate a rebuttable presumption 
that he or she intends to engage in prohibited conduct, but the 
service member will be given an opportunity to reflate that 
presumption - in other words, to demonstrate that he or she 
intends to live by the rules of conduct that apply to military 
service. 
And four, all provisions of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice will be enforced in an even-handed manner as regards 
both heterosexuals and homosexuals. And thanks to poUcy 
provisions agreed to by the Joint Chiefs, there will be decent 
regard to the legitimate privacy and associational rights of all 
service members."'^' 
Remarks by President at Defense University 19/7/93. [http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov] 
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The Executive Order announced by President Clinton outraged the gay 
community. Its limited nature was seen as a "capitulation to the Pentagon and 
Congressional conservatives."'^^ In an attempt to explain the final shape of the 
policy President Clinton said: 
"Those who want the ban to be lifted completely on both status 
and conduct must understand that such action would have 
faced certain and decisive reversal by the Congress and the 
cause for which many have fought for years would be delayed, 
probably for years. "'^^ 
For many gay rights groups, it was not the scope of the reform which was 
troublesome, but the fact that, with so little achieved in this case, the prospects for 
flirther reforms were becoming more distant. Additionally, the sense of betrayal 
was deep given candidate Clinton's unconditional pledge to end the ban during his 
presidential campaign. '^ '* 
Loosening Abortion Restrictions 
The case of reauthorizing federal fianding for services dealing with 
abortion was dramatically different. Since the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. 
The Times 20/7/93 
'^ ^ Remarks by President at Defense University, [http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov] 19/7/93 
The 'Don't Ask/Don't Tell' policy has not protected all gay service personnel. Timothy R. 
McVeigh, a Navy sailor, was discharged from the Navy in November 1997 for using the word 
gay on his Internet provider user profile. He was careful not to provide details of his occupation 
or fijll identity so as not to violate the current policy. A Navy investigator obtained flail personal 
details from the internet provider (AOL) with a single telephone call and no court order or 
subpoena. Two issues at stake here are whether both the Navy and AOL have violated privacy 
laws and if McVeigh has stepped outside the protection of the 'Don't Ask/Don't Tell' policy. 
The Navy contends that McVeigh has violated the existing policy with his declaration that he is 
gay. Gay rights workers advocate that imder the 'Don't Ask/Don't Tell' policy, the Navy have 
no reason to pursue McVeigh as he did not reveal his fiill identity or occupation. For fiill details 
see "Navy Targets Sailor's Use of 'Gay' on AOL Case Raises Issue of Online Privacy 
Protection" Washington Post 12 November 1998, A07 (http;//www.washingtonpost.com/) 
170 
Wade (1973) abortion has played a crucial role in shaping the nature of the 
American political scene. In every election since 1974 abortion has become a 
critical issue dividing supporters and politicians of both political parties. Not until 
the Republican administrations of the 1980s and early 1990s was there a single 
presidential political message about abortion. Ronald Reagan's anti-abortion 
rhetoric cemented the fate of abortion rights campaigners for more than a decade. 
Reagan's actions changed the nature of the national debate in several ways. He 
gave presidential legitimacy to the anti-abortion movement; he aggressively 
sought constitutional and legislative solutions to the Roe decision; federal judicial 
appointees were screened for their opinions on the abortion issue, removing 
abortion rights supporters from consideration; regulations were enacted by the 
administration which would restrict the availability of abortions.'^^ 
These actions varied in then- success as Congress exercised its own 
powers to moderate presidential activity. Success was achieved in the areas 
where the presidency had the most scope of action, appointments and regulations. 
Unable to pass a constitutional amendment to overturn Roe, Reagan settled for 
reinterpreting fiinding regulations for the Department of Heath and Human 
Services in 1985. The new regulations effectively removed fiinding under Title X 
of the Public Health Services Act (1970) for organisations that performed or 
provided counselling for abortion.'^^ While unable to undermine the 
constitutional right of women to have abortions, the Republican administration 
aggressively sought to remove the availability of abortion through federal 
regulations. 
Craig, Barbara Hinkson & David M. O'Brien: Abortion and American Politics, p. 169 
Ibid p. 188 
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President Bush continued the work of the Reagan administration 
throughout his own presidency. Again, unable to persuade Congress to work 
towards a constitutional amendment, he maintained the federal regulations limiting 
the availability of abortion. Additionally, he extended the regulations to cover 
research conducted by federal scientists on foetal tissue transplants. Congress 
continued to pass legislation to Umit the extent of these regulations, and Bush 
continued to use his veto. For over a decade, abortion rights activists saw their 
campaign thwarted by presidential actions. 
The 1992 presidential election campaign saw the Democrats and the 
Republicans draw their traditional battle grounds on the abortion debate. The 
Republicans continued to affirm that the rights of the unborn child were of 
paramount importance, while the Democrats stood behind the rights of women to 
determine their own actions with regard to every area of reproduction. With the 
economy foremost in the minds of the voters, abortion was less decisive as an 
issue than had been the case in previous years. This did not, however, prevent 
Clinton from making the reversal of federal regulations limiting access to abortion 
one of his administration's early priorities. 
Just two days after his inauguration. Bill Clinton signed three memoranda 
reversing the regulations imposed by the Reagan and Bush administrations. The 
Secretary of Defense was ordered to reverse the ban on privately funded abortions 
in Military Hospitals which had been established by memoranda on December, 
1987 and June, 1988. In February 1988 Title X fiinds were withdrawn from 
cUnics providing abortion services; this became known as the 'Gag Rule'. 
Clinton's memoranda suspended the 'Gag Rule' until new regulations associated 
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with the Public Health Services Act could be drafted. The version of the ban that 
affected the use of foreign aid by organisations providing family planning services 
was also removed. Finally Clinton removed the moratorium on foetal tissue 
research conducted by the National Institute of Health and instructed the Food 
and Drug Administration to investigate the necessity of banning the importation 
for personal use of the controversial abortion pill Mifepristone (RU-486). Of the 
package of memoranda, Clinton said: 
"Today...marks the begirming of a new national reproductive 
health policy that aims to prevent unintended pregnancies. Our 
administration is committed to providing the kind of prenatal 
care, child care and family and medical leave that will lead to 
healthy childbearing, and will support America's families".'^^ 
While not strictly designated Executive Orders, as they were unnumbered 
and entitled memoranda in the presidential announcement, their publication in the 
Federal Register provided them with equal status. Clinton's use of memoranda in 
these cases was in direct response to presidential precedent, rather than just 
expedient policymaking. While his actions legalised or reauthorised many 
activities related to abortion, it was still essential for Congress to initiate and 
approve appropriation bills for many of these regulations to be enforced or acted 
upon. There was a strong probability that such approval would be forthcoming 
given the historical climate of congressional activities during the previous 
Republican administrations. By using the fiiU extent of his executive powers in 
this case he was able to promote perceptions of decisiveness and dynamism. 
'"^^ Remarks by President during signing of Presidential memoranda 22/1/97. 
[http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov]. 
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The Role of Precedent and the Use of Executive Orders 
In the two cases examined the use of executive power brought about 
dramatically different results by dramatically different means. In the case of 
repealing the ban on homosexuals serving the in the military the new 
administration faced a hostile and unyielding opposition in Congress and the 
military elite. President Clinton's problems with the management and execution 
of the Executive Order stemmed from three factors that influenced the fate of the 
order. 
Firstly, precedent has been incredibly important to the historical 
development of the scope of Executive Orders. In the case of homosexual 
integration into the military, the precedent came from the desegregation and 
integration of African-Americans and women. However, as previously explained, 
these are not direct comparisons as no military law prescribed their segregation. 
For homosexuals, desegregation and integration would require a change in the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, which could only be brought about through 
congressional consent. Therefore, just as congressional approval is needed for a 
financial appropriation, the President was not able to act independently and make 
fiill use of his executive powers. 
Secondly, many of the obstacles that the administration had to confront 
with this issue were brought about by the scope of the proposed Executive Order. 
As an electoral and social issue, gay civil rights were low on the list of priorities 
for the vast majority of congressmen. Regarded by many as a distraction from the 
main poUcy priority of the economy and too far reaching to be popular with the 
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majority of the electorate, it was difficuh for them to support the presidential 
initiative. Moreover, the lack of consuhation between the President and Congress 
alienated many leading Senators. 
The final, and equally influential factor in shaping the outcome of the 
order was President Clinton's lack of regard for the opinions of military leaders. 
While his constitutionally mandated power of Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces gives him the authority to order the integration of homosexual men and 
women into the military, it does not empower him to change the opinions of the 
officers who would be enforcing the order. Lack of consultation with military 
leaders in the early stages of the debate over status and conduct was a serious 
oversight and indicated a lack of respect for the wishes of the military. It 
seriously eroded any legitimacy that the President had with such leaders who 
knew that, without their support. President Clinton would never be able to 
achieve his goal of integration. I f the Clinton team had consulted with military 
leaders before reconfirming their campaign pledge they would have been prepared 
for the levels of opposition which they encountered. Ultimately, it seems likely 
that they would have continued with the pledge, but in a more informed 
environment than that in which the policy was finally shaped. 
It is clear that Clinton did not appreciate the seriousness of the issue he 
was tackling and the ramifications it could have for the rest of his legislative 
programme. Because the issue received very little publicity during the campaign 
it was impossible for the President to gauge pubUc and institutional opinion, both 
essential to the success of any reform initiative. Even more importantly, a lack of 
understanding of the Executive Order process meant that CUnton was unable to 
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use this presidential tool effectively. He appears to have been unaware in the 
initial stages of the process of the need for military consuhation and congressional 
consent. All of this is underpinned with evidence of post election hubris, an 
affliction that has caused many newly elected Presidents considerable problems 
and embarrassments. 
In the case of gays in the military, the use of an Executive Order to 
enforce integration was always going to be a contentious issue. Without sufficient 
outside support, presidential prestige and institutional legitimacy, the proposal had 
little chance of success. Additionally, the necessary involvement of Congress in 
the enforcement process limited the President's scope of action and severely 
limited the extent of his executive powers. 
The use of executive powers in the case of lifting the restrictions on 
abortion practices was far more successfiil. By using the powers of office 
appropriately, and in line with precedent, the new administration was able to undo 
the actions of previous administration with the draft of three simple documents. 
The issue at hand was no less highly charged with opinion than homosexuals in 
the military, it was simply that the President matched the actions of previous 
office holders in dealing with the issue. Without any constitutional mandate, the 
limits on the use of executive powers are tightly bound to history. Any attempt to 
extent those limits, without recourse to crisis, is liable to face obstruction from the 
other branches of government seeking to maintain their own constitutional 
positions. 
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Conclusion 
It would be inaccurate to suggest that President Clinton made consistent 
or extensive use of Executive Orders to work outside the traditional legislative 
arena or that his Executive Orders were exceptional. As a governing strategy, he 
used Executive Orders within what he believed was their historical context, with a 
strong sense of history and precedent. The publicity, which surrounded the issues 
of gays in the military and abortion, was by virtue of the nature of the issues 
rather than the use of Executive Orders to achieve the policy ends. In the first six 
months of the Clinton administration he issued 22 Executive Orders. The 
majority of which (15) were concerned with the management of the executive 
branch and the federal bureaucracy. In order to put this in perspective it can be 
compared with Ronald Reagan's use of Executive Orders in the first six months in 
office. He issued 28 Executive Orders, again with the majority focused upon the 
bureaucracy. President Bush made less use of Executive Orders issuing only 
sixteen. The case of President Bush appears to indicate that newly elected 
Presidents facing inter-party transitions need to make greater use of the Executive 
Order to stamp their mark upon the executive branch. Through such Orders, 
Presidents give indications to Congress and the bureaucracy about their future 
legislative strategy, adapt the federal bureaucracy to their personal and policy 
needs; and seek to fiilfil campaign pledges without tackling the legislative obstacle 
course. 
Executive Orders can be effective and usefiil policy tools, but new 
National Archives and Records Administration. 
[http://www.nara.gov/nara/fedreg/eo/eo.html] 
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Presidents seeking to place their mark on government should err on the side of 
caution. An understanding of their limits is essential, they should not be viewed 
as a cure all, prescribed at will, for problems and issues which do not lend 
themselves to the traditional legislative process. The case of the abortion 
memoranda demonstrates that it is relatively simple to undo the actions of old 
administrations through the appropriate, precedented use of executive powers. 
However, the experience of President Clinton in the case of homosexuals in the 
military should caution fliture office holders in their zeal to deliver on impossible 
campaign promises. 
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Chapter 7: Establishing Transition Linkages 
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The previous five chapters have analysed the endeavours of the new 
Clinton administration to secure success in both the appointments process and the 
development of policy options. What is most evident is that such success in 
presidential transitions is elusive, even under the most ideal circumstances. The 
transfer of power fi-om one administration to another is highly unpredictable and 
prey to numerous pressures both within the executive branch and in the wider 
Washington community. The policy outcomes achieved in the five issue areas 
discussed are significant as a means to judge presidential accomplishment during 
the transition period, but the outcomes are only one small part in that judgement 
exercise. More illuminating in the pursuit of greater understanding of the conduct 
of this presidential transition is the way in which the whole transition machine is 
linked together. 
It is the linkages between the White House, the Executive Office of the 
President and the legislative agenda that reveal the fiill truth about the transition 
and its place in the presidential history of Bill Clinton. The Clinton transition of 
1992-93 can be seen to have had a strong influence over the conduct of his first 
term in office, and most particularly the period of time up to the 1994 mid-term 
elections. In order to assess the extent to which this transition was successfijl in 
its aims it is, therefore, appropriate to identify trends across issue areas relative to 
both appointments and policy selection and formulation, to reveal the genuine 
nature of the Clinton transition. These trends will be identified through Brauer's 
four factors essential for success in presidential transition and these elements will 
be used as a fi-amework to assess the extent to which Bill Clinton's transition can 
be assessed in terms of Brauer's paradigm. 
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Effective Planning 
Since the Kennedy Transition in 1960-61 much has been made of the 
necessity to plan early for the transition. In 1992 Bill Clinton followed the 
example of his predecessors with the establishment of the Pre-Transition Advisory 
Board. There can be no doubt that the formation of this group during the 
nomination contest was a deliberate attempt by the presidential candidate to lay 
the foundations for his transition, should he be successful in the November 
election. Despite accusations of haste and hubris, both previous Presidents and 
academics alike maintain that it is an essential step towards preparing for office. 
However, the effectiveness of this planning organisation was reduced by the scope 
of its remit. Having responsibility for political appointments, policy direction and 
an evaluation of the larger picture of the condition of government was a tall order 
for a small team, one member of which had additional responsibilities within the 
campaign team. 
A second problem associated with the pre-transition planning organisation 
was that it would not be the only source of information for the President-elect. 
Through their membership of the DLC, both Clinton and Gore had encountered 
many like minded individuals. Members of the DLC were to become closely 
associated with the campaign and later the transition. Furthermore, the DLC's 
own think tank, the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), became an additional voice 
in the area of policy formulation. It was involved in preparing policy options, in 
membership of policy working groups and uhimateiy in the publication of its own 
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book,'^^ which became associated with the administration. Such competition for 
ideas is important in developing innovative policy, but it can also undermine the 
hard work embarked upon during the middle stages of a presidential campaign. 
By comparison, the highly focused remit, covert activity and cohesion, 
which was associated with the Reagan transition planning team, ensured that there 
would be no dilution of the Reagan message through outside actors. Moreover, 
the transition itself was directed fi'om the structures established during the 
planning stages. For Reagan, the key to this aspect of transition success was the 
concrete foundation laid by E. Pendleton James and his staflf in Arlington. 
The location of the pre-transition planning organisation also appears to be 
an important determinant in its success. Both Carter and Clinton established their 
pre-transition planning teams in their home states. These teams were divorced 
from the political processes at work in Washington, whereas Reagan's team was 
in an ideal position to take advantage of the proximity of the city, to begin to 
establish contacts within Washington and to establish a rapport with important 
actors within the wider Washington community. For Clinton, as a Washington 
outsider, the development of these types of relationships would have been a boost 
in the evolution of his own administration during the transition. 
There are other striking similarities between the Clinton and Carter 
transitions. Both established pre-transition planning groups outside their 
campaign organisations, both appeared unaware of the pitfalls that might result 
fi-om such a disjunction and both experienced conflicts between their two sets of 
staffs following the November election. In recognising that the tasks of 
' Marshall & Scram. Mandate For Change 
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campaigning and governing are very distinct, the rationale behind separating these 
tasks during the election was sound. However, the difficulty lay in 
communicating that reality to a campaign staff exhausted from months of 
travelling, rallying and speech writing, who were desperate for the spoils of such 
hard work. To exemplify this point, despite the division of tasks and the 
subsequent antagonism between the two groups, only two of the senior members 
of the pre-transition planning group and the campaign staff did not take up 
permanent positions within the new Clinton administration. Clinton may have 
recognised the difference between campaigning and governing, but he did not 
follow through when filling the appointments in the executive branch. 
The majority of the attention of pre-transition planning groups appears to 
be focused on personnel selection, and rightly so as it is a task which requires 
prompt action from the President-elect following the November election. There 
are high expectations from political commentators and observers that the public 
face of the new administration will be available for scrutiny in the early weeks of 
the transition. Additionally, because of the huge volume of positions to be filled, 
it is the most time consuming activity of the transition. The process can become 
more costly in terms of time and manpower i f the President-elect is intent on 
maintaining a tight hold over the whole appointments process, rather than just 
concentrating on the higher level cabinet nominations, or i f there are a diverse set 
of appointment criteria placed upon potential candidates. This focus on 
appointments, however, does not leave much scope for policy development, i f 
that is one of the remits of the pre-transition planning team. There is little 
evidence to suggest that the Clinton pre-transition planning team were able to 
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tackle fiiUy this aspect of their responsibilities. It was not until after the election 
that working groups would be designated to consider poUcy options in the major 
policy areas consistent with campaign promises. 
Transition Success Factor One: Plan Early for the Transition. 
The process of pre-transition planning for Clinton, therefore, was in place, 
but not exploited to its fiillest capacity. I f the transition can be thought of as a 
barometer for fiature administration activities, then these pre-transition planning 
organisations are equally illuminating about the fiiture practices of the transition. 
Pre-transition planning might not be the most important of Brauer's four factors 
to get right, but a strong start can do nothing but aid the transition once it is in fiiU 
swing after the election. Presidential candidates who are serious about embarking 
upon such planning should consider the main objective of the planning process. 
Focus and coherence in terms of aim and method are essential. It is also essential 
that the work of the pre-transition planning organisation be fijlly utilised during 
the early transition period. In James Pfiffher's terms, this is the ability of the 
administration to 'hit the ground running'.^™ The time scale for the interregnum 
is too brief, and open to too many additional pressures to embark upon a 
replication of the background research undertaken during the previous summer. 
Taking Control of the Appointments Process. 
Upon coming to office, Clinton faced a governmental situation which 
no Pfiffner, op. cit., p. 7 
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would have been unfamiliar to any of his predecessors. The longevity of the 
Republican Party's dominance in the presidency and the indifferent appraisal of 
the Carter administration, bequeathed Clinton with a difficult task: the 
rejuvenation of the Democratic Party's presence in federal government and 
uniting the Party across the institutions after an extended period of divided 
government. In order to achieve both these aims the appointment of talented and 
experienced men and women would be essential. The new administration's own 
goal of diversity and strict criteria of ethnicity, gender and geography, were 
instrumental in delaying the speed of appointments. This, in combination with the 
very loose transition structure associated with selecting possible candidates for 
nomination, fiirther exacerbated the Clinton transition's problem of perceived 
inefficiency. 
In the case of the Clinton transition, the groundwork provided by the Pre-
Transition Advisory Board was not so much replicated as convoluted following 
the election. By placing the responsibility for personnel selection with a vast 
network of volunteers, close personal friends of the Clintons and Bill and Hillary 
Clinton themselves, the process became highly decentralised. Additionally, those 
charged with the management of personnel tasks, for example, the former 
governor of South Carolina, Richard Riley, had little familiarity with the 
appointments process or the nature of the positions that he was filling.*^' There is 
little doubt that Riley was a close and loyal fiiend of Bill Clinton, but he did not 
have the expertise to manage aides who themselves had little experience of the 
Washington culture and the political appointments process. More useful in this 
Mackenzie & Shogan. Cfcstacle Course p.69 
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scenario would have been a Washington insider with a less personal relationship 
to the President-elect, who could provide sound advice and direction to the 
central task of the transition. 
The position of Richard Riley in the appointments process was indicative 
of the way in which the whole transition was managed. Problems with 
organisation and structure, which were evident during the campaign, spilled over 
into the transition with the aforementioned clash between campaign and transition 
teams. Despite the strategic appointment of two transition heads - Christopher 
and Jordan - this attempt at structure and organisation did not overcome the 
personal impulses of Bill Clinton to maintain a free flowing and non-hierarchical 
managerial style. From the very beginning, the transition lacked a central focus or 
direction and the only point of cohesion was the President-elect. 
The muhiple sites used to manage the policy and appointments process 
fijrther exacerbated this lack of focus and direction during the transition. Part of 
the transition was housed in Washington D.C., in an office block near to the 
White House, part was based in a skyscraper in Little Rock, and the big decisions 
were taken in the study of the Governor's Mansion in Little Rock with the 
President-elect, Vice President-elect, Hillary Clinton and a small group of their 
intimates. 
The Clinton transition also introduced a new dimension to preparing for 
the White House. In combination, the Clinton - Gore ticket brought together two 
professional politicians who believed that they were going to change the face of 
politics in the US. Unlike the pairings of Carter - Mondale, Reagan - Bush and 
'•'^  Friedman, Thomas L. "The Transition: The New Team; Clinton's Aides Search for Options 
and Offices." New York Times. 16/11/92 p. A 14 
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Bush - Quayle, where Vice - Presidents, possessed to varying degrees, some 
political independence, Clinton - Gore promised to be more of a partnership. The 
Vice - President would pursue his own interests and use his office to promote his 
own agenda in addition to supporting the President. This elevation of the vice-
presidency necessitated that the Clinton transition accommodated more than one 
centre of power. Al Gore's personal policy interests in the environment and 
technology were destined to be administration priorities and his expertise and 
influence became evident in the appointment of his former senior senatorial aide 
and Secretary of Environmental Regulation in Florida, Carol Browner, to head the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the elevation of that agency to cabinet 
status during Clinton's first term. 
A fiirther test of the ability of the transition to adapt the presidency to a 
new type of political leadership was preparing for an activist First Lady. 
Following in the footsteps of Eleanor Roosevelt and Rosalynn Carter, Hillary 
Clinton was seeking to advance the role of the First Lady beyond the boundaries 
established by her predecessors. Commonly recognised as the driving force 
behind the political ambitions of Bill Clinton, her presence in the White House 
would revolutionise the character of the office. Therefore, the existence of three 
power centres in the White House would require a delicate balance between the 
institutional imperatives of the presidency and the desires of the inhabitants of the 
White House. 
In addition to reshaping the relationship within the White House, Bill 
Clinton intended his administration to be distinct from those of past office holders. 
Ultimately, this distinction would be more one of degree than kind. There is no 
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disputing that Clinton assembled, in terms of ethnicity, gender and geography, the 
most diverse cabinet in presidential history, but this diversity was not so evident in 
the high profile cabinet departments charged with the management of economic 
and foreign policy. Having designated economic policy as one of his own 
priorities, the appointment of seasoned professionals from both inside and outside 
the Beltway to senior positions within both the EOP and White House Offices 
was inevitable. From the beginning, these appointees would have to work with 
the economic and political establishment, reassure the financial markets of 
Clinton's economic intentions and firmly establish the administration's legislative 
direction early within the budget cycle - which would be well underway by 
inauguration day. The appointment of Bentsen, Panetta, Altman and Rivlin 
captured the political centre ground allowing them to be advocates for good 
policy rather than ideology. Additionally, the 'insider' status of Bentsen, Panetta 
and Rivlin increased important legislative connections between the executive 
branch and Congress. 
Similarly, in terms of foreign policy staff, the need to appoint a team 
acceptable to the defence community was essential. Great uncertainty, brought 
about by the end of the Cold War, further pressurised Bill Clinton to appoint 
advisors and cabinet secretaries with considerable knowledge and experience. 
Foreign policy decisions provide all newly elected Presidents with their greatest 
leadership test. No previous occupation adequately prepares any successflil 
presidential candidate for the management of foreign affairs and it is the area of 
policy which accords the office holder the greatest amount of constitutional 
scope, but also encompasses the most hazardous pitfalls. Regardless of the 
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reassertion of congressional war making powers following the Vietnam War, the 
president maintains a pre-eminent position in the foreign policy field. Beyond the 
realm of the defence specialists and into the international community, the nature 
of Clinton's appointments would send signals to the United States' allies and 
opponents alike. It was for these reasons that experienced administrators, whose 
appointments were not affected by the EGG criteria, filled senior positions in the 
Department of Defense and State Department. 
The sharp distinction between economic and defence appointments 
resulted in the general impression that the individuals in place in those 
departments would be expert administrators rather than poUcy innovators. In the 
case of economic policy, this opinion was punctuated by President-elect Clinton's 
statement that " I will be the chief economic advisor in my Administration and I 
would take responsibility for addressing both the short and long-term economic 
challenges facing us." '^^  
Setting Appointment Priorities: Organising the White House. 
As the most time consuming and public activity of the transition, the filling 
of executive branch appointments became a priority for the Clinton transition. 
However, the appointment of the President's personal White House staff is 
recognised as being of the greatest priority in the early days of the transition. 
Presidents, from Kennedy onwards, have been urged to select their White House 
staff early, and to publicise the appointments to provide a focus for potential 
'"Rosenbaimi,DavidE. "Dec. 6-12; Insiders, Outsiders." New York Times. 13/12/92 Sect. 4 
p. 2 
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"office-seekers, idea-peddlers, pressmen, legislators, diplomats and cabinet 
designees."'^ "* From both an academic and political perspective, the 
announcement of the White House staff" marks an important watershed for the 
new administration. The timing and substance of these appointments provides a 
strong indication about the organisational nature of the new administration and 
the President-elect's managerial and political intentions. 
The organisation of the Clinton White House remained a mystery to 
commentators and observers for the first five weeks of the transition. His first 
cluster of appointments included his chief of staff and the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget. Even with the announcement of Clinton's choice for 
his chief of staff, little of the confiision that surrounded the organisation of the 
future Clinton White House was dispelled. Clinton's decision to appoint Thomas 
McLarty did not alleviate impressions of disorganisation and inexperience. 
Moreover, by leaving the appointment of Howard Paster'^ ^ to congressional 
liaison until the final week of the interregnum, he denied Congress a point of 
reference for their enquiries and problems. 
A comparison of the appointments process in the Carter, Reagan and 
Clinton transitions reveals some striking similarities between the Democrats and 
further illustrates the dramatically different approach of the Reagan transition. In 
both political and academic terms, Reagan established a clear picture of the 
workings of his transition from the early weeks, and maintained a tight hold on his 
priorities by announcing his nominees within the space of two weeks. From the 
Memorandum from Richard Nenstadt to Kennedy transition. Quoted in Jones, Charles O. 
Passages to the President: From Campaigning to Governing. (1998) p 89 
Howard Paster came to the Clinton administration from the public relations and lobbying 
firm of Hill and Knowlton. He would return to the company as their president by the end of 
1993. 
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start there had been a clear organisational and administrative structure which 
reflected the legislative priorities of the incoming administration, (see Figure 1, 
p.214) 
Transition Success Factor Two: Organising the White House 
Between the election in November and the inauguration in January it 
remained unclear, to outside observers, whether a central organising principle of 
the Clinton transition existed. Just six days prior to the inauguration, Clinton 
announced the majority of his White House appointments. These appointments, 
while punctuated by the appointment of older and more experienced advisors -
Carol Rasco (Domestic Policy Advisor) and Eli J. Segal (Office of National 
Service), generally represented the youthful 'thirtysomething' face of the Clinton 
C a m p a i g n . I f the early transitioti provides messages about the future of the 
administration, then the strongest message broadcast prior to the inauguration 
was not one of policy direction, but of the importance of assembling a diverse 
administration. Pursuing Brauer's advice about structuring the White House as 
early as possible may not have prevented the diversity issue from dominating the 
pubUc face of the transition, but having staff in place to act as conduits for 
information may have lessened critiques of the transition appointments process as 
a whole, which appeared directionless. Following the inauguration, the prime 
objective of the administration would be to embark upon the legislative agenda, 
however, mistakes and miscalculations made during the early transition would 
Berks, Richard L. "The New Presidency: President-Elect; Clinton Selects a Mostly Youthful 
Group of White House Aides." New York Times. 15/1/93 p. A 14 
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hamper their ability to focus attention upon the central policy themes. 
Setting the Legislative Agenda 
Measures of presidential success are fixed on a number of factors; one 
criterion often used is legislative success, to what extent the President achieves his 
stated policy aims through Congress. Appraisals of the early months of the 
Clinton administration are generally uncomplimentary about his ability to set and 
promote his legislative agenda. As in during the interregnum, it appears that the 
message received by observers was not the one intended by the President. 
Ideological fuzziness and inconsistency overcame claims of policy focus and 
direction. In reality, however, was the Clinton agenda inconsistent and 
unfocused? 
The uncertain nature of Clinton's aims and objectives during the early 
months of his administration can be attributed to a number of different factors. 
Firstly, he was seeking to undertake a series of domestic policy initiatives 
following a domestic policy climate that had seen twelve years of relative neglect. 
Secondly, estimates of the current situation of the government supplied by the 
outgoing administration were proven to be inaccurate. Thirdly, despite claims of 
a mandate from voters, the political reality was that Clinton had not gained a 
majority vote in the November election and was reliant upon holding together a 
diverse coalition to secure support of his proposals. These factors required that 
promises and pledges embarked upon during the campaign were tempered to 
reflect the political reality that the administration was facing. 
A further important influence over the initial impressions of the Clinton 
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administration was the political climate which it shaped for itself. Focus, 
coherence and consistency are easy to maintain when the aims and objectives of 
the administration are limited to one or two issues. The narrow legislative agenda 
espoused by the Reagan administration in 1981-82 was relatively easy to achieve 
because tax cuts required little policy innovation or strong arm tactics to persuade 
legislators. An ambitious legislative agenda will require far more management and 
promotion, and this is the key to the Clinton legislative agenda in 1993. 
There is a sense that the Clinton policy programme could have been far 
more expansive than its final scope. Promises made to a large number of 
constituencies had the potential to become a gargantuan legislative agenda that, in 
the end, would achieve few of its aims and please nobody. In selecting issues to 
which he had the greatest attachment CUnton attempted to make his poUcy 
programme more realistic. 
Capturing the Right Political Limelight 
From the very initial stages of his presidency, it was essential that Bill 
CUnton captured the attention of the electorate, legislators, the press and political 
observers with his early announcements. These announcements should effectively 
reveal the governing intentions of the new administration both in specific and 
thematic form. On 4* November, 1992 Bill Clinton outlined his intentions for 
office. Initially focusing on a theme of continuity in foreign poUcy, he continued 
to stress the importance of "restoring...economic strength" and maintaining 
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economic stability.''^ In his inaugural address, Clinton espoused the themes of 
socio-economic investment and renewal/'* Statements made in the days 
following the inauguration, however, did not follow these mainstream themes. 
The President strayed from his focus on popular economic and social issues to 
what were perceived by many to be minority issues, and the issue which gained 
the most pubUc attention was that of lifting the ban on homosexuals serving in the 
military. From the outset, this issue was destined to polarise the public and 
politicians alike. In seeking to use the broadest scope of his executive powers, 
Clinton subjected the early weeks of his presidency to a barrage of unwanted 
media attention. It is obvious from the analysis of the events surrounding the 
issue that Clinton's concept of an Executive Order did not correspond with its 
actual political and legal role. 
Moreover, he did not recognise the essential connections between the 
presidency and the other actors involved in repealing the ban. As President, he is 
able to utilise powers accumulated by precedent to issue Executive Orders, but 
the administrative reality in this case was that he would be reliant upon the 
consent of parties outside his sphere of influence to bring about the full force of 
the administrative tool. The ideal approach to securing this policy initiative would 
have involved early consultation with senior military officers and congressmen, 
consultation which should have taken place before any presidential announcement. 
However, for Bill Clinton, the most important factor was being seen to be acting 
upon a campaign promise early in his term of office. 
m "Transcript of Clinton's remarks on White House Transition." New York Times. 5/11/92 p. 
B2 
"President Clinton's Inaugural Speech." [http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov] 
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The process of poUcy development and negotiation took place in an 
adversarial atmosphere following the initial presidential announcement on January 
25, 1993. Congress and the military were brought into the deliberative process 
after CUnton had decided upon his course of action. In the glare of media 
attention political and ethical positions on the issue were drawn and the fiall extent 
of the obstacles facing the President became evident. From his early actions it 
appeared that Clinton's loyalties lay with the gay community, who represented an 
important electoral constituency, and organised interests rather than with the 
military, his constitutionally mandated responsibility. 
The managerial and political impulses of the new President deeply affected 
his approach to this issue. In combination, the desire to fiilfil an important 
campaign promise, move quickly and decisively at the beginning of his term of 
office, and to use the fi i l l extent of his executive powers to solve poUcy problems, 
shaped his conduct in the use of the Executive Order. There was no recognition 
that this would be a divisive issue and no strategy prepared to cope with 
opposition Irom Congress and the miUtary. The unity of these two influential 
groups forced the administration to back down fi-om its initial promise, enter into 
lengthy negotiations, put in place an interim measure and ultimately compromise 
on the substance and style of the final Executive Order and accompanying 
legislation. To suggest that Executive Orders can only be used within their 
historical context would be to ignore their development of the previous 200 years. 
However, the extension of Executive Order authority has to be combined with a 
sense of urgency or crisis, and in the case of repealing the ban on homosexuals 
serving in the miUtary, such a crisis did not exist. 
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Executive Orders, when used in the correct situations, should not require 
Presidents to bargain with competing groups to such a large extent. This is 
clearly demonstrated with the reauthorization of abortion practices in federal 
medical facilities. Presidents Reagan and Bush used these legislative tools to 
circumvent a Congress unwilling to pass anti-abortion legislation or consider a 
constitutional amendment to overrule the 1973 Roe decision. In signing the 
memoranda on January 22, 1993 CHnton simply reversed the actions taken under 
previous presidents. Appropriations required by Congress to fiind medical 
facilities etc., were virtually assured given their consistent support of abortion 
rights throughout the previous RepubUcan administrations. That abortion remains 
a highly contentious issue in American politics should not be ignored. Yet, in the 
case of this executive action, Clinton was assured of relatively high levels of 
public support and was able to deliver on a campaign promise within days of his 
inauguration without intense media scrutiny or poUtical opposition. 
Throughout the controversy surrounding the declaration of the Executive 
Order relating to homosexuals and the military, attention was naturally focused on 
Bill Clinton's actions. Unlike regular legislative action, where the responsibility 
for the final outcome rests with a number of different actors, with the exercise of 
executive powers responsibility rests squarely with the President and the White 
House. The flaw in the Clinton White House appears to be the lack of 
understanding of the legal mechanisms surrounding the use of Executive Orders, 
as a Washington outsider, Clinton should have sought the advice of experienced 
administrators in preparing the announcement of the Executive Order. 
The experience of the new Clinton administration in relation to the 
196 
homosexuals in the military issue was, in terms of presidential transitions, 
exceptional. Most new administrations seek to spend their first few weeks setting 
the legislative agenda and publicising their fixture policy initiatives rather than 
defending a minority issue. Because of the saga with the Executive Orders 
President Clinton's ability to take control of the process of poUcy promotion in 
other issue areas was severely limited. The seriousness and far reaching 
implication of the major poUcy initiatives constantly battled with the trials and 
tribulations of the Executive Order for media attention. The early mistake of this 
minority issue was to have knock-on effects for both health care reform and 
economic policy. 
Focusing the Limelight 
Management of the economy was, in many respects, going to be the 
biggest test of Clinton's political resolve. Reforming heahh care and bringing 
costs within the reach of milUons of uninsured Americans would be a huge poUcy 
achievement, but long term economic management would be the yardstick by 
which President CUnton would be judged in the 1996 presidential election. To the 
extent that the economy had been the undoing of George Bush in 1992, it would 
also determine whether Bill Clinton would be another one term Democrat 
President. 
The influence of the budget cycle over the yearly political and policy 
agenda in American politics is such that, until the budget is resolved, no other 
domestic policy initiative that requires an appropriation wiU be passed by 
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Congress. It is for this reason that President Clinton should have held himself to 
his pledge to 'focus on the economy like a laser beam'. 
The Clinton administration's investment in the development of economic 
poUcy is clearly evident from the amount of time given over to its development 
during the interregnum and through the appointments made to key economic 
posts. By bringing to his administration a mixture of seasoned Washington 
experts and professional economists from the world of business and education, 
Clinton sent all the right signals to the economic community. Of some concern 
was the duality of opinion in terms of deficit reduction versus investment 
spending, however, there was a recognition that the economic team was going the 
be up to the task at hand. '^^  
During the interregnum Clinton flirther demonstrated his commitment to 
developing economic poUcy that reflected the needs of the economy through the 
economic summit held in Little Rock. However, questions have been raised about 
the real intentions behind the December 15 meeting given that no representatives 
form either house of Congress were present. The budget proposal is the property 
of the new administration, however, they are reliant upon congressional support 
for its passage. Corporate representatives at the conference were won over by the 
President-elect's knowledge and understanding of the complexities of financial 
and economic policy, but remained unclear about the substance of Clinton's 
proposals to reduce the deficit and provide a boost to the economy through 
infrastructure investment.^ *" 
Fuerbrubger, Jonathan. "Credit Markets; Reports of Clinton Nominees Ease Fears of Bond 
Traders." New York Times. 8/12/92 p. Dl 
Greenhouse, Steven. "The Transition: Executives'Early Reaction to CUnton: Not too Bad, 
For a Democrat." New York Times. 8/12/92 p. A27 
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Early Congressional neglect would give way to fi"enetic lobbying activity 
following the armouncement of Clinton's economic plan. In recognition of the 
immense task ahead of them, the administration used every possible tactic to push 
through both the investment and the deficit reduction aspects of their programme. 
FoUowing initial doubts and uncertainty about the White House's abiUty to work 
as an advocate for its poUcies, a strategy akin to President Johnson's personaUsed 
approach to working with legislators emerged as President Clinton sought out 
both Democrats and Republicans and campaigned for his policies. The aloof 
impressions of the interregnum gave way to an administration that was immersed 
in the day to day poUtics of persuasion, bargaining and courting. Moreover, the 
internal management of the White House appeared more settled as the 'outsiders' 
found their feet. Initial assessments of Clinton's chief of staff were dismissed as 
McLarty proved himself to be a sound manager of ideas and people in an 
environment that often resisted such management. In seeking to compare his 
role to that which existed under Presidents Nixon, Reagan and Bush is to ignore 
the simple fact that President Clinton's personal leadership style would not permit 
the presence of a gatekeeper or 'no' man. 
The difficulties experienced in selUng the stimulus plan were the resuh of 
an improving economy, which did not appear to need stimulating, 'investments' 
targeted at non jobs related programmes, and a strong impulse to emphasise 
deficit reduction as the long term policy vision. Embarking upon a short-term 
stimulus package would not, in the opinion of some economists, have a significant 
Berke, Richard L. "Looking for Alliance, Clinton Courts Congress Nonstop." New York 
Times. 8/3/93 p. Al 
'^ ^ Fill, Gwen. "Washington at Work; Clinton Chief of Staff Lives Up to Name." New York 
Times.'19/3/93 p. Al 9 
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effect upon America's long term economic fortunes. The economic indicators 
which showed the economy was taking an upturn in the late months of 1992 did 
not herald the end of the recession, but did raise questions about the necessity of a 
stimulus package over more traditional interest rate based mechanisms. 
Clinton's Senate battle conclusively proved that legislators, while eager to 
provide the President with a legislative success, were not wilUng to endorse 
spending which deviated from the original theme of infrastructure investment and 
job creation. The loss of the fiill stimulus package was ameUorated by the passage 
of individual elements at a later date, but the fate of this initiative brought into 
question the ability of Congress and congressional Democrats in particular to 
work with the White House on their economic policy proposal. 
The strength of Clinton's broader economic plan was demonstrated by the 
passage of the budget. Democrats united more consistently but were weakened 
over the energy tax element of the budget. The failure of Congress to support the 
energy tax on fuel consumption demonstrated the continued strength of industry 
and agriculture in committee politics. For the administration, however, it 
represented the first defeat of the Vice-President's agenda to link environmental 
and economic concerns in policy. In the final instance, the ignominy of Vice-
President Gore's casting vote in the Senate seriously embarrassed the new 
administration in its first serious legislative test. However, the passage of the 
budget with its deficit reduction measures in place did deliver the new 
admitiistration a symboUc victory and put in place the foundations for seven years 
of successful economic management and deficit reduction. 
Woodward, Bob. The Agenda p. 68 
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The combination of White House and cabinet staff and policy orientation 
aUowed the new administration to pursue its mandate for economic change. The 
mixture of Washington experience and business savvy aUowed President Clinton 
to sell his budget to Congress and the business community. Clinton's initial 
impulses about economic appointments, ensuring the "swift and effective 
implementation of our economic plan"'*'* proved decisive in securing the passage 
of the budget with few aherations. The weakness in the economic transition was 
the consuhation and work undertaken in the interregnum, where the President-
elect could have made more opportunities for working with Congress. However, 
the economic policy team, following the appointment of Bentsen, Panetta, Rivlin 
and Altman, adapted rapidly to the demands of being the administration rather 
than the administration in waiting. 
Constructing Major Policy Reform 
Every President wants to place his mark on the institution, to go down in 
history for a great achievement. For Bill CUnton, this opportunity presented itself 
in the form of health care reform. A highly publicised initiative that promised to 
solve the problems of ever increasing costs - to the individual and to the country 
- and the unacceptable numbers of Americans unable to afford health care. The 
question facing the administration was whether or not it could inject a sense of 
social responsibility into an industry dominated by private hospitals, 
pharmaceutical muhi-nationals, large insurance companies and wealthy doctors 
Rosenbaum, David E. "The Transition: An Eye Toward Wall Street and Capitol Hill; 
Promises before Policies." New York Times. 11/12/92 p. Al 
201 
and convince the protected majority of the necessity of reform. Without the 
consent of the stakeholders and the support of the electorate there would be no 
reform of health care provision. 
In an attempt to move quickly on the development of his health care 
reform plan Clinton utilised a number of different aspects of the election campaign 
and transition. The campaign proved an essential testing ground of policy 
options. Politicians at the state and national level were talking about the 
possibility of health care reform and putting forward policy options. For example, 
Harris Wofford in Pennsylvania's special Senate election in 1991 made health care 
reform central to his platform and won. The political capital to be gained from 
such reforms filtered through Congress and witnessed the proliferation of 
legislative proposals which sought to tinker with the current system of 
provision.'*^ The 1992 presidential election also attracted contenders who were 
wilUng to place health care on their agenda. Their attachment to the various 
reform options available determined their levels of success and, in watching the 
debate play out in electoral and congressional terms. Bill Clinton was able to 
settle upon the reform option which offered the path of least resistance. 
As an early proponent of reform. Bill Clinton utilised his connections with 
the DLC and PPI to provide the underlying policy framework for his proposed 
reforms. Providing a synthesis of pubUc and private provision which protected 
the individual, maintained the position of business actors in the health care sector, 
but required them to conform to government regulation, was the aim of the 
Clinton plan; managed competition became the 'buzz word' for health care 
185 Skocpol (1996) p. 29-31 
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reform. For much of the Clinton campaign and during the early stages of the 
transition, the Clinton proposals were strongly thematic. By avoiding specifics in 
the early stages, the administration believed that it would be able to avoid 
premature conflicts with the electorate, organised interests and Congress. 
Once elected, delivering on the campaign promise was to become the 
largest obstacle of Clinton's first term in office. Planning for the development of 
the reform poUcy during the transition competed with the appointments process 
and economic poUcy for concentrated attention. Between November 1992 and 
January 1993, Ira Magaziner developed the background for the policy proposal. 
It necessitated taking Clinton's broad themes and the policy research from the PPI 
and creating a detaUed and strongly defined agenda from which to create a 
legislative proposal which took account of the economic, social and political 
realities facing the administration. In order to allow the president to concentrate 
his efforts on economic poUcy - which was the key to enabUng heahh care reform 
- he deputised HiUary Clinton to lead the Task Force which would organise itself 
from Magaziner's poUcy outline. 
The announcement of the formation of the Task Force foUowed the media 
firestorm over ending the ban on homosexuals serving in the military. This, in 
addition to the administration's problems with the nomination of Zoe Baird, did 
not provide a suitable platform for the announcement of the President's headlining 
policy initiative. The specifics of the policy initiative were still sparse and 
formation of the Task Force did not provide any clearer picture of BiU CUnton's 
intentions for heahh care reform. However, the administration promised that its 
health care reform proposal would be available in May 1993 - meeting the 
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informal transition deadline of the first 100 days. 
Much of the critique of the health care issue has been focused on the Task 
Force; Hillary Clinton's involvement, its secrecy, its legaUty, its size and the final 
document it produced. For many observers of the process it appeared that the 
White House was acting outside the institutions of government and beyond the 
powers of the executive branch, hence the legal action taken against Hillary 
Chnton and Ira Magaziner. Walden'** beUeves that much of the controversy of 
the Task Force could have been avoided i f the Clinton had had a stronger sense of 
the law under which they were acting. Uncertainty over who was employed to do 
what and by whom resuhed in confusion over the role of the Task Force and the 
working groups. Furthermore, greater openness would have encouraged 
inclusion and consultation rather than impressions of exclusivity and secrecy. 
The litigation that ensued played out in its fijUest form for considerably 
longer than the Task Force existed. The majority of the Task Force's deliberation 
took place between January and May 1993, but legal action continued into 1994. 
Central to this action was the ethical behaviour of members of the working 
groups. Given President Clinton's personal assurances of higher ethical standards 
in his administration, he provided opponents and critics alike with an irresistible 
opportunity to discredit him eariy in his term of office. 
Issues of legality and ethics may not have been pursued had the structures 
and strategies used by the administration been more familiar. Central to this was 
Mrs. CHnton's involvement in the whole deliberation process. The power and 
influence exercised by First Ladies is well recognised, however, the explicit nature 
Walden,op. cit., p. 103 
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of Hillary Clinton's influence and her involvement in the administration's policy 
centrepiece troubled many political observers. Unelected and unaccountable, 
Mrs. Clinton's role appeared to go against much of the foundation of American 
politics. The complexity of the relationship between the Task Force and the 
working groups and their remit in relation to the formulation of heahh care reform 
policy did not rest comfortably with perceptions of how the White House should 
operate in its poUcy-making structures. 
Beyond the semantics of the legal debate, the substance of heahh care 
reform policy was also destined for a turbulent time in the corridors of power in 
Washington. Levels of public support for Clinton's thematic approach to heahh 
care reform were high during the campaign and into the transition. Over time, 
support was eroded by a combination of effective negative pubUcity, doubts about 
the ability of the administration to deliver on its promises, the specifics of the 
poUcy and the necessity of the reforms. Between April 1993 and July 1994 the 
percentage of the American public who believed that the system of heaUh care 
provision should be completely rebuik fell from 55% to 37%. General support for 
the Clinton plan feU from 59% to 40% over the same time period (see figure 2).'*^ 
Even before the decisive congressional action m 1994, the administration was 
losing the battle for public opinion, and this being the case, it should have come as 
little surprise that the legislation would have to be abandoned. 
The question has to be asked whether there was an opportunity for health 
care reform in 1993? Was the fate of this initiative sealed by the means used to 
bring about the reform, or was the reform impossible regardless of the actions of 
Brodie & Blendon, op. cit., p. 406 
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the Clinton administration? Clinton's approach was flawed in the sense that it 
alienated many of the stakeholder groups who were essential at the consultation 
and implementation stages of any reform agenda. The publicity surrounding the 
Task Force and Hillary Clinton's involvement in the decision making process did 
little to put a positive spin on the intentions of the President, and persistent delays 
in the announcement of the plan portrayed the new administration as disorganised 
and indecisive. 
The other major cause of delays was the budget. No finaUsed plan could 
be announced until the administration was sure of deficit reduction measures and 
the federal fiands available to fund prospective reforms. The announcement of the 
Health Security Act had to wait until after the passage of the budget. Meeting 
this institutional imperative was vital and, in recognition of this, Clinton should 
have initially aimed for a poUcy announcement in the late summer of 1993. 
However, in seeking to meet the unattainable deadline of the first 100 days 
Clinton fell into the institutional trap bequeathed by FDR. 
Health care reform through flindamental poUcy upheaval was never going 
to be possible. Without the notion of a crisis, too many individuals and groups 
involved in the consumption and provision of health care had too much to lose. 
In selecting this reform for his legislative agenda in 1993, Clinton failed to 
recognise that not all popular campaign promises are suitable policy priorities. 
The tenacity with which Clinton pursued health care reform despite pubUc and 
institutional criticism provides another example of post-election hubris in a new 
administration. 
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Resurrecting Old Policy Ideas 
The beauty of Clinton's national service initiative was that it embraced 
more than just community based service. As a early policy priority it illustrated 
the Clinton administration's intentions to find different solutions to poUcy 
problems. Throughout his campaign he emphasised his awareness of the plight of 
the 'forgotten middle classes'. Heahh care reform was one poUcy area which was 
increasingly affecting their quality of life, another was the rising cost of higher 
education. In seeking to maintain the ability of the middle class to afford coUege 
level education, Clinton Unked the necessity for educational grants to service in 
the community. Very much inspired by the ethos and motivation behind President 
Kennedy's Peace Corps, CUnton sold domestic national service to the American 
people as a way to help needy communities and to prevent students from 
dropping out of college. 
For a number of years Americans had been advocating community service 
and volunteerism as a solution to many of their social problems. For Republican 
politicians, volunteerism and community service were usefiil approaches to 
providing for community needs without cost to either local or federal 
governments. At the local level, programmes designed for specific ends had been 
working to rejuvenate inner city communities. Historically, federal approaches to 
community service were fragmented and disjointed as a result of the Great Society 
policies in the 1960s. There was little sense of an overarching national service 
plan until CUnton's proposal in the 1992 election. Beyond the worid of poUtics, 
the benefits of the link between service and educational grants had been extoUed 
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for approximately a decade. The DLC which constantly sought to bring together 
innovative social ideas with feasible poHcies became a consistent advocate of a 
more national version of community service. 
The establishment of national service as a policy priority for the CUnton 
administration took place during the interregnum. The establishment of the White 
House Office of National Service provided the underlying framework for the 
development of the policy proposal. Its task was to unpack Charies Moskos's 
and the DLC's idea into a legislative proposal which could be put to Congress in 
the first months of the administration. Unlike Clinton's other early initiatives, it 
was not controversial and not complex in congressional terms. As an example of 
policy development, it had all the appearances of a perfect policy option for the 
new administration. 
Intrinsic problems with the development of the national service initiative 
related to the structure of the White House Office of National Service. While 
Clinton and the transition team concentrated their attention on staffing the 
important cabinet posts, senior economic and defence positions in the White 
House, and ensuring commitment to the EGG criteria, the small lower profile 
White House office would become the depository for younger, less experienced 
White House staff fresh from the campaign. Moreover, Clinton's own focus on 
economic policy would require that the management of the Office of National 
Service would have to be deputised. Clinton's choice of EU J. Segal revealed a 
management strategy which would become common in the Clinton transition. 
Positions in government that were connected to poUcy areas to which 
CUnton was deeply committed, but feU outside the central focus of economic 
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policy, were placed in the hands of his closest and most trusted friends. These 
appointments posed the greatest dichotomy in his White House. His most trusted 
friends were given a great deal of autonomy in developing policies of which they 
had little understanding coupled with limited knowledge of the operating structure 
of Washington. This managerial strategy reflected Clinton's previous political 
experiences as Governor, where is was possible to rely on a very personalised 
staff - hence his desire to work with McLarty, Segal, Mrs. Clinton, etc. 
Problems associated with the development of national service policy were 
allied with the appointments made and the pressures of the legislative agenda. 
The policy's announcement following Clinton's budget and stimulus package 
necessarily meant that it was competing with a major legislative action for 
publicity and congressional consideration. Despite the potentially universal appeal 
of the policy, it came up against stiff opposition from legislators in both houses. 
Several policy proposals relating to a form of domestic national service had been 
put before Congress in previous terms. Proponents of these policies continued to 
maintain an attachment to the proposals and were often reluctant to support the 
new proposal from the Clinton administration. 
In seeking to adapt a policy idea tackled previously in past Congresses 
Clinton had not only to make his proposal more attractive to legislators who had 
not supported earlier incarnations of national service but also compromise on the 
details of the policy to ensure the support of previous sponsors. These 
compromises manifested themselves in the form of numbers of volunteers and the 
value of the post service award. Both were affected by the spending limits 
imposed by the budget deficit. 
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Linking the problem of deficit reduction and increased federal government 
spending provided the dilemma for both policy makers and legislators. Providing 
volunteers with post service awards and administrating the programme had the 
potential to conflict with Clinton's long term economic plan. It was only through 
reducing the cost associated with each volunteer, and by consolidating the 
administration of existing service programmes such as VISTA and ACTION with 
the new programme - Americorps - that the administration was able to reduce 
costs, thereby convincing Congressmen that the programme would not resuh in 
the spending of large amounts of federal money. 
As a legislative strategy, the announcement of this policy just weeks after 
the beginning of the budget battle demonstrated a lack of awareness of the 
operational limits of Congress. In managerial terms, the OflSce of National 
Service was weakened by its sparse links to the Washington establishment. 
President Clinton may have had confidence in the ability of Segal to direct the 
development of a policy option but his outsider status did little to help the 
development of relationships and contacts to overcome the battles it faced in 
Congress. 
Transition Success Factor Three: Setting the Legislative Agenda 
Clinton's overall legislative agenda was very ambitious, too ambitious for 
Congress. It was impossible to define his presidency by it successes because these 
successes were always camouflaged beneath more media attractive occurrences. 
Part of the key to managing legislative agendas is the ability of Presidents to 
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promote the issues they want promoted rather than the issues which seem to want 
to promote themselves. Clinton's performance improved with the appointment of 
David Gergen to the White House communications office, but early impressions 
of drift and inconsistency remained with the administration. In terms of Brauer's 
third factor for presidential success, setting the legislative agenda, the Clinton 
administration made attempts at putting forward a clear policy message, but were 
unable to prevent peripheral policy issues from distracting their attention from the 
central task of economic policy. 
Understanding Personal Strengths and Weaknesses 
It is recognised that Bill Clinton came to the Presidency in 1992 v^th a 
number of personal gifts, not least of which were his analj'tical mind and 
passionate interest in all things related to policy. However, everyone has their 
weaknesses and these also manifested themselves during his first year in office. 
Stressing the interplay of these strengths and weaknesses in an assessments of 
Clinton's presidential performance is vital. The elements of pre-transition 
planning, political appointments and selecting policy priorities clearly reveal the 
strengths and weaknesses of Clinton's leadership style. 
Self-reflection is a difficuh activity and possibly virtually impossible for a 
politician who has just been elected to the most powerfiil office in the world. The 
recognition of weakness in this instance goes against every impulse. For Bill 
Clinton, his major weakness was his personalised approach to management. His 
desire to be immersed in every aspect of his presidency stretched his skills and 
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resources to their limits. As governor, with a handful of staff, and fewer 
responsibilities, this style of leadership defined him as a product of his political 
time and location. However, this management style did not transfer well to the 
White House and the U.S. presidency. This personalised approach translated into 
an ill-defined and non-hierarchical White House structure and, in terms of policy 
development, it produced a broad and ambitious agenda from which it was 
difficult to discern a primary legislative objective. 
The Clinton White House did improve over time, which is as much to do 
with the ability of his appointees as with adjustments to his own style of 
leadership. In seeking to take over the levers of power, which is the purpose of 
the transition, he did not facilitate a smooth transfer. He did not provide other 
actors in the political system with the structures to understand the intentions of 
the new administration and thus did not facilitate their assistance, rather he 
encouraged criticism and opposition. In Arkansas, this would not have been a 
fatal error but in Washington, it delayed his ability to begin governing. 
Clinton's policy priorities in his first year in office reflected not only the 
diversity of his campaign promises but also his vision of the presidential institution 
and how he intended to work within it. Through rhetoric, he sought to emphasise 
his desire to tackle the economic policy and the deficit. In this issue, which 
attracted the most concern during the election, he recognised that this was where 
his mandate with the electorate was the strongest. However, his ability to 
maintain this focus was limited by his desire to enact social policy aimed at the 
margins of society. The lack of policy clarity which faced Congressmen, 
organised interests and political commentators, provided them v^ ath opportunities 
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for criticism and obstruction. 
During the presidential election, the strength which Clinton demonstrated 
above all others was his ability to communicate. In comparison to George Bush, 
who was renowned for his inability to inspire through rhetoric. Bill Clinton was 
able to capture the attention of an audience through a mixture of simple policy 
themes and the demonstration of his awareness of what was important to his 
audience. Once in office, the President's reliance on this personal strength was to 
become one of his most visible weaknesses. The communications strategy of the 
Clinton White House was a sharp departure from the ones adopted by previous 
presidents. The operation of the White House Office of Communications 
alienated the most important and influential media actors in Washington. Rather 
than using the mainstream media channels accessed through the White House 
Press Corps, the Clinton White House 'narrowcasted' directly to the electorate, a 
strategy which had been highly successfiil during the election. 
In by-passing influential journalists Clinton maintained his personal 
popularity v^th the American people, but found himself unable to control the 
substance of reports on the nightly television news. In the age of electronic mass 
communication, when news travels at the rate of seconds and the sound bite 
controls the nature of news reporting, it is essential that the President is able to 
influence the content of news programmes and newspapers through his 
communications strategy. In addition to not controlling the nature of the news 
reported, Clinton alienated the media on a more personal level, "preventing them 
from getting the stories they needed to maintain their prestige."'** The early 
Wilcock, Rita J. "The Compromising Clinton, Images of Failure, Record of Success." in 
Denton, Robert E . Jr. & Rachel L . Holloway. The Clinton Presidency; Images, Issues and 
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months of the Clinton White House witnessed the President continuing the 
presidential campaign as a strategy for promoting his legislative agenda and 
operationalising his presidency. 
Following upheaval in his Office of Communications and the appointment 
of David Gergen as Director of Communications, the attitude and tone of the 
White House towards the media changed substantially. The Press Corps regained 
its primacy in the White House daily agenda and received the type of information 
which they could usefiiUy report. After the passage of his budget in August 1993, 
the President said " I did not realise the importance of communications and the 
overriding importance of what is on the evening television news. I f I am not on, 
or there with a message, someone else is, with their message."'^ ^ 
Transition Success Factor Four: Assessing Strengths & Weaknesses 
There is no doubt that Bill Clinton brought a range of talents to the White 
House in January 1993. His strengths were his ability to work with complex 
policy options and to connect with the American people. His weaknesses, 
however, were a reluctance to play Washington's political game, work with a 
limited number of policy options - in relation to one issue area or multiple issues 
and a highly personalised approach to management. The interaction of these 
factors ensured a rocky start to Clinton's first term in office. As a candidate, his 
strengths made him highly successfijl and his weaknesses were of little importance 
to the campaign. Once elected, however, it was his weaknesses that became the 
Commxinication Strategies, p. 126 
Bill Clinton quoted in Woodward, B. op. cit., p. 368 
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driving force behind his presidency. Clinton failed to reflect upon his early 
problems and mistakes and compensate quickly to avoid repeat performances. 
Conclusion 
Acquiring and maintaining success in presidential transitions requires that 
the presidential candidate and newly elected president embark not only upon a 
process of pro-active preparation, but also of sustained development and 
adaptation of their administrative style. For Bill Clinton the pursuit of success 
was coloured by his political and personal experiences. These can be interpreted 
through Brauer's four factors for transition success to a single theme. Many of 
the problems that Clinton experienced following his election and during the early 
months of his administration resuhed from an inability to communicate a single, 
coherent political message. This theme establishes clear linkages across issue 
areas dicussed in this thesis. 
Firstly, transition planning efforts were hampered by a variety of loosely 
defined objectives. Secondly, important White House organisational decisions 
were displaced and overshadowed by the desire for racial and gender diversity in 
appointments to the EOP. This was compounded by CUnton's personal desire to 
be the centre of all political and policy decisions. Thirdly, an ambitious legislative 
agenda was handicapped by a lack of institutional back up; this should have been 
provided by a strong administrative structure in the early weeks of the new 
administration. The notion of legislative priorities was negated by minor policy 
issues stealing the political spotlight from central policy themes. Finally, Clinton's 
personalised approach to his own presidency allowed him to fall into the many of 
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the traps associated with post election hubris and ideas of political invulnerability. 
These four factors pull together to provide a wider picture of the early 
Clinton administration that is not strongly signposted by individual issues and 
cases. It can be seen that there are clear linkages between president, policy and 
persormel across issue areas in the Clinton transition. The diversity of the 
legislative agenda and the nature of the appointments distinguished the new 
administration from its predecessors and reflected both Bill Clinton as an 
individual and his conception of the institution. The new President stumbled in his 
attempt to take over the levers of power by his attempts to extend the presidency 
into unfamiliar territory and impossible political situations. 
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Figure 1. 
Sequence of Presidential Appointments by Carter, Reagan and Clinton. 190 
Carter 
I r Week: 
2°"^  Week: 
3"* Week: 
4* Week: 
5* Week: 
6* Week: 
7* Week: 
8* Week: 
9* Week: 
10*^  Week: 
11* Week: 
Reagan 
Week: 
2"'' Week: 
3"* Week: 
4* Week: 
5* Week: 
6* Week: 
7* Week: 
8*^  Week: 
9* Week: 
10* Week: 
ll*Week: 
Clinton 
r'Week: 
2"^ Week: 
3'"* Week: 
4* Week: 
5* Week: 
6* Week: 
17* Week: 
18* Week: 
19* Week: 
10* Week: 
11* Week: 
None 
Press Secretary 
None 
None 
Secretary of State, Director of OMB 
Secretaries of Treasury, Transportation 
Secretaries of Interior, Commerce, Agriculture, Defense, Labor, HUD, and 
Attorney General, head of NSA, Ambassador to UN, Chairman of CEA 
Secretaries of Health, Education and Welfare and Energy and Director of 
CIA 
None 
None 
Congressional Liaison, Coimsel, Domestic Policy 
None 
Chief of Staff, Counsel 
None 
None 
None 
Secretaries of Commerce, Treasury, transportation, HHS, Defense, State, 
Labor, and Attorney General, Director of the OMB, and Director of CIA 
Congressional Liaison, Domestic Policy, Secretaries of Interior, Energy, HUD, 
and Agriculture, Head of NSA, and Ambassador to UN 
None 
Press Secretary 
Secretary of Education 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
Chief of Staff, Secretaries of Treasury, Labor, HHS, and Commerce, Director of 
OMB and Chairman of C E A 
Secretaries of HUD, Veterans Affairs, Education, Energy, defense and State, 
Director of CIA, Ambassador to UN, and Head of NSA 
Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, and Transportation, and Attorney general 
(later withdrawn) 
None 
None 
Congressional Liaison, Press Secretary, Domestic Policy, Coimsel. 
190 Adapted from Jones, Charles O .(1998) p. 94-5 
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Figure 2. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
219 
In considering the performance of the Clinton transition, it is evident that 
there are several elements which can be thought of as crucial: the effectiveness of his 
planning organisations, his leadership style, his appointments, and his legislative 
priorities. Assessments of these various elements of his transition have been mixed'^' 
and it could be said that in many ways the Clinton transition avoids classification 
under existing theories. Charles O. Jones in Passages to the Presidency contends that 
in the Clinton transition we are seeing something new, that it represents a "watershed 
case"'^ and that transitions are now developing into something different which 
cannot be assessed under the old criteria. However, there is little about the Clinton 
transition that sets it apart from its predecessors and why it should, therefore, elude 
classification or assessment under the traditional measures. More than anything else, 
the Clinton transition represents the pressures of government and politics in the 
1990s: globalisation, changing socio-economic requirements and rapid developments 
in information and communication technology. 
In terms of the traditional measures, Bill Clinton made mistakes consistent 
with his predecessors, despite Brauer's caution that newcomers to the presidency 
should learn from the mistakes of those who have gone before them.^ ^^ Keen to 
undertake preparation for his presidency, transition planning was in place prior to the 
election, but not capitalised upon during the interregnum. This would categorise Bill 
Clintons's performance as either a partial success or a partial failure depending on the 
perspective. In organising his White House, Clinton made judgments about his own 
See Pfifftier (1996), CamfHodl & Rockman, Bond & Fleisher 
Jones, Charles O. Passages to the Presidency: From Campaigning to Governing, p. 3 
''^ Brauer, op. cit., p. 259 
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requirements rather than the needs of other Washington communities with whom he 
would have to work. This proved to be an early failure, but, after a few months 
restructuring brought about an improvement in relations between institutions and 
actors, after which a more favourable assessment can be made of the White House's 
performance. This adaptation to political conditions is part of the transition process 
and the fact that the President did react to the situation is an indication that he was 
aware of the problems and willing to embark upon change. 
In seeking to compensate for the years of domestic policy neglect of 
Republican Presidents, the Clinton legislative agenda was highly ambitious. The 
administration's ability to sell this agenda was limited by its own inconsistencies and 
appetite for policy. These limitations were additionally impacted upon by the 
structure of the White House and the administration's relationship Avith the media. 
The failure of the early Clinton policy agenda is the most obvious weakness in his 
transition. In wanting to achieve so much from his presidency. Bill Clinton and his 
administration were unable to prioritise and positively publicise the major poHcy 
initiatives. However, this is not to say that the administration was unsuccessfiil in 
legislative terms. In his first year, Clinton received in excess of 80% success rates on 
conflictual votes in Congress, placing him only slightly below Presidents Eisenhower 
and Johnson and ahead of Kermedy and Carter. Negative assessments of Clinton's 
legislative performance are focused on specifics and driven by the poor performance 
' Bond & Fleisher, op. cit., p. 362 
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of health care reforms and the debacle of gays in the military, rather than the 
performance of the administration in all legislative areas. 
The relative success of the National Service initiative and the battle for the 
budget demonstrate the new administration's capacity for policy innovation and 
legislative bargaining. The importance of these early policies was to provide 
President Clinton with terms of reference for his remaining priorities for his first year 
in office. Moreover, they represented learning opportunities for future policy and 
administrative goals. Despite problems of people and ideas, in the case of National 
Service, and of changing economic climates, for the stimulus package and the budget, 
the new administration turned its legislative fortunes around to bring about concrete 
policy achievements despite an less than co-operative Congress. 
However, the impact of these policies upon the fiiture of health care reform is 
clear. Clinton's style of policy deliberation and formulation which was disconnected 
from other transition activities had worked for National Service and continued with 
the Health Care Task Force. Delays in dealing with the budget and economic policy 
initiatives moved the legislative window opportunity for health care reform further 
into the first year. These delays made it less easy to view the legislative proposal as 
work in progress and open to change and adaptation. By September 1993 heahh care 
reform was overdue, and possibly over worked, but President Clinton was committed 
to its passage and compelled to fialfiU his campaign promise. 
The experiences of health care reform during the Clinton transition directly 
influenced how the policy was received by Congress and perceived by the public and 
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the Washington community. Clinton's approach to his transition compounded the 
potential policy problems that would have faced the legisalation regardless of when it 
received consideration. 
The problems that Bill Clinton encountered with his political appointments 
and policy priorities during the transition in 1993 overshadowed his personal 
strengths and exaggerated his weaknesses. It has been contended that Clinton's 
greatest strength, his intellect, was his greatest weakness, and i f he believed that as a 
student of the presidency and a student of policy, he had 'the bases covered', he 
would be seriously mistaken.There appears to be some credence in this theory. 
Bill Clinton's previous political experiences moulded his conceptualisation of the 
presidency as an institution and drove his organisational impulses. As Governor of 
Arkansas, he was most comfortable working with close fiiends and being in control 
of all aspects of an administration and these were the principles upon which his White 
House was based. Initially, he was unable to recognise that the White House 
required more structure because he and the White House would be the focus of 
attention in American politics and what worked in a small southern state could not be 
transferred directly to Washington D.C.. This personalised approach to government 
would never disappear, but it would become more structured with the appointment of 
advisors more familiar with the workings of Washington and the political education 
of the Washington newcomers working within the White House. 
''^ Pfifiher, op. cit, p. 180 
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In terms of Brauer's four factors for transition success, it appears that Bill 
Clinton's performance was very mixed. In comparison with Reagan's transition, it 
was shambolic; in comparison with Carter's, it adapted more quickly to the 
administrative and organisational circumstances which confronted the administration. 
Brauer's observations about presidential transitions usefijlly highlight the central 
problems of the Clinton transition and can be applied in order to make assessments of 
success or failure. I f the transition is about preparing for governing and achieving 
goals then the record of the Clinton administration is again mixed. In 1993 the policy 
goals, which the administration explicitly set itself were successfiil in the resolution of 
the budget and the lifting of abortion restrictions. There were qualified successes in 
the passage of the National Service Trust Act, elements of the stimulus package and 
to a lesser extent the repeal of the ban on homosexuals in the military. The most 
disastrous part of the Clinton transition was the failure of health care reform, not just 
in policy terms but also in terms of the perceptions of the motivations and actions of 
the Clinton administration. Until the impeachment crisis in 1998 and 1999, the failure 
of health care reform threatened to be the mark which Bill Clinton left on the 
American presidency. 
The question arises whether health care reform can be viewed as the defining 
element of the Clinton transition or of the Clinton first term? Whether the failure of 
health care reform was more symptomatic of the transition process than of the policy 
process in general? There can be little doubt that any comprehensive attempt to 
reform the United States' curtent system of health care provision would face a 
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number of social and political challenges and that success would be elusive. The 
timing of the presentation of reform legislation places health care reform as an issue 
in the very latter stages of the Clinton transition. However, the structural and 
intellectual processes which lead to this legislative announcement were situated in the 
very heart of the transition process. The formation of the Task Force and its 
relationship to the rest of the administration reflect Bill Clinton's legislative and 
managerial ambitions in the early stages of his presidency. The lessons learned, in 
particular from the battle for his economic policy agenda, came too late to influence 
the fiindamental decisions effecting health care reform. By September 1993 any 
dramatic changes to the target of comprehensive health care reform became 
impossible to justify as the new administration had spent so long preparing for the 
legislation. Furthermore, it was never Bill Clinton's intention to just tinker with the 
existing system, he had promised comprehensive reform. Despite the example of the 
National Service legislation which provided a simple, coherent and incremental 
solution to a campaign promise, the Health Security Act would remain a large, 
diverse and all encompassing attempt to solve existing problems. 
Central to the outcome of the health care reform proposal was the influence 
of Hillary Clinton. Her 'old' Democrat ideals, shaped by the comprehensive welfare 
policies of the New Deal and the Great Society, directly influenced the Task Force's 
approach to policy deliberation. Her experiences with education reform in Arkansas 
steeled her for the challenges of reforming a large and powerful industry, but did not 
provide her with adequate preparation for the task ahead. Washington's, and the 
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nation's, experience of Mrs Clinton, the Task Force and health care reform damaged 
perceptions of the Clinton White House. Many questioned the desirability of such 
overt mfluence by a spouse who was both unelected and unaccountable to the 
American people. The ultimate failure of health care reform was believed to be a 
vindication of these fears. 
The weakest areas of performance of the Clinton transition reveal additional 
interesting aspects to presidential transitions. The problems associated with the 
passage of health care reform and support for repealing the ban on homosexuals in 
the miUtary are linked on one level by the opposition of powerfial organised interests 
and low levels of public support. However, there is a more important legalistic link. 
In both cases President Clinton embarked upon an innovative strategy for solving 
social problems with little awareness of the legal mechanisms that he was seeking to 
employ. The Task Force's responsibilities and relationships to the administration 
tested the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act in the very public worid 
of the courtroom. Legal questions about its powers and responsibilities were only 
resolved after it was disbanded. More importantly in presidential terms, the scope of 
executive powers was tested with the President's use of the Executive Order in an 
inappropriate case. The final outcome of the homosexuals in the military case should 
caution Presidents to look carefijUy to history when seeking to use extra 
constitutional mechanisms. Activist Presidents who wish to extend the use of 
executive powers into new policy areas, should ensure that the legal ground upon 
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which they are proceeding is solid. The loss of good policy is one pitfall should they 
be unsuccessfiil, but more fatal is the diminution of presidential power and prestige. 
The experience of the Clinton transition can be seen to add to the diverse 
experiences of previous Presidents. The extent to which the Clinton transition can be 
seen as a watershed is severely limited by the absence of a direct comparison. John 
Kennedy came to the presidency at the dawn of a new television age and his 
transition could have been classified as a watershed, however, subsequent analysis 
proves that it was the natural development of presidential transitions in response to 
changing technological circumstances. Brauer cautions students of the presidency 
that "the importance of transitions should not be exaggerated",^^ and in the case of 
Bill Clinton this is sound advice. The transition established the foundations of his 
presidency, but they were not set hard in concrete. Despite the mistakes and 
omissions, Clinton was able to recover. Following the 1994 congressional mid-term 
losses it appeared unlikely that Clinton would be re-elected in 1996. But the 
combination of a sound economy and a weak opponent returned Clinton to the White 
House as the only second term Democrat President since Franklin Roosevelt. 
The Clinton transition reveals much to the observer about the influence of this 
formative period upon the development of an individual's presidency. Assessments 
of aspects of Clinton's transition such as appointments, policy priorities and the 
relationship with the media have branded it an unqualified failure. However, it is 
clear that such an assessment is based upon aspects of the transition taken in abstract. 
196 Brauer, op. cit., p. 268 
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It would be impossible to contend that the Clinton transition was successful overall, 
but the new administration showed both the willingness and the ability to learn from 
its mistakes and to adapt to the demands of leadership over time. In considering the 
broad range of transition activities, this study has shown that President Clinton was 
able to capitalise upon the strength of his appointments, especially in the sphere of 
economic policy, achieve broad legislative success unmatched in recent majority party 
presidencies and embark upon major changes in his White House to reflect the 
lessons learned. 
In seeking to determine the relationship between the Clinton transition and the 
Clinton presidency, Brauer's observations revealed an intricate web of influences 
working together to produce a transition which did not adequately prepare Bill 
Clinton for the task of governing. In considering President Clinton's early policy 
priorities, it was revealed that a previously overlooked aspect of presidential study 
was significant in the development of Bill Clinton's presidency. His use of Executive 
Orders was illustrative of the diflBculties faced by newly elected presidents in making 
use of the fiiU extent of their executive powers. In seeking to utilise a powerful 
policy-making tool the President was forced to recognise that the scope of this 
executive power is not boundless and that its use is limited by historical precedent 
and the recognition of a policy crisis. Executive Orders are a neglected area of 
presidential study but this study suggests they offer a new dimension to assessments 
of presidential transitions. 
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